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# INDIAN THEISM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MORAL ACTS

JAY R. MCCULLOUGH

GENERALLY SPEAKING, ethics as an independent (that is, separate and differentiated) subject for speculation does not occur in the Indian metaphysical tradition. Practical morality, or harmony with the Truth (*ṛita, dharma*) which orders the turn of the phenomenal or saṁsāric wheel, is looked upon as a preliminary, although in itself insufficient, means rather than as an end, and is valued as a cleansing or prophylactic agent incident to and within the integrative process which, in its culmination, dissolves the moral need in a higher synthesis.[1] Morality, even that which may be considered as of the highest or sattvic nature, still is conditioned by saṁsāric limitations and the functions of finite mental and volitional processes, and as such cannot lead to nor be the basis or ground of that true and integral spiritual life which transcends it.[2] Morality is not to be divorced from karma [3] and as such carries with it its own natural fruits, either as a relatively greater tranquility (*prasāda*) or an increased turbidity, thus differing from the "intimate connection between goodness and Godness" basic to the Christian concept of sin as a revolt against God, who punishes the *wrongdoer,* the defiant

1. Cf. P. N. Śrīnivāsāchāri, *The Philosophy of Viśishṭādvaita* (Adyar, 1943), pp. 179 f.; S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (London, 1940), p. 103; S. Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life* (London, 1949), p. 77; R. Otto, *Mysticism East and West* (New York, 1932), p. 207; A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford, 1933), p. 15; E. W. Hopkins, *Ethics of India* (New Haven, 1924), p. 183; R. D. Rānade, *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy* (Poona, 1926), pp. 288, 315, 329; S. K. De, *The Vaishṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal* (Calcutta, 1942), pp. 412 ff.; A. Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy* (New York, 1945), p. 251; Śivānanda, *All About Hinduism* (Rishikeś, 1947), p. 197; *Kaṭha* 2.22,24; Īśa 9; *Muṇḍa* 1.2.12; 3.1.5; 3.2.4.

2. F. Edgerton, *The Bhagavadgītā, Translation and Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1944), II, 81; Śrī Aurobindo, *Letters of Śrī Aurobindo* (Bombay, 1947-1951), I, 91; II, 57. Cf. *Gītā* 18. 51 ff.

3. Cf. A. W. Ryder, *The Bhagavadgītā* (Chicago, 1930), p. x: "Work well done not only does not bring salvation, it has no tendency to bring salvation; yet salvation is impossible without it. Its value is great, but negative. It is a condition *necessary,* but not sufficient. It is important because it is un-important. What wise man permits the un-important to block salvation?"

creature who therefore is odious in His sight.[4] Viśishṭādvaita, as an example of Indian "theism," recognizes no permanence of sin (or to be more exact, of the evilness or ignorance) and therefore "no sinner as such . . . [for] sin destroys itself by contacting divine love." [5] It is this divine love which is said to be integral with and identical to man's True Self and is not to be conceived, here, as a power poured upon man from an ontologically separate "other." The use of the word "sin" in connection with the problem of moral values as it may occur in Indian theism makes necessary some brief survey of the subject of sin and evil and the varied meanings which properly may be attached to these translated terms.

Vedic "sin," as a transgression against *ṛita* or spiritual Truth, has physical and moral overtones but also has a ritualistic nature and, for the most part, is said to be concerned with the god Varuṇa. Rodhe finds no evidence here of a guilt feeling or a sense of sin, and therefore no need for personal repentance—for it clearly must be understood that there are no exact distinctions between "sin" and other evils, and the human will is not connected intimately with these evils.[6]

In the Vedas sin, as such, is best characterized as a pollution or stain, an evil encountered in the world, and one which may be wiped off or cleared away.[7] Hopkins concurs in this view and says that sin is "an encompassing environment like an egg-shell round a bird unhatched. It leads to something being deformed . . ." [8] It is this cleansing view, this "wiping off" of the stain of turbidity preventing the full realization of spiritual power,[9] which forms the basic metaphysical analogy of *prasāda,* not only as the grace of the true Self as Divine Personality, but more specifically as the clarity, tranquillity,

4. See E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India* (Boston, 1895), pp. 554 f.

5. Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.*, p. 599.

6. Sten Rodhe, *Deliver Us From Evil* (Lund, 1946), pp. 135 f., 144, 146 ff., 160 ff. Cf. Hopkins, *Ethics of Indi,* p. 44; S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (London, 1948), I, 108 f. ". . . the *Upanishads,*" says Rodhe (p. 170), "do not speak of deliverance from sin, but of deliverance from 'all opposite pairs,' such as good and evil works, birth and death."

7. Rodhe, *op. cit.*, pp. 150, 153, 160. In AV 7.65.2 the evil deed (*dushkṛita* is called *śamala* or stain that can be wiped off. AV 12.2. calls it *ripra,* uncleanness. Cf. AV 6.113 where the verb for wiping off this stain is *apamṛijate.*

8. Hopkins, *Ethics of India,* pp. 46 ff.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

and calm which lead to that "clarity of awareness" constituting the integral freedom of spiritual experience.[10]

This view of sin as a temporary stain, an obstruction or a hindrance which blocks the normal and clear perfection of awareness, is distorted analogically in the Christian view of sin as "a stain . . . by which the soul is disfigured and rendered odious in God's sight . . . a disfigurement and degradation of God's image." In the supernatural order this sin-stain "not only covers its [the soul's] countenance with filth, but eats into it like a corroding poison, and thoroughly disfigures and devastates it by altering its state," thus not only beclouding the divine beauty which is the soul's in a state of grace and supernatural justice, but permanently annihilating and completely extinguishing it by an act of "moral suicide." [11] This permanent defect may be removed, according to this view, only through that opposite power which also is considered as permanent, that is, sanctifying grace and the grace of the Christian sacraments.[12]

In the Upanishadic experience the focus of infection, as it were, for all evil was found in that state of separateness and incompleteness with which the Self is identified in the saṁsāric "cycle of existence." [13] More comprehensive than a "mere moral defect," the incompleteness of *saṁsāra* may be viewed as a metaphysical limitation and stricture.[14] This is mirrored analogically in Catholic doctrine, which denies and excludes physical evil as a positive quality inherent in nature and, instead, gives it but relative and negative status dependent upon the positive good for its meaning.[15] The Self's ego (*jīva*)-relation with *saṃsāra,* however, being non-integral from the *jīva* view is not, therefore, an acceptance of *saṁsāra* for what it is, for no more and no less than it is. There thus is precipitated a state of *adharma* which is neither of a moral or theological nature, but one of one-sided dis-

10. See introduction by A. Watts in Frederic Spiegelberg, *Spiritual Practices of India* (San Francisco, 1951), p. xii.

11. M. S. Scheeben, *The Mysteries of Christianity* (St. Louis, 1947), pp. 256 f.; E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (New York, 1936), p. 337.

12. L. P. Everett, *The Nature of Sacramental Grace* (Washington, 1948), p. 56; J. Pohle, *Grace, Actual and Habitual* (St. Louis, 1917), p. 333.

13. Rodhe, *op. cit.*, p. 106. *Saṁsāra* (*sam sarati*), "to flow together." In Rodhe's opinion the advent of saṁsāric concepts in the later Upanishads is conditioned by Buddhist influence. See pp. 116, 137.

14. See Frederic Spiegelberg, *The Religion of No Religion* (Stanford, 1948), p. 6.

15. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 113 ff.

equilibrium or inharmony with the integral "norm," [16] a condition of incomplete or adumbrated awareness which is far from the Western concept of sin as an "agonizing sense of guilt." [17] Thus, from the Indian point of view, "Sin" is more appropriately termed an aberrational ignorance, a denial of the ground of the infinite Self through persistence in complete identification with the finite and its oppositional pairs, rather than a defiance of God or a violation of God's decree.[18] The Viśishṭādvaitic view of *avidyā-karma* as without beginning (*anādi*) admits the inadequacy of any logical and causal series, with its infinite regression, to explain the origin and nature of evil. It accepts the ills of *saṁsāra,* stemming from desire (*kāma*) and aversion (*krodha*), as real, but insists that their removal is more pertinent than any analysis, for the problem of evil is dissolved in the divine vision (*Brahmadṛishṭi*).[19] Śrīnivāsāchāri declares that, in its limited state, the *jīva,* as the "son of man . . . bears the cross of his karma," but as the Son of the Divine this abnormality of self-alienation is destroyed by *dayā* or compassion which replaces the historical sense with consciousness of the eternal.[20]

This karmic "cross" of ignorance or *avidyā* is not to be construed, here, as mechanistic or as a "constraint from outside," [21] for the essence of its operation involves and demands that freedom of choice proper to the *jīva* and in accordance with the will of the inseparable Self.[22] This freedom is not that of an arbitrary and capricious license, but is characterized in its physical, ethical, and spiritual aspects by

16. See René Guénon, *Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines* (London, 1945), p. 212; F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (New York, 1950), p. 387.

17. See Edwyn Bevan, book review, *International Review of Missions,* 19 (July, 1930), 449 f.

18. Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life,* p. 73; Huxley, *op. cit.,* pp. 161, 179, 184; Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.,* p. 305.

19. Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.,* pp. 172, 152, 312; *Gītā* 3.37.

20. Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.,* p. 407. *Nārāyaṇa* is the "Son of Man" (*Maitri* 6, 8; 7.7.), not of man as the ego, but of "primal man or Spirit,"—that is, of the ground which is *Brahman-ātman.* See C. R. Lanman, *A Sanskrit Reader* (Cambridge, 1952), p. 180. The "two-fold" view of "living creation" is stated in *Gītā,* Ch. 16.

21. M. Hiriyanna, *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy* (London, 1951), p. 48.

22. See *Gītā* 18.63. Also Krishna Prem, *The Yoga of the Bhagavadgītā* (New York, 1949), pp. 185 f.; Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life,* p. 75; Hiriyanna, *op. cit.,* pp. 48 f.; Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.,* pp. 150 f. Cf. *Bṛih.* 4.4.5.

that determinism which alone is derived from the Self.[23] The *jīva's* "sense" of freedom, often checked and inhibited in practice, can be but a harmonic response to the absolute freedom of the indwelling Self and its identity with infinite will or grace. Thus the actions of the *jīva* partake of the freedom of the Self's freely assumed limitation, which includes and gives meaning to all karmic possibilities and responsibilities[24]—for the ultimate power (*śakti*) acting as the transcendent-immanent ground for saṁsāric play and the finite movements of karma is that of the integral and all-embracing will, which as grace "fulfils itself" in its finite image "through karma."[25] The highest sattvic or moral act, however, still is bound within the saṁsāric "strands," and it is only when there is a clear awareness of having transcended these limiting factors, of being *triguṇātita,* that the full or integral consciousness of freedom is realized.[26]

The limitations of *saṁsāra* and the sorrows and sufferings experienced by the ego or *jīva* as a separate desire-individual in time have been conceived by religion (as distinct from Indian metaphysic) as an analogical fall of man which was subsequent to creation.[27] The peculiar and unique Christian concept of original sin is an historical analogy far removed from *avidyā* or ignorance, and is entirely foreign to Indian metaphysical principle in general and Viśishṭādvaita in particular.[28] While Hopkins recognizes the Brāhmaṇic rule which says that "there is no sin in a new-born babe," a condition which he cites as persisting until the time of initation, he does dwell upon its apparent contradiction with that which has been interpreted as the

23. Hiriyanna, *op. cit.,* pp. 46 f.; Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.,* pp. 172 ff. Cf. *Manu* 7.205.

24. See T. V. Kapāli Śāstry, *Lights on the Upanishads* (Madras, 1947), pp. 58 f.; Śrī Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gītā* (New York, 1950), pp. 190 f.; Alan Watts, *The Supreme Identity* (New York, 1950), pp. 109, 113, 120 f., 124 f., 127.

25. Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.,* pp. 180, 342. See H. Chaudhurī, *Śrī Aurobindo, The Prophet of Life Divine* (Calcutta, 1951), pp. 41, 119; Guénon, *op. cit.,* p. 214; Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 94; Radhakrishnan, *The Hindu View of Life,* p. 73; *An Idealist View of Life* (London: 1951), p. 294; A. Roy, ed., *The Message of the Gītā as Interpreted by Śrī Aurobindo* (London, 1946), p. 68 n. Cf. *Gītā* 7.11-12; 10.4-5, 34, 36, 38; 15.15; *Kaush.* 3.9.

26. Śrī Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gītā,* pp. 197 f.

27. See Huxley, *op. cit.,* pp. 182 f., 250; Spiegelberg, *The Religion of No Religion,* p. 6.

28. Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.,* pp. 171, 176, 404 f., 538.

Vedic idea of "hereditary" sin.[29] This stain which proceeds from the "semen and the womb" [30] is not to be conceived, however, as apart from the general framework of saṁsāric and karmic obscurations which arise from *prārabdha karma,* that fruit of the sum total of all past actions (*saṁchita*) which, as *avidyā* or ignorance, is responsible for the present bodily incarnation.[31]

Metaphysically, the "non-dual" or advaitic Supreme is qualified symbolically in the cosmic scheme as a quaternity consisting of Īśvara, from whom emerge the three modes of manifestation, preservation, and dissolution. Unlike Christian symbolism, which excludes the necessary dissonance-factor, thus creating a gulf of ultimate dualism between the triune Being and the mutable multiplicity, Indian metaphysic tends to experience the cosmic play as "all of a piece," [32] and consciously recognizes the existence of that which, from the limited ego view, may be called the "brutal fact of the world." There are, therefore, the many "terrible" forms or aspects of cosmic forces, the necessary counterpart to their beneficial aspects. Śiva, true to his name, is auspicious—but also is a disruptive force, from the *jīva* view. "*Brahmā* and *Śiva,*" quotes Hopkins,[33] "create and destroy at the will of *Vishṇu;* they are born of His grace and His anger." [34] The divine power (*Śakti*) is free in its expression of both synthesis and analysis, and the dark and stern aspect of the Great Mother, under such varied names as Durgā, Kālī, Syāmā, Chaṇḍī, and Bairavī, is expressive of the discordant element so necessary for a rich harmony, of the corrective discipline needed to balance maternal love, of the separative motion of nature which is but the obverse side of a unitive motion. The Purānas, the *Mahābhārata,* and the *Rāmāyaṇa,* stress the coincidence of "good and evil," for even the greatest hero or *Avatāra* is

29. Hopkins, *Ethics of India,* p. 110. See R. Ballou, ed., *The Bible of the World* (New York, 1933), pp. 114, 1346; RV 7.86, where Varuṇa is implored to "free us from sins committed by our fathers." Cf. Christian Bible, Exodus 20:5; Numbers 14:18.

30. Cf. *Manu* 2.27.

31. Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.,* p. 173.

32. Cf. C. Jung, *Psychology and Religion* (New Haven, 1946), p. 73.

33. Hopkins, *The Religions of India,* p. 413.

34. Anger, not against the revolting sinner, but anger as the cleansing power of dissolution, the power necessary for the removal of detrital material.

depicted with at least some small trace of saṁsāric weakness, and the most vile demon is capable of a modicum of spiritual awareness.[35]

The ontological dichotomy of Western religion imposes a different set of values and meanings on the problem of sin and appears to exhibit a negative analogy to the Eastern view. Imperfections experienced by the ego, here, are due to an improper relation between it, as the lower, and the supreme authoritative Being as a result of disobedience, of "a debt of guilt contracted with God . . . , a want of right relationship with God" [36] which can make us "objects of divine wrath and abhorrence," [37] of "His hate and anger" until the debt is paid, through his aiding grace, by repentance and "rendering satisfaction." [38]

Upon the "native goodness" which was a primary gift of grace bestowed by the Christian God, according to the Roman Catholic view, there are "super-induced" the deforming ills of sin distorting the image of God, and thus making it false to its creator and to its nature, a situation which engenders a "horror of self which is the inner tragedy of the sinner's life." The Christian horror of the distorted image remains until, "through charity and grace," the image is not only restored but the reflection of God Himself is envisioned.[39] Man's willed, ego-centric self-interest, and not an inherent evilness of nature, thus is in direct opposition to his utter dependence upon the religious Creator,[40] although Protestant Christianity carries with it a more naturalistic and "melancholy 'conviction of sin' . . . , of feeling

35. See J. Dowson, *A Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology* (London, 1950), pp. 86 f. W. Y. Evans-Wentz, *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* (London, 1949), pp. 31, 131-149, speaks of the Wrathful Deities as the Peaceful Deities in changed aspect—and both extend grace into the saṁsāric world, being inseparable from the all-pervading consciousness.

Krishna Prem, *op. cit.*, p. xxiii, says: "It should be further noted that the *Kauravas* and the *Pāṇḍavas* are cousins. There is none of the ultimate dualism that has marred so much of Christian thought, no God or Devil standing as ultimate irreconcilables. The *Daivi* and *Aśurik* forces both spring from the same Supreme Source and in the end both return to it."

36. Scheeben, *The Mysteries of Christianity*, p. 253.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 619.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

39. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 295 f., 216 f.

40. Watts, *op. cit.*, pp. 102 f.

inwardly vile and wrong." [41] Regardless of its origin, however, there appears to be a religious sense of guilt, of an all-too-easy sinfulness that serves to divide the Christian from his God,[42] an "infinite gulf between his own injustice and divine justice." [43] From the Eastern view this sense of "guilt" arises when the *jīva* or ego, the "true center unconscious of itself," becomes identified with impermanent finite objects and thereby establishes a finite desire center, with all of its attendant frustrations, anxieties and dread.[44] This individual center is, in fact, the ego, the *jīva*—"a distorted reflection of the true Self . . . which is one with the Self of other individuals." [45] In Western religion, then, there is a gap of guilt, of sin, unworthiness and unrighteousness [46] separating man from God. The Eastern metaphysical gap is one of ignorance with its attendant misery and vexations of *saṁsāra* [47] which separates the *jīva* from Self-realization.

Guénon has said that religion, as distinct from metaphysic, conjoins the three elements of dogma, moral law, and cult—a triune concept to be found only in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.[48] The highly sentimental nature of religion and its over-accentuation of feeling values has, according to this view, tended to displace those values from their proper analogical context and make of them the essence of Reality.[49] Thus Western religion, particularly emphasized in modern Protestantism, has tended progressively to develop a type of humanistic morality at the expense of dogma and cult.[50] Even where morality was not conceived as a purely humanistic end, it was regarded by Christians as absolute, for God, as essential Being and righteousness, is the supernatural end of man.[51] The concept of sin

41. W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, Modern Library), p. 167.
42. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought,* pp. 283 f.
43. Gilson, *op. cit.,* p. 340.
44. Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 148.
45. Chaudurī, *op. cit.,* pp. 193 f.
46. Otto, *Mysticism East and West,* p. 191.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Guénon, *op. cit.,* pp. 103 ff.
49. Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 73.
50. Guénon, *op. cit.,* pp. 104, 106; Huxley, *op. cit.,* p. 251.
51. Hopkins, *The Religions of India,* p. 554; Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 111; Otto, *op. cit.,* pp. 207, 209.

as obstructive ignorance, as "missing one's mark" (*ámárτανειν*), is criticized by Christian apologists as being on the human plane, whereas religion demands that it be an offense against God. Unable to look upon morality as a means rather than as an end, Christianity views this "human plane," in contrast to the "supernatural plane," as the end of "pagan morals," unaware that metaphysically the "end" transcends yet includes all conceivable planes.[52] Christianity, again from the Roman point of view, demands that the supernatural end which qualifies all moral actions be "proposed to the will as a term laid down by the divine law, imposed by a Creator on His Creatures," and the "Christian conscience, as an expression of the Divine legislative reason always prescribes the act to be done as a moral obligation." [53] Thus Christian morality may be characterized as obedient, while that of Indian metaphysic is expedient.

From the time of the Upanishads there is a quite pronounced tendency to look upon moral good in itself, the persistent sattvic element, as a bond which, like evil, can prevent deliverance. There thus is developed that which Rānaḍe calls a "supermoralism" which goes beyond both good and evil as an ethical counterpart to the nondual or advaitic Absolute realized in the supreme integral knowledge, or *ātmavidyā*.[54] *Muṇḍakopanishad* 3.1.3., for example, states that the wise man "shaking off (*vidhuya*) good and evil (*puṇyapāpe*) is delivered.[55] Thus, wherever the texts deal with realization, both *puṇya* and *pāpa* are evil (*pāpman*) [56] from which the wise are delivered. In *Chhāndogyopanishad* 8.4.1. there is an extensive list of evils composing many pairs of opposites, and both "good" and "evil" are included as the fetter, *pāpman*.[57] The Upanishads also note that the stamp of death is upon all saṁsāric life forms and activities, and is exemplified in all cyclical natural phenomena—for life and death

52. Cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 353-357, 475 n.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 279, 353.

54. Rodhe, *Deliver Us From Evil*, p. 34; also Rānaḍe, *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, p. 306.

55. Cf. *Bṛih.* 4.4.22-23; *Maitri* 6.18; Rānaḍe, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

56. Rodhe, *op. cit.*, p. 34, does not subscribe to Hume's translation of *pāpa* as evil and *pāpman* as sin. He furthermore declares that *pāpman* is not to be contrasted to *puṇya* but to *ānanda* (bliss). See *Bṛih.* 4.3.9.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 35 f.

are in identity—are but two aspects of the identical saṁsāric wheel.[58] In the *Kaṭhopanishad* the identity of death and life as *saṁsāra* and the necessity for deliverance from both are clearly told. Earthly pleasures as separate and distinct in themselves are, here, but temptations of Death. It is only the *ātman,* the true Self, which transcends Death and his recurrent cycle of existence which extends even into *svargaloka* or heaven.[59] It is through that clarity of consciousness which is perfect knowledge of the Self or *ātman* that all saṁsāric duality, all virtues and vices bound up in a world of karma, are transcended.[60]

From the vantage point of liberation or *moksha,* then, neither sins nor virtues are to be cherished, for otherwise they may tend to become idols in themselves, real but relative symbol-tools given a pseudo-absolute status.[61] Enlightenment does not annihilate morality, but transcends it so that the immediate basis for all action is the will of the Self rather than the ego. Thus "evil action does not adhere" to the *fully realized* sage, for all of his works spontaneously are consistent with the divine love and will (grace) and, therefore, with the welfare of all the manifest world (*lokasaṁgraha*).[62] It is only from the font of eternal tranquillity, devoid of anguish and the necessity for planned moral action, that there can emerge a true, spontaneous, and free action, a true dynamism as against mere agitation.[63]

Hopkins, somewhat inadequately, has linked the views of the Teṅgalai sect, with their emphasis upon faith, with antinomianism.[64]

58. *Bṛih.* 3.1; 3.2.10.

59. Rodhe, *op. cit.,* pp. 99-102. See *Kaṭha* 1.6; 1.23-29; 2.1-3; 2.14; 3.7.

60. Edgerton, *Bhagavadgītā,* II, 24.

61. Śrī Aurobindo, *The Yoga and its Objects* (Calcutta, 1949), p. 18; Chaudhurī, *op. cit.,* p. 152; Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought,* pp. 102 f.

62. See *Chhând.* 4.14.3; *Muṇd.* 3.2.2.; *Gītā* 3.20,25; 18.17; Roy, *The Message of the Gītā as Interpreted by Śrī Aurobindo,* p. 247 n.; Rānaḍe, *op. cit.,* p. 316; B. G. Tilak, *Śrī Bhagavadgītā—Rahasya* (Poona, 1935), p. 1203; De, *The Vaishṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal,* p. 414; Hopkins, *Ethics of India,* pp. 66, 68, 70, 85; Watts, *op. cit.,* pp. 117, 121. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life,* p. 218, warns against moral codes of negation which invent "sterile" virtues and "imaginary" sins. These, of course, are impositions of morality from "inside" *saṁsāra.*

63. Cf. *Śvet.* 4.11; 6.12; *Kaṭha* 6.10-11; *Tait.* 2.9; also Rānaḍe, *op. cit.,* p. 316; Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 30; Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought,* pp. 64-69, 105; Otto, *op. cit.,* pp. 168-175.

64. E. W. Hopkins, *The History of Religions* (New York, 1926), p. 596. In Indian

While the Veḍagalai school insists upon the performance of proper action even in the stage of *prapatti,* or surrender, Teṅgalai sees in this surrender to the true Self of the self—*if it is true, perfect, and complete,* an abandonment of "all *dharmas,*" a sacrifice of *all* action, thoughts, and will—not to the limited desires of the ego as such, from which all evil acts arise, but to and by the inseparable divine power-grace which therefore acts through the devotee and therefore transcends all ego-morality.[65] The supreme harmony of the non-dual divine thus is seen in manifestation as the unitive and separative movements of divine love, experienced before surrender as goodness and evil.[66]

Christian doctrine repeats, in its own vacabulary, the same contention, which again is set forth in I John 3.9.[67] Maritain, speaking of the spiritual experiences of St. John of the Cross, states that the soul emptied of itself, "and *having nothing yet having all*" has passed through the portal to "the infinite amplitude of spiritual liberty: *Here there is no more a path because for the just there is no law.*" [68] By more than the law the freed soul of the Christian saint, as well, has been raised through the grace and love of Christ, and moves only in accordance with the impulse of the Holy Spirit. Maritain warns, however, that the only error is to seek this liberty from the basis of fleshly license, for "The law is the only way of surpassing the law, on the condition that love passes through it." The ground-motif underlying the above statement is developed and enlarged upon within the varied forms of traditional Indian metaphysic, especially as it concerns the place of the sāttvic guṇa in *sādhana,* or the path of spiritual discipline, where the aspirant is enjoined to utilize the

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"Theism" as expressed in Viśishṭādvaita there are two major sects, the Teṅgalai and Vedagalai, which express divergent views concerning faith and works. Inasmuch as their basis is that of Indian metaphysic, it is semantically inadvisable, however, to draw conclusions from the purely religious point of view of the West.

65. Śrīnivāsāchāri, *op. cit.,* p. 536; *Gītā* 18.66; De, *op. cit.,* pp. 412-415.

66. Cf. Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 117.

67. "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God."

68. J. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge* (New York, 1938), pp. 444 ff. Cf. the view of the Reformers as given by Hopkins, *The History of Religions,* p. 587: "Justification is from God in consequence of faith; free grace without merit is granted to every believer and is followed by freedom from the law."

"thorn" of sāttvic moral purity as an expedient tool for the removal of the agonizing "thorn" of evil—and then throw both "thorns" away. It might be said that an integral and synthesizing summation of this view is found in *Śaktivāda* and the *Tantra,* where within karmic experience itself is found the root-power (*śakti*) of inseparable and nondual spirituality which may lead, through the surrender, sacrifice or "making holy," in its sense of wholeness, of all lawful as well as unlawful human acts, to integral realization or awakening.

# DOSTOEVSKY: PHILOSOPHER OF FREEDOM, LOVE, AND LIFE *

James L. Jarrett

Dostoevsky was, of course, a novelist. With the exception of the editorials which he wrote for *The Diary of a Writer*—and they are mainly topical pieces—virtually all of his writing was fictional. Therefore, if one is to speak of him as a "philosopher," it seems that quotation marks must be used to indicate that the word is being employed in a Pickwickian sense. Literary critics today are quick to detect any subtraction from their subjects. Quite properly they insist that it is unfair and misleading to strip a novel of its characters, its story, its drama, its very style, in order to reveal the white, clean, and shiny philosophic bones. For the most part, professional philosophers agree, though with a certain difference. They sometimes go so far as to say that poetry and fiction are merely emotional stimulants, and that it is a great mistake to treat them as if they "say something." It is significant that when anti-metaphysicians come to pronouncing the malediction, they like to say, "Metaphysics is nothing but poetry."

Nevertheless, without making the mistake of ignoring Dostoevsky as artist or of proposing him as a systematic philosopher, I would urge that in this great writer's fiction there is much that is philosophic. But more than that, because it is possible for novels to be philosophic in trivial, dull, pedantic, or moralistic ways, the philosophic element in Dostoevsky's fiction is important, exciting, live, and—what quality shall I oppose to "moralistic"?—moral.

There are some novelists who say to us: Pull up a chair and I'll tell you a story, and there are others, as Pegúy once said in a different connection, who pull their story, not out of their pocket, but out of their guts. Dostoevsky is philosophic in that his characters are—nearly

* The following abbreviations will be employed: FF = *The Friend of the Family;* NU = *Notes from Underground;* BK = *The Brothers Karamazov;* C&P = *Crime and Punishment;* RY = *The Raw Youth;* I = *The Idiot;* DW = *The Diary of a Writer;* DRM = "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man"; HD = *The House of the Dead.* The Constance Garnett translations have been used throughout, except C&P (David Magarshack tr.), and DW (Boris Brasol, tr.).

every one of them—in search of a philosophy or in search of some way to get rid of one philosophy in order to find a better. And Dostoevsky is the more philosophic in that he *is* these characters in their search. I do not know how to prove that this is true; one must recognize it, as one recognizes the difference between two teachers of philosophy, that one of them is trying to achieve a philosophy and another is exhibiting philosophies. I believe that because Dostoevsky's novels *are* active, agonized philosophical struggles, they make for philosophy, the process of philosophy, the élan of philosophy, and not its ashes.

André Gide said:

> I read lately in an interview with M. Henry Bordeaux a sentence which surprised me somewhat: "Seek first to know yourself." The literary creator who seeks himself runs a great risk—the risk of finding himself. From then onwards he writes, coldly, deliberately, in keeping with the self he has found. He imitates himself. If he knows his path and his limitations, it is only to keep strictly to them. His great dread is no longer insincerity, but inconsistency. The true artist is never but half-conscious of himself when creating. He does not know exactly who he is. He learns to know himself only through his creation, in it, and after it. Dostoevsky never set out to find himself; he gave himself without stint in his works. He lost himself in each of the characters of his books, and, for this reason, it is in them that he can be found again.[1]

However, in denying that Dostoevsky had a philosophical system and in insisting that his philosophizing was dynamic and genuinely dialectical, I would not want to preclude the possibility of speaking of his tendencies, the main directions of his thinking, his antipathies and ideals. Indeed, I should like to turn now to a brief consideration of three of his major themes: Freedom, Love, and Life.

There are those who base their denial that Dostoevsky is a philosopher upon their observation that he is forever opposing the reduction of life to a formula, of man to a mouse or a bug, of choice to a natural law.[2] But this is to make the mistake of identifying philosophy with certain kinds of philosophy. Dostoevsky is most certainly not a Rationalist nor a Mechanist nor a Naturalistic Utilitarian. If

1. *Dostoevsky*. (London, 1949). pp. 50 f.

2. Ivan says: "Men are themselves to blame, I suppose; they were given paradise, they wasted freedom, and stole fire from heaven, though they knew they would become unhappy" (BK, p. 289).

we must give a name to the philosophy he opposes to these hated and rejected philosophies, we might do worse than to call him an Existentialist. The first thing this means is that man's fundamental reality is existence, contingent existence. I *am* before I am anything; that is, before I have a "nature," before I become a settled personality or a type from which my actions flow or are derived or are predictable. Sometimes I wish I were defined, even if to my own disadvantage. As the Underground Man says, Even let it be said that I am simply lazy, a sluggard. "A sluggard; how very pleasant it would have been to hear that of oneself! It would mean that I was positively defined" (NU, p. 141).

This sense of the self as existing undefined engenders dread, as Kierkegaard taught. Dread is the sense of the self as finite, as undetermined, contingent, as necessarily free to choose oneself.[3] Who can doubt that the Grand Inquisitor was a shrewd observer of men when he said to Jesus that his great error was in supposing men want freedom.

> Instead of taking men's freedom from them, Thou didst make it greater than ever! Didst Thou forget that man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil? Nothing is more seductive for man than his freedom of conscience, but nothing is a greater cause of suffering. . . . Thou didst desire man's free love, that he should follow Thee freely, enticed and taken captive by Thee. In place of the rigid ancient law, man must hereafter with free heart decide for himself what is good and what is evil, having only Thy image before him as his guide. But didst Thou not know he would at last reject even Thy image and Thy truth, if he is weighed down with the fearful burden of free choice? (BK, p. 302).

We need not be concerned here with the historical accuracy of Dostoevsky's interpretation of Jesus and his mission, or of the Church's dependence upon "miracle, mystery and authority" to make men submit to happiness; what is important for our purposes is the fact of Dostoevsky's construction.

But acquiescence to a totalitarian institution is only one of the ways in which men ease the burden of their freedom. Another way even more alarming to our Existentialist is the embrace of a philosophy which calls freedom an illusion. Let one decide that man is no

3. Does not Kierkegaard somewhere speak of dread as "the dizziness of freedom"?

exception to the ordered regularity of the universe and behold! he will be right. If every action of man is another case of twice two, then the problem of freedom is solved, the agony of choice is dispelled. One acts the way he acts because of the type of person he is. Thus if one is a soldier, say, a normal man of action, he goes straight to his goal; if something is in the way he moves it, and if he encounters an immovable wall he is simply stopped by it, and that is that. Or again, if man always acts, as the psychological hedonist tells us, from his own self-interest, necessarily choosing whatever appears to be to his own best advantage, one need only *observe* himself choose and need never get upset about such a natural, dependable, predictable, lawful matter.

These simple mechanistic theories are appealing, it would seem, in the same way that the Church is appealing: both make for peace and comfort. Yet, to say that man hates freedom and is filled with dread by realizing freedom is to say what is only part of the truth. Man also loves freedom. He is as much of a rebel as he is a conformist, as much an anarchist as a law-abider. Tell man that he can be cabined in a formula, and he will claw his way out; tell him that he always chooses to his own apparent advantage, and he will choose to his own apparent disadvantage. As the Underground Man says:

> The fact is, gentlemen, it seems there must really exist something that is dearer to almost every man than his greatest advantage, or (not to be illogical) there is a most advantageous advantage . . . which is more important and more advantageous than all other advantages, for the sake of which a man if necessary is ready to act in opposition to all laws; that is, in opposition to reason, honour, peace, prosperity—in fact, in opposition to all those excellent and useful things if only he can attain that fundamental most advantageous advantage which is dearer to him than all (NU, p. 143).

Or again:

> Man everywhere and at all time, whoever he may be, has preferred to act as he chose and not in the least at his reason and advantage dictated. And one may choose what is contrary to one's own interest, and sometimes one *positively ought*. . . . One's own free unfettered choice, one's own caprice . . . is that very "most advantageous advantage" which we have overlooked, which comes under no classification and against which all systems and theories are continually being shattered to atoms. . . . What man wants is simply *independent* choice, whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead (NU, p. 145 f.).

Now the Underground Man is certainly wrong in saying that this is what man *simply* wants—if there is one thing that Dostoevsky teaches us better than any other, it is that man doesn't *simply* want anything[4]—but that freedom, independence, autonomy, are precious, is the other side of the truth that they are dreadful. Men may be attracted by the Church, but the kiss of Jesus has its own power. Man may be rational, but he is not merely rational and thus is not determined by rationality. "Reason is nothing but reason and satisfies only the rational side of man's nature. . . ." (NU, p. 147).

*The House of the Dead* contains moving testimonials to the beauty of freedom, in that most elementary sense which the word has for a prisoner. And not infrequently the doctrine of freedom is urged against the Social Planners. The Raw Youth says indignantly: "And for all this, for this little part of mediocre advantage which your rational system guarantees me, for a bit of bread and a warm corner you take away all my personal liberty" (RY, p. 54). Freedom is one of the indispensable goods. Yes, even if it is liberty to smash someone's skull. Or to be anti-humanitarian. The "Raw Youth" callously insists: "I must be perfectly free not to lift a finger if I like" (RY, p. 53).

And again:

> You say 'a rational attitude to humanity is to your own advantage, too'; but what if I think all these rational considerations irrational, and dislike all these socialist barracks and phalanxes? . . . . Allow me to judge of my advantage for myself; it's more amusing (RY, p. 54).

We have sufficiently seen that the experience, the realization, of freedom is sometimes joyful, sometimes dreadful. Its negative qualities are more often expressed by Dostoevsky in terms of suffering. The first and most fundamental thing to learn about suffering is that it is a part of the ineradicable absurdity of life. Suffering belongs to life, and life is a more basic category, if you will, than any possible explanation of life. Life is, man exists, we suffer.[5] The intellectual, the rationalist who says, "But why?" is needlessly and dangerously torturing himself with a question which absolutely has no answer.

4. "The causes of human actions are usually immeasureably more complex and varied than our subsequent explanations of them. And these can rarely be defined" (I, p. 461).

5. "Perhaps suffering is just as great a benefit to (man) as well being. . . . Why suffering is the sole origin of consciousness" (NU, pp. 151 f.).

Job's friends were altogether wrong in their explanations of why Job was suffering, because they assumed that there must *be* some rational explanation: Job must have sinned, God must be instructing him, and so on. No, none of these things. What then? No answer at all. One may not much admire the blasting voice from out of the whirlwind, but its absolute refusal to give explanations must be significant: there are no explanations.

Ivan is about to "return the ticket" because he cannot see any conceivable way in which God's justice can be vindicated in a world in which innocent children undergo unspeakable horrors. Alyosha is asked whether he would consent to be the architect of a world in which even one child was made to suffer so that others might be happy, and Alyosha says no, he would not consent. But Alyosha does not try to play God; it is not a choice that faces him. Actual instances of suffering are something else. Here perhaps we can do something. Alyosha tries. And he sometimes succeeds. But this does not remove the radical unexplainability of life itself, complete with suffering.

To say that suffering is part of life is not at all to say that it is the whole of life. Life is both suffering and joy—and other things too. If Father Zossima says to Ivan: "Thank the Creator who had given you a lofty heart capable of such suffering; of thinking and seeking higher things, for our dwelling is in the heavens" (BK, p. 80), he also says "Men are made for happiness, and anyone who is completely happy has a right to say to himself, 'I am doing God's will on earth' " (BK, p. 62). The sheerest exuberance of joy in life seems reserved for those capable of suffering. It is of the tortured Raskolnikov that it is said: "A new great and exhilarating sensation of tremendous energy and will to live . . . suddenly surged up within him. It was a sensation not unlike that of a man condemned to death who is quite unexpectedly pardoned" (C&P, p. 207).[6] It is Raskolnikov who says he would accept life even if it means standing for a thousand years on a square yard of a cliff in eternal solitude amid eternal gales in the eternal darkness (C&P, p. 177). It is Raskolnikov who exults: "Only to live, live, live!" (C&P, p. 177). It is the agonized Ivan who can say to Alyosha:

> Do you know I've been sitting here thinking to myself: that if I didn't believe in life, if I lost faith in the woman I love, lost faith in the order of

6. Cf. I, p. 55.

things, were convinced in fact that everything is a disorderly, damnable, and perhaps devil-ridden chaos, if I were struck by every horror of man's disillusionment—still I should want to live, and, having once tasted of the cup, I would not turn away from it till I had drained it. . . . I've asked myself many times whether there is in the world any despair that would overcome this frantic and perhaps unseemly thirst for life in me, and I've come to the conclusion that there isn't. . . . I have a longing for life, and I go on living in spite of logic. Though I may not believe in the order of the universe, yet I love the sticky little leaves as they open in spring. I love the blue sky, I love some people, whom one loves you know sometimes without knowing why. I love some great deeds done by men, though I've long ceased perhaps to have faith in them, yet from old habit one's heart prizes them. Here they have brought the soup for you, eat it . . . (BK, p. 273).

Over and over the point is made.[7] Life has many joys, but the fullest joys are for those who love not merely joy but life itself, life with its sufferings and dullness and ugliness and tawdriness and frustration and—well, the whole catalogue of evils that Dostoevsky did so much to lengthen. For not to love life, to lose one's zest, is to sink into that torpor which is the prelude to suicide, the ultimate denial of life. There is, for instance, that girl—a real case which this omnivorous writer uses in *A Raw Youth*—who committed suicide because of her sense of life's absurdity, not only at bottom, but throughout, unrelieved by meaning and value anywhere. She expressed this isolation of hers, this absolute rejection, by a suicide note written in a flippant, even a vulgar style. Here is the real note, as Dostoevsky registered it in his Diary:

I am undertaking a long journey. If I should not succeed, let people gather to celebrate my resurrection with a bottle of Cliquot. *If I should succeed,* I ask that I be interred only after I am altogether dead, since it is very disagreeable to awake in a coffin in the earth. It is not chic! (DW, p. 469).

About this case, the "Raw Youth" says to his sister: "Ach, Liza! let death come when it must, but meantime let us live—let us live! Oh, let us pity that poor girl but let us bless life all the same" (RY, p. 192).

And to be content with just one more witness, there is the pas-

7. Ippolit: "It's life that matters, nothing but life—the process of discovering, the everlasting and perpetual process . . ." (I, p. 373). Myshkin: "What beautiful things there are at every step. . . . Look at a child! Look at God's sunrise! Look at the grass, how it grows!" (I, pp. 427 f.).

sionately racked Dmitri Karamazov, who says: "I think I could stand anything, any suffering, only to be able to say and to repeat to myself every moment, 'I exist.' In thousands of agonies—I exist," (BK, p. 721).

The trouble with the intellectual, finally, is not that the intellect is bad nor that life is wholly irrational—contrary to much supposition, Dostoevsky was not a hater of man's mind—but that the intellectual so often tries to substitute his categories, his concepts, his meanings, for life itself. So often he is a reductionist, a nothing-but-er. He is dead to the immediate beauty of things, his appetite jaded, his foot unfeeling because shod. The Underground Man speaks not only of himself when he says:

> Leave us alone without books and we shall be lost and in confusion at once. We shall not know what to join on to, what to cling to, what to love and what to hate, what to respect and what to despise. We are oppressed at being men—men with a real individual body and blood, we are ashamed of it, we think it a disgrace and try to contrive to be some sort of impossible generalized man (NU, p. 222).[8]

It is no accident that the intellectual is so often dreary, cold, negative, detached, isolated. Not necessarily less so if he turns social reformer or philanthropist:

> The man of higher education and culture, pursuing higher ideas, sometimes loses sight of reality altogether, becomes ridiculous, capricious and cold, and indeed I may say stupid, not only in practical life but in theory. The duty not to neglect practice and to make at least one real person happy would correct everything and would give fresh life even to the philanthropist himself. (RY, p. 469).

If Dostoevsky believed that ability to suffer—that is, to stand up under and to accept suffering—is concomitant with a zest for life and a quest for better life, he believed too that men may be regenerated by punishment. The detective Porfiry will not permit Raskolnikov merely to give up, to acquiesce in any sentence the state suggests. No, he must work for a reduction of the sentence and then accept his imprisonment as the way to a new life. Dostoevsky speaks in *The House of the Dead* of the "poignant and terrible suffering of never being alone even for one minute" (HD, p. 11) during his years in prison; of

8. It is curious that D. H. Lawrence, who is almost summarized in this passage, had a relatively adverse opinion of Dostoevsky.

living in constant association with vicious criminals and sadistic guards; of never being warm enough, eating vile food, being denied every slightest comfort or luxury. And yet he accepted his punishment, and came out of Siberia, stronger, healthier, more affirmative than he went in. In Russia the common people, he says, call criminals "unfortunates" (HD, p. 64), or "sufferers" (DW, p. 14), but do not imply that therefore criminals should go unpunished; quite the contrary, the way back to "fortune" is through just punishment.[9] Elsewhere he tells the story of a soldier who, when he confessed to a crime, was acquitted by a humanitarian jury; but the poor fellow was utterly bewildered: he *had* committed the crime, he told them he had, and now they were not punishing him. He knew of no way out except to punish *himself,* but his own punishment was no rehabilitation: he put a bullet in his head (RY, p. 379).

Nothing disgusted Dostoevsky more than the so-called liberal ideas of his time concerning "environment" as a social determinant. Here is a criminal, a murderer; but the lawyers say, summoning up the testimonies of advanced social thinkers, the man could not help himself; he was the victim of an unfavorable environment, therefore acquit him.[10] To this sophistication Dostoevsky opposes the wisdom of the people, who refuse to say, "Since environment is guilty, there are no crimes at all."

> No, the people do not deny crime, and they know that the criminal is guilty. It is only that the people are aware of the fact that they themselves are guilty in common with every criminal. Still, blaming themselves, the people do not prove thereby that they believe in "environment"; on the contrary, they believe that environment is wholly dependent on them, on their uninterrupted repentance and self-betterment. Energy, work, and struggle—these are the things which reform environment. By work and struggle alone, independence and the sentiment of self-respect are being achieved. "Let us become better, and environment will improve." This is what the Russian people, by a strong feeling, are tacitly conceiving in their concealed idea of the misfortune of the criminal (DW, p. 15).

9. One's regeneration begins when he learns to bow "down to all suffering humanity" (C&P, p. 337). For all of her love, Sonia terrified Raskolnikov because she represented to him "relentless condemnation" (C&P, p. 475).

10. Environment is the root of all evil. . . . That's why they (the socialists) dislike the living process of life so much. They don't want a *living soul!* A living soul makes demands. . . . Human nature wants life" (C&P, pp. 272 f.).

Now in all this it is important to notice that the acceptance of suffering as a part of life and the regarding of suffering as sometimes absolutely necessary to moral regeneration is not, in any sense, a callousness to evil. Quite the contrary. Ultimately, the only effective social melioration is carried on by those who know suffering in their own persons, yet who have not therefore turned in their ticket, refused life on such terms.

But it will be well to clear up what may seem like a contradiction in the philosophy so far given exposition. On the one hand, it has been said that it is requisite to accept existence as absurd, for instance in there being no solution to the Problem of Evil; on the other hand, it has been said that those who come to regard life as meaningless and absurd fall into a will-less torpor whose logical consummation is suicide. The paradox disappears when it is noticed that *meaning* and *value* may be categories subordinate to *existence* without being either unreal or unessential. Whatever be your system, something must finally be accepted as *given,* as ultimate, as unexplained, underived, unaccounted for, there because it is there and not caught up in any larger telic whole. But everything less ultimate may be theoretically explainable and capable of being evaluated. In Dostoevsky's philosophy what the atheist *practically* amounts to is the nihilist, the denier of value. Or, to put it another way, there are harmless atheists—Versilov in *A Raw Youth* speaks of the good-humored Russian atheists who are "always disposed to be kind to God. . . ." (RY, p. 209)—but there is the other kind of atheist, the grim, humorless, vain men who have pulled back away from their fellows, from the earth that would nourish them, the mockers and scoffers to whom nothing matters, to whom everything within life is meaningless,[11] the Kirilovs, the Smerdyakovs, and the rest.

One of the best expressions of this is from the "Ridiculous Man": He speaks of

> the terrible misery that was growing in my soul through . . . the conviction that had come upon me that *nothing in the world mattered.* . . . I suddenly felt that it was all the same to me whether the world existed or whether there had never been anything at all: I began to feel with all my being that

11. Ivan is going too far when he says: "The absurd is only too necessary on earth. The world stands on absurdities, and perhaps nothing would have come to pass in it without them" (BK, p. 288).

there was nothing existing. . . . I gave up caring about anything, and all the problems disappeared (DRM, p. 594).

That is, he decided to kill himself. But if nothing mattered, the little girl who (fruitlessly) appealed to him for help, didn't matter; yet she did—he couldn't forget her. So instead of suicide he dreams that he corrupted paradise. The corruption of the perfectly happy men consisted in leading them to a sense of mine and thine, of individuality, of desire and sensuality. His guilt over this dreamed evil led him back to life, to will, and to love. "Men of this caliber will precisely shoot themselves apparently *for no reason,* and yet it will be necessarily because of anguish, unconscious perhaps, for the sublime significance of life which they have found nowhere" (DW, p. 543). They are the men without love, but "with love one can live even without happiness" (NU, p. 193). For the two great commandments are to love God, which, on a *minimum* interpretation, means for Dostoevsky to accept life as a whole and to find meanings and values within life, and to love your neighbor as yourself. But the cynical Versilov says:

To love people as they are is impossible. And yet we must. And therefore do them good, overcoming your feelings, holding your nose and shutting your eyes, (the latter's essential). Endure evil from them as far as may be without anger, "mindful that you too are a man." Of course you'll be disposed to be severe with them if it has been vouchsafed to you to be ever so little more intelligent than the average. Men are naturally base and like to love from fear. Don't give in to such love, and never cease to despise it. Somewhere in the Koran Allah bids the prophet look upon the "froward" as upon mice, do them good, and pass them by—a little haughty, but right. Know how to despise them even when they are good, for most often it is in that they are base. Oh, my dear, it's judging by myself I say that "Anyone who's not quite stupid can't live without despising himself, whether he's honest or dishonest—it makes no difference." To love one's neighbor and not despise him—is impossible. I believe that man has been created physically incapable of loving his neighbor. There has been some mistake in language here from the very first and "love for humanity" must be understood as love for that humanity which you have yourself created in your soul (in other words, you have created yourself and your love is for yourself)—and which, therefore, never will be in reality (RY, p. 210).[12]

But the man who says this is himself a very incomplete lover, an "enlightened" man whose enlightenment is still dark though not utterly bedevilled. When, in the same book, the youth reveals his

12. Cf. Ivan: "It's just one's neighbors . . . that one can't love" (BK, p. 281).

rawness in remarking to his mother, "The love of one's relations is immoral . . . just because it's undeserved; love ought to be earned," his mother, a simple peasant woman, replies, "You'll earn it later on, but here you are loved without" (RY, p. 257).

Yes, unearned, undeserved love for actual human beings may perhaps be the necessary condition to loving mankind. Even the Christ-like Myshkin, that puzzling character, was perhaps ultimately deficient as a bringer of good because of his impotence to love in something like the way that the wicked Rogozhin loved. At least it is curious that Aglaia says to him: "You have no tenderness, nothing but truth, and so you judge unjustly" (I, p. 406). And Nastasya, the torn and beautiful women, writes, "One must be an angel to love everyone—to love not oneself but others for their own sake—like Christ" (I, pp. 432 f.), and Nastasya wanted not an angel but a man. The love which Aglaia had for him—Yevgeny Pavlovitch says, "Aglaia Ivanovna loved you like a woman, like a human being, not like an abstract spirit" (I, p. 556)—was a kind of love which the Prince, with the best will in the world, could not return.[13] Yet, however this be, more is required of a man than that he have passionate love for a woman. It is required that we love all men. Very well, we say, but surely not my neighbor, that paltry person (Cf. Ivan, BK, p. 281). What does this second commandment mean?

I make bold to say that Dostoevsky has an answer to this vexed question, though here the going is slippery, the air misty, the cliffs precipitous. The rope I seem to grasp has three strands, which I will call: "total responsibility," "involvement in mankind," and—our old friend—"radical freedom."

It was Markel, Father Zossima's saintly brother, the dying consumptive, who said, "Everyone is really responsible to all men for all men and for everything" (BK, p. 344).[14] And this is true because every man is part of the continent.[15] Whenever anyone commits an

13. There are important ways in which Myshkin and Alyosha contrast: the former was sick and functioned as an idol: the latter was healthy, active, loving, realistic (See BK, p. 25).

14. Mitya: "We are all responsible for all. . . . How I want to live now!" (BK, p. 720).

15. The oneness of humanity does not imply uniformity. Razumikhin is faithful to Dostoevsky's beliefs when he deplores that idea of progress which means sacrifice of one's own distinctive self (C&P, p. 219).

evil, there has been a failure of love on my part. It does no good, it offers no final excuse, to say, "Ah, but surely that is expecting too much." Of course it is expecting too much. One's fullest duty is always literally unrealizable, but for all of that the duty remains. But love here, that love which alone can save men from the ultimate wickedness, is not a mere feeling, a mere glow of benevolence and good will. It is, as nearly as I can understand it, a dedication, an active dedication, to the freedom of all men. No man can himself be free while other men are enslaved. To aspire to my own freedom is inseparable from an aspiration to the freedom of others. And, in the same way, love for others *is* finally love for oneself—not in the superficial sense in which one is prudently counselled toward "enlightened self-interest," but—simply because the purely individual man is an abstraction from humanity itself. Beware of the self-lacerating person or the buffoon, for these self-haters hate you too. Beware of the cold man struggling toward absolute independence and aloof autonomy,[16] for this isolated being is doomed to suicide [17] and cares not whom he cuts down with him. Love men not because they deserve it—for some of them are ugly and malevolent old pawnbrokers and may seem really to deserve death—but because you must if you are to love life. Love men for the freedom that is in them to be realized, for on that realization your own freedom depends. Love men because mankind is one, and he who would in hate divide himself off is electing death and cold night.[18]

Not that it is easy. It means suffering (See DRM, p. 604). "Love in action is a harsh and dreadful thing compared with love in dreams. Love in dreams is greedy for immediate action, rapidly performed and in the sight of all. Men will even give their lives if only the ordeal does not last long but is soon over, with all looking on and applauding as though on the stage. But active love is labor and forti-

16. Isolation is a major theme in Dostoevsky. Raskolnikov's theory of an elite, e.g., is inextricably implicated with his lovelessness and his crime. Talking to his sister after the murder, Raskolnikov "suddenly realized with appalling clarity that . . . not only would he never again have a chance of talking freely . . . , but that now he would not ever be able to talk to anyone about anything" (C&P, p. 246).

17. Lise: "I shall kill myself because I loathe everything." And, but for Alyosha's love-which-inspired-love, she might have (BK, p. 711).

18. Father Zossima's advice to the "God-seeker" was: love of one's neighbor engenders faith in God (BK, p. 63).

tude, and, for some people, too, perhaps a complete science" (BK, p. 65). So spake the Elder Zossima. Please notice the last expression—active love may even be a complete science. That is, there is an infinite amount to *know* about how to love; there is a very great difference between mere good intentions and the paving stones to the Kingdom of Heaven. But if hell "is the suffering of being unable to love" (BK, p. 387), the opposite of hell is the ability to accept total responsibility, the ability to love. "As soon as men understand that, the Kingdom of Heaven will be for them not a dream, but a living reality" (BK, p. 362).

Dostoevsky, I have been trying to show, was a philosopher, at least in the sense of involving us in the genuine philosophic activity of his fictional characters. But more than that, he was a thinker dialectically working out of some hard and important philosophic problems. Among much else, he tells us—not discursively, but dramatically, suggestively, poignantly—that life is more fundamental than reason and so must be accepted without being justified or explained; that love is both the chief manifestation of life and the highest duty of man; and that man assumes his full responsibility only when he loves and promotes the freedom that is the live man's essence.

# ON READING HESCHEL'S *GOD IN SEARCH OF MAN*: A REVIEW ARTICLE *

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ELSEWHERE I HAVE PRAISED THIS BOOK, but here I come neither to praise nor to bury it under a formal review and criticism; I propose, rather, to retell in the plainest language I can use the central argument which Heschel maintains, though it may be concealed in the book under scattered "insights" and technical, rabbinical idioms. Theologically the book is undoubtedly beautiful—both the general mysticism of the first half and the Jewish pietism of the second half. But as a philosophical argument it may alienate the reader who is unfamiliar with theological rhetoric. Hence, I ask the author's indulgence while I try to put into argumentative, academic form his two chief theses: (1) God's ineffable glory is an empirical reality, and (2) his Voice finds a natural response in man's heart and conduct.

For more than a hundred thirty pages Heschel illustrates the pitfalls into which men's minds wander when they set out to find God. The search is not condemned: on the contrary, by himself undertaking it in many directions Heschel shows how baffling the whole undertaking always turns out to be. He emerges repeatedly from his quests with striking statements which are supposed to be "insights." Most of them are variations on the theme: "The question about God is God's question." But the more he belabors this theme in these introductory hundred pages, the more he reminds himself of the poet whom Socrates criticized for not being able to explain what he says so very well. God's glory, he claims, is a familiar presence, and yet it escapes definition. He tries vainly to represent the awareness of this glory as a "presupposition" of thought, but realizes that it is not a conceptual foundation like the transcendental categories of "power" or "structure." This glory is something encountered, not conceived.

* Abraham J. Heschel, *A Philosophy of Judaism: God in Search of Man.* New York: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1955. 437 pp. $5.00.

Heschel excuses himself on the conventional ground, taken from Maimonides,

> It is not possible for one who has grasped mysteries to expound clearly and systematically whatever he has comprehended, as he would have done in any other science which has an established method of instruction. When he tries to teach others, he has to contend with the same difficulty which faced him in his own study, namely, that matters become clear for a moment and then recede into obscurity. It appears that this is the nature of this subject. . . . For this reason when any metaphysician and theologian, in possession of some truth, intends to impart his science, he will not do so except in similes and riddles (p. 135).

But by this time such excuses are somewhat threadbare. He then excuses himself less conventionally by a commentary on "Seek the Lord while he may be found; call upon him while he is near" (p. 131). But this commentary is more mystifying than clarifying. He struggles through about ten pages (pp. 126 ff.) in which he throws together all the recent theological talk about "ultimate meaning of the universe," about God's being "at least alive," about "radical amazement," about the presymbolic meanings in acts of love, etc. But through it all he seems to be aware, as the reader certainly is, that these supposed "searches" are not really *thinking* at all. There is no substantial argument in it; it is post-symbolical manipulation.

Then he turns dramatically, on page 136, where the real argument begins, and shifts the whole basis of analysis. He abandons the metaphor of insight and the traditional language of metaphysical mysticism for the plainer metaphor of God's Voice. God "calls" man, and man "responds." The joy of being found by God and the terror of being found out by him are now portrayed with convincing, empirical analysis. The supposed "seeking of the mind" turns out to be "the answer of the heart to God's call." The theory is that God, the great creator and destroyer, is not "at home in the world." He needs a creature who is sensitive to his glory, and in man he at last finds such a being, who praises him, worships, obeys, "glorifies" or "blesses" God. This seems to be relatively simple theological language for the familiar facts of religious behavior and sentiment. But the philosophical argument is not so simple. In trying to restate it, I am trying to follow the essentials of Heschel's philosophy, though I may contradict some of his statements on minor points.

God's glory is an elementary fact of religious experience, but it is even more difficult to define than the "temperance" which baffled Socrates in his search for definitive knowledge. The intemperateness, extravagance of this glory tempts us, as it tempts Heschel, to say that it is "ineffable." And yet neither he nor we can let it go at that. Heschel tries to communicate the "meaning" in "glory" and refers to "transcendent," "ultimate" meaning "in the universe" or "of the universe," and such phrases he equates with "transcendent worth." This is confusing. To equate meaning and worth is not clarifying, and to attach both to "the universe" when they are really "God's" does not help the definition.

Some philosophers, to be sure, will insist that such words as "glory" have no place in respectable, analytic discourse. But "glory" and its equivalents are in common usage and should not be rudely dismissed and discarded. They demand careful interpretation.

"What a glorious morning!" I have often said to myself as I rose with the sun and walked out into the fields. Here "morning" is more vague than "glorious." The morning is not really an identifiable object. It might have been more accurate to say, "glory encompasses me" or "the glory of it all". Such phrases are intended to describe situations *when it seems a privilege simply to be.* In such situations there is not apt to be any "quest for ultimate meaning"; meaning is irrelevant. The "sense" of exaltation is a response to the encompassing glory. The glory is not subjective; it is the exaltation that is subjective; and the praise is neither objective nor subjective, but expressive, and would be communicative if at sunrise anything but God and the birds were listening. Under such circumstances "to give God the glory" is an intelligible expression. Here "God" is not a particular object but an encompassing reality, an environment, which man recognizes and to which he makes a fitting response. Or, in the words of Hobbes, "God" is understood to be part of the language of praise, and hence his name should not be taken in vain. Similarly, to attribute the glory to "the universe" designates no concrete object and implies no "ultimate meaning." On the contrary, the more suffusive, overpowering the glory is, the less is it the glory of anything in particular. It belongs to the Great Creator. "Hail, glorious Light!" sang Milton, and though he referred to physical light, he had no par-

ticular illuminated object in mind, and was well aware of a long tradition of *Lichtmetaphysik*. Milton's piety came to expression.

There are, of course, particular glories, glorious objects about which critics, when they have done with their aesthetic analysis, "rave." Even in criticism there is need for a language of praise. But such language is most appropriate *after* reflective appraisal. Praise from an inexperienced person, or from someone like Walt Whitman, who was in the habit of praising everything, is less expressive than when it comes as a sign of genuine appreciation. Hence, I would not agree with Heschel that religious praise is presymbolic; it is usually accompanied by symbols or else is post-symbolic. In any case, praise does not refer to a meaning, either definite or "ultimate." Praise symbolizes the presence of something wonderful. This is the real heart of Heschel's argument. The wonder may be "striking" and appear at once, prior to reflection; but even so, the *praise* is most genuine when made reflectively. But to read the processes of problematic thinking into the situation of praise is careless analysis, which accounts for much of the mystification in current theology. "Praise the Lord, O my Soul!" is not an expression of thinking or of "cognitive reference" or inquiring search. There is in it no appraisal of God; it is a simple recognition of God's wonderful presence or glory. Of course, it may be merely a ritual exhortation to the "souls," but a genuine, "hearty" burst of praise is a *response* to the presence of the wonderful.

Is this a purely emotional experience? To this question I would be inclined to reply, yes, if it were not for the implications of positivist dogmatism in the word "purely." Certainly the experience is not adequately described by "I wonder" or "I am amazed" or "I am awed." In its immediacy the experience is no doubt emotional, but in its context it implies an *intellectually* sensitive person. It is more than impulsive expression, and is most genuine when it comes as the culmination of thoughtfulness. The beauty of Pythagoras' theorem is "felt" only by a mathematical mind. And the kind of glory which Heschel is portraying is "perceived" only by an awakened, lively, disciplined imagination. To be awed one must be in the presence of the awe-inspiring; there is an objective factor in the situation, just as there is an objective proof in the case of Pythagoras. This fact must

be recognized whether one uses the language of perception or of feeling in the interpretation of the experience.

I knew a person who had what he called "glory fits." He would be seized more or less hysterically in extreme elation and would cry out "Glory, Hallelujah!" But when the fit passed he was again a very common sense, practical, unimaginative, unmystical person. Such hysterical mystics take the glory out of "Glory!" for other persons, and make the sceptics suspicious of all mystical saintliness. In so far as religious exercises are only exhortations of praise or routine benedictions, the expressions of praise are artificial. For genuine praise there must be a glory actually given or present.

In general, the seeking for glory or striving to be praiseworthy usually produces "vain-glory." True majesty, divine excellence, is not an ideal to be aimed at; it is a gift, a creation that *comes* to us. It seeks us, when we do not seek it. Glory is not perfection in achievement or performance; it is not a virtue or a moral value. The truly admirable is not made to be admired. God's glory is, of course, a special case. The fullness of God's glory is his very essence, and precisely because his excellence or praiseworthiness is his very being, God could not be content, so goes the argument, without "glorifying" himself in creation. God needs to be worshipped and hence seeks a creature that can praise him. A worshipper in Heschel's sense does not praise God for his "many benefits." He is not engaged in thanksgiving. He is attributing to God the recognition due his essential glory or majesty, even though he knows that this fullness of God's glory has never been revealed.

But now the sociologists and psychoanalysts may object. They will interpret this "glory complex" as a survival or sublimation of human lordship. The Lord God, they say, is simply a glorified Lord So-and-so. This explanation sounds plausible, but is really specious, for human majesties have, from the earliest days, tried to put on the garb of divine Glory. The governing body is not content with authority and obedience, it seeks dignity, superiority, and divine right. It pretends to descend from above; governors usually believe quite sincerely that they are superiors. All the pomp with which human lords surround themselves is borrowed ultimately from the attributes of the gods. It may be impossible to tell as a matter of chronology which

came first, royalty or divinity, but until recently few rulers have ruled without assuming some sort of sanctity and using superhuman sanctions. It is not God who has the sovereign complex, but sovereigns who have appropriated and exploited divine majesty—a majesty not invented, but discovered.

In any case, the chief point of the argument is that there are glorious beings which can be distinguished from the vain-glory of the ambitious and the proud. In Jodhpur, Rajasthan, there is an ancient palace on an eminence within the city. The city literally lives around it, and the citizens often climb up to it in reverence. It is now neither a maharajah's residence nor a temple. It is, nevertheless, a sanctuary, a "high place," and whoever enters it and climbs to its parapets and looks out over the city, is overcome with the glory of it. It is the city's crown, built like a diadem, and it casts a halo or a *gloria* on the whole community. Late in the nineteenth century, too late, a maharajah, with the help of British architects, on a hill *outside* the city, built a bigger palace—domed, lavish, sumptuous, full of lordly pomp and circumstance—a monument to vanity. No one will live in it; it is not fit for a museum; it might do for a grand hotel in a Hollywood movie. It is loathed by the citizens, an abomination unto the eyes of the community and even of its lord. Here is an illustration of the old story of the search for glory blundering into vanity. True majesty belongs not to an isolated object created to be admirable, but to a harmony of many beings, generated not fabricated, in which each responds to each in what Jonathan Edwards, in his analysis of the divine Excellence, called "the sweet consent of being to Being."

Such infinite worthiness or splendor of being calls naturally for reverence. But the worship of glorious being may be quite independent of any search for ultimate meaning or "deep" significance, such as current "depth theology" asserts. Philosophers are in danger of going to two extremes in interpreting the presence of such being: they either make it too mystical, clothing it with ineffable depths of transcendent meaning, or they make it too verbal, assuming that there is something intoxicating in the word "glory" which unbalances the mind. To deal with such exuberant experiences soberly requires critical restraint.

However, there is a second part to Heschel's book and a second aspect to the divine majesty, less exuberant, naturally sobering—the

moral aspect. When God finds man, the result is not only praise but also contrition. Man is judged. Heschel expresses this by saying that God is "concerned" that man should be "accountable." God is not only Glory, he is also Word; he calls man to account. Heschel's analysis of the Voice of God and of the concern it expresses for man is an exceptionally fine piece of criticism, but it is made in a rhetoric which may conceal it from the eyes and ears of theological laymen. He explains how God is *Great* and *One,* the essence of integrity. But this divine integrity speaks to man not of its own majesty, but of the *expectation* it puts on man. This leads Heschel into the theory of revelation and prophecy. However, since his development of the theme of the Law and the Prophets is largely in terms of "a philosophy for Judaism," I shall not review it in detail. There are certain general traits in man's encounter with the Voice of God, which Heschel describes with care, and which I shall call attention to here, in order to contrast this encounter with God's Voice with what has been said above about the encounter with God's Glory.

The Voice or Call of God is meaningful, but the meanings are directly related to human action. This is true of the Prophets as well as of the Law. There is an ultimacy in the call, the ultimacy of conscience, the authoritative, sovereign standard of right; it is not a revelation of the ultimate meaning of the universe. This Voice or Word comes to man, "seeks him" in many ways, and its effects on the person to whom it comes may be shattering or comforting. Whatever the consequences, the voice clearly shows a concern for man, for his dignity, worthiness, nobility. In other words, our individual consciences encounter from time to time a revealing, unquestionable judgment to which they bow in humility; when God is judging a man there is no argument, no evasion, no question, only confession. The question, which Heschel labels "the Egyptian Question," *"Who* is the Lord that I should hearken unto his Voice?" receives no answer, for it is as rhetorical as *"Whose* is the Glory?" It is no answer to say "God, thy Lord," for the proper term for the Voice is "The Lord, thy God." The voice has authority in it; it needs no authorization. To demand that it be the voice of an individual ruler implies habits of idolatry or slavery. God has a "living" voice: it comes continually to the living, in life, through life. It is not merely written and traditional; it

is the "Oral Torah," which, according to the Zohar (which Heschel quotes to good effect) is the ultimate, heavenly Torah.

The Voice like the Glory are God's, but God himself remains hidden in "the cloud." All we know, but this we know empirically, is that he shows concern for man both in his glory and his commandments. The question, "Who is man, that Thou art mindful of him?" is as rhetorical as the other pseudo-questions mentioned above; it needs no answer.

I do not know how the reader of my abstract of Heschel's philosophy of religion may respond to the terms of the "argument." He may not admit that there is an argument here, but I, for one, must report, as a reader of Heschel's own words, that his theology, though impressionistic in form of exposition, is a sustained, philosophical analysis. There are dogmatic lapses here and there, as in any system; but the general aim and temper of thought is, to my mind, most refreshing and stimulating. It proves to me once more that even in theological language one can tell the truth and tell it well.

# COMMUNICATION

## BISHOP NICOLAI VELEMIROVICH

Clarence A. Manning

On March 18, 1956, Bishop Nikolai of the Serbian Orthodox Church died in the Russian Monastery of St. Tikhon in South Canaan, Pennsylvania. He had long been one of the outstanding bishops and thinkers of the Orthodox Church and was the only Orthodox theologian who has ever received an Honorary Doctorate from Columbia University.

Bishop Nikolai was born in Serbia in 1880 and educated at Oxford University and at the University of Berne. During World War I, he was sent to England with a group of Serb students and made several trips to the United States. He was one of the few foreign clergy who has preached in English in both St. Paul's Cathedral, London, and in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, in New York. Between the Wars, he was Bishop in Okhrid, Bitolj, and Zhicha, the see of the Patron Saint of the Serb Church, St. Sava. During World War II, he was for a time with the Serb patriotic leader Drazha Mikhaylovich, Minister of War in the Yugoslav government; then he was captured by the Nazis and was, for a considerable period, in the Dachau Prison Camp. On his liberation, he came to America where he was enthusiastically received by the Serb community, but he passed much of his time in the Monastery at South Canaan, where he taught theology and was Rector of the Theological School. He never recovered his health after his sufferings during the war but maintained a surprising activity until a few months before his death.

Bishop Nikolai had wide contacts among both the Orthodox and the Episcopal, and other Churches of the United States and England. He was truly a great scholar, but a man of the greatest humility who patterned his life on that of St. Sava and regularly alternated periods of intensive scholarly and practical work and periods of seclusion and meditation.

He wrote a large number of books in his native language including *Sermons under the Mountain,* the *Religion of Nyegosh, Sermons on*

*the All-Man, Prayers on the Lake,* and in English he published several, including the *Life of Saint Sava,* and *Signs and Symbols.* In addition he prepared a Serb Hymnal for a group of lay evangelists whom he had trained in Yugoslavia and inspired with the religious enthusiasm of the old Covenanters.

Bishop Nikolai was a great friend of the late Professor Michael Pupin and was a foremost exponent of what we may well call a Balkan school of Orthodox theology. Remaining true to the best traditions of Orthodoxy, he combined with it a willingness to accept the modern scientific viewpoint. He was willing to accept the reality of the visible world without losing his contact with the invisible and thus avoided the extremes of what is far too often in the West a denial of theology and of spirituality, but he escaped likewise that tendency to overstress the invisible and to deny the reality of the visible that is today the feature of much of Russian Orthodox thought.

In his public actions and his private life, Bishop Nikolai was a man of saintly character and viewpoint, and it is only to be regretted that ill health and bodily weakness prevented him from being as active in his last years in the larger circles of the world and the Church as he would have liked to be. Yet all who had the honor of knowing him at all well recognized his superlative qualities and felt real sorrow at his passing. *Requiescat in pace.*

# BOOK REVIEWS

*The Dead Sea Scrolls.* By MILLAR BURROWS. New York: The Viking Press, 1955. xv, 435 pp. 10 plates. $6.50.

The first ancient Hebrew and Aramaic scrolls from the caves in Wady Qumran on the western shore of the Dead Sea, about eight miles south of Jericho, were discovered early in 1947, and this extraordinary discovery was first publicly announced in April, 1948 by Professor Millar Burrows, of Yale University, who was then director of the American Schools of Oriental Research in Jerusalem. There is, therefore, a certain neatness of historical circumstance in the fact that Burrows is the first scholar to give a comprehensive account of the discovery, contents, background, and significance of these scrolls, and of the other documents from the same period found in the same region.

It is true that, in one of the issues of the *New Yorker* magazine published in May, 1955, the distinguished critic-poet-novelist, Edmund Wilson, gave a highly interesting and, for a non-professional student, remarkably scholarly account of the scrolls, which, when subsequently published in book form, soon found its way to the weekly list of best-sellers. But Wilson's little volume contains only a small part of the material to be found in Burrows' work, which, besides being much more comprehensive is also more authoritative, as is only natural in view of the fact that the scholarly author has taken a leading part in the decipherment and publication of some of the scrolls and has worked in the field of biblical Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek for a great many years.

Incidentally, it should be noted that, while many readers of Wilson's article responded delightedly to the detective-story fascination of the discovery of the scrolls and the spirited narrative of the complications and controversies involved in determining their authenticity and date, it is likely that readers of Burrows' book will be even more attracted by the problem of the historical background of the scrolls as it is presented with compelling skill by the talented author.

With some modesty Burrows advises readers, in his introductory Word to the Wise, that his book, "is not intended for the scholar." In spite of this disclaimer, he has written a book that every scholar not hopelessly prejudiced will read with gratitude for the comprehensiveness and orderliness of the presentation (which makes it perfect for

classroom reference) and also perhaps, if he is a specialist in this field, with grudging and envious admiration of Burrows for having "got there fustest with the mostest." There have been dozens of books, scores of monographs, and hundreds of articles written about the scrolls in the past seven years, but of all these works only a few have dealt with more than a small number of the many problems raised by the scrolls and fragments already published, and of these few general treatments none is as instructive and well balanced as Burrows'.

The contents of this meritorious work are as fellows. Part One, Discoveries and Discussions: I, The First Discoveries; II, Alarms and Excursions (controversies about authenticity and dating); III, Later Discoveries. Part Two, The Age of the Manuscripts; IV, The Evidence of Archeology and Paleography; V, The Evidence of Text and Language. Part Three, The Dates of Composition: VI, Historical Allusions in the Habakkuk Commentary: the Kittim; VII, Historical Allusions in the Habakkuk Commentary: *Dramatis Personae;* VIII, Identifications of Persons and Events; IX, Historical Allusions in the Other Documents; X, Ideas, Vocabulary and Literary Relations. Part Four, The Community of Qumran: XI, Origin, History and Organization; XII, Beliefs; XIII, Identification. Part Five, The Importance of the Dead Sea Scrolls: XIV, Contributions to Textual Criticism, Historical Grammar and Paleography; XV, Contributions to the Study of Judaism and Christianity, Summary. Part Six, Translations: A, The Damascus Covenant; B, The Habakkuk Commentary; C, The Manual of Discipline; D, Selections from The War of the Sons of Light with the Sons of Darkness; E, Selections from the Thanksgiving Psalms. The translations are followed by a long and well-selected Bibliography.

From a work that covers so many different aspects of the field and deals so fully with most of the important scholarly contributions made to date, it is not easy to select all the passages deserving of comment within the restricted limits of a review. I shall, therefore, pass over the first three chapters on the story of the discovery and the controversies that followed, and deal only with the author's main conclusions and with those details that have particular importance. Nor shall I discuss the appended translations of the Qumran scrolls and the related Damascus Covenant from the Cairo-Geniza, because this would involve technicalities of Hebrew grammar. I should, however, make the general comment that Burrows has done a very good job of translating, in

view of the fact that the Qumran writers were not very clear even when dealing with practical matters and were deliberately obscure or enigmatic in their allegorical commentaries.

From various indications the author sensibly concludes (p. 77) that the scrolls and numerous fragments so far found are remains of a library originally containing several hundred manuscripts, and that "the collection was apparently broken up and placed in different caves for safekeeping when the community was forced to abandon the settlement of which the building at Khirbet Qumran was the center." This was shortly before the end of the Jewish rebellion against the Romans that lasted from A.D. 66 to 70. Burrows' careful review of the paleographical evidence (pp. 83-101) not only establishes the time of writing of most of the documents as the last two centuries B.C. (there are a few fragments from the fifth or fourth century), but also presents an outline of the development of the square Hebrew script that helps to fix the relative chronology of the scrolls and fragments and other documents of this period.

Also valuable is his discussion (pp. 102-19) of the relation of the Qumran Isaiah scroll (first owned by St. Mark's Monastery) to the Masoretic text that Jews have used since the early rabbinic period and to the Hebrew *Vorlage* of the Greek version of the Old Testament known as the Septuagint. Burrows does well to remind us that "the degree of accuracy in a manuscript is no sure indication of its age. The Masoretic text undoubtedly rests on manuscripts both older and better than the St. Mark's manuscript of Isaiah. At the same time the manuscript is certainly older than the work of the Masoretes." But one detail in this section requires correction, namely the statement (p. 109) that "the fragments of the book of Samuel consistently agree with the Septuagint as against the Masoretic text." Frank Cross's recent study of the Qumran Samuel fragments shows merely that these agree more often with the Septuagint than with the Masoretic text, but this agreement hardly deserves the description of "consistent."

Interesting, though not yet clearly proved, is the author's suggestion (p. 112) that the *scriptio plena* (free use of vocalic consonants like *w* for *u* and *o*, and *y* for *i* and *e*) "was introduced gradually during the centuries before the Masoretes established the standard text, and the Masoretes eliminated most of the vowel letters on the basis of their oldest manuscripts."

There may be disagreement for some time about the relative chronology of the scrolls found in the first Qumran cave to be explored, but a reasonable starting point for future discussion is Burrows' summary (pp. 118-19):

> The oldest . . . St. Mark's Isaiah scroll, probably came from a little before 100 B.C. or possibly a little later. The Manual of Discipline cannot be dated much later than 100 B.C. From perhaps the last quarter of the first century B.C. comes the manuscript of the Habakkuk Commentary. The Lamech scroll, the War scroll, the scroll of the Thanksgiving Psalms and the Hebrew University Isaiah scroll were all probably made during the first half of the first century A.D.

Before noting the main conclusions of the chapters on the historical background and the identification of persons and events, I should like to remark that the statement (p. 124) that "Hebrew was already a dead language for the Jewish people in general long before the Christian era" is too strong. In spite of the use of Aramaic Targums of the Hebrew Bible in the synagogue (which was probably meant to insure the general acceptance of the theological interpretation of the Sopherim rather than merely to make Scripture intelligible), it seems clear, from the general use of Hebrew in public and private devotions, that most Palestinian Jews had a reasonably good working knowledge of the language, while among scholars Hebrew was anything but a dead language at that time. And the members of the Qumran sect in particular must have been fully at home in Hebrew, as these remains show.

Burrows has made an excellent canvass of widely divergent theories on the historical background of the scrolls and has, with notable fairness and clarity, presented the strength and weakness of each theory, beginning with that of a pre-Maccabean origin and concluding with that of a medieval dating. In this whole section I have found only one serious factual error, the statement (p. 134) that a collector of tribute was sent to Palestine in 166 B.C. by Seleucus IV "the successor of Antiochus Epiphanes." Since Seleucus IV was the predecessor of Antiochus Epiphanes and died long before 166 B.C., it is clear that the above statement is merely an absent-minded slip, one of the very few in the whole volume. In future editions (*hoffentlich*) this slip will probably be corrected.

Like many other scholars Burrows recognizes that the reference in the Habakkuk Commentary to the Kittim worship of (military) standards is good reason for identifying these Kittim with the Romans

rather than the Seleucids, but he cautiously, perhaps too cautiously, concludes (p. 140) that "the references to the Kittim are too general to point clearly and unmistakably to any one nation."

The author argues plausibly (pp. 144-45) that the term "teacher of righteousness" or "righteous teacher" (*moreh ṣedeq*) reflects the passage in Joel 2.23 where the Hebrew words *moreh leṣedaqah,* originally meaning "early rain for vindication" could, in the peculiar exegesis of the Qumran sect, be taken to mean "teacher of righteousness." (In this connection I must parenthetically express regret that Burrows has not transliterated Hebrew key-words except in three or four places, as on pp. 150, 190-91, and 316. The inclusion of Hebrew words, even in transliterated form, makes the sometimes complicated philological argument much easier to follow for the scholar as well as the layman.) He also seems to be right in concluding (pp. 146-48) that the teacher of righteousness is to be identified with "the priest into whose heart God put wisdom to explain all the words of His servants the prophets," and that "the man of the lie" was the opponent and chastiser of the teacher of righteousness.

Even more important, perhaps, is the author's contention (p. 149) that the name Absalom need not refer to an historical person of that name, and that particular groups are not explicitly named in the Habakkuk Commentary. But I should be even more cautious than the sometimes over-cautious author about assuming, as he tentatively does (p. 158), that, besides the "teacher of righteousness" and "the wicked priest," there are two more *dramatis personae,* namely, "the man of the lie" and "the preacher of the lie." But we shall need more material before determining the relations of these shadowy figures to one another.

I doubt that any scholar could have given a more helpful summary of the arguments for and against the various theories of historical background and the various identifications of persons than that given by Burrows in his eighth chapter. He does not accept any theory (ranging from a pre-Maccabean to a medieval dating) as proved, but, in a later passage (p. 223), he assigns the composition of the sectarian documents to a period between 175 and 40 B.C., and if one reads between the lines, one gathers that he considers the historical background to be the period between Hyrcanus I and Hyrcanus II, roughly between 135 and 63 B.C.

That there is a close relation in background and doctrine between the Damascus Covenant, found some sixty years ago among the papyri

of the Genizah in an old synagogue in Cairo, and the Qumran Manual of Discipline has been recognized since the publication of the latter document, but a few scholars have so well summarized the historical implications of this relation as Burrows does (pp. 187-203). One detail might be mentioned here. It may be true, as the author says (p. 191), that the Hebrew word *moshab* may be used in different ways in the two documents, meaning "session" in the Manual and "settlement" in the Damascus Covenant, but the meaning "settlement" seems to occur in the former work as well beside that of "session." And there are other Hebrew terms that have several different meanings in the same scroll, so that this particular difference may not be very important. Burrows suggests that the differences between the two documents may be explained by the theory that they come from two different groups within the same movement or by the theory that they represent different stages in the history of the movement. The latter seems to me more probable.

The author deals at some length with Isaac Rabinowitz's somewhat radical notions about the historical background of the Damascus Covenant and concludes (p. 202) that he has made a "very strong case" against the common assumption that there really was a migration of orthodox Jews to Damascus. With this conclusion I think the great majority of scholars will disagree. As for the background of the scroll called The War of the Sons of Light with the Sons of Darkness, it seems at the present time to be eschatological rather than realistic. Burrows is sensible, as usual, in suggesting (p. 207) that "even if there is no reference to a specific war, already in progress or regarded as imminent, the writer's conception of military procedure might reflect the practices of his own time." In his bibliography Burrows mentions Avi Yonah's theory of a Hellenistic coloring to the military terms, but he does not discuss this in his text.

A number of interesting observations are brought together in the chapter, "Ideas, Vocabulary and Literary Relations." Here the author effectively disposes of several of Zeitlin's arguments against a pre-medieval dating of the scrolls, and in so doing is much more courteous than Zeitlin has been in dealing with his critics. Burrows has neatly pointed out, among other things (p. 215), that "curiously enough the argument here consists of explaining a term that does not actually appear in the Karaite literature by other words, derived from the same root, which are used in Karaite writings but do not appear in the Dead

Sea Scrolls!" In making his own criticisms of Zeitlin, and in reporting the similar objections made by other scholars, such as Sukenik and Teicher, Burrows might, I think, have strengthened the case for an early dating as against Zeitlin's theory of Karaite origin by pointing out that Zeitlin believes the book of Jubilees to be pre-Maccabean, and since certain resemblances between it and Kararite works can best be explained by assuming that the book of Jubilees survived long enough to influence the Karaites in the Middle Ages, there is no good reason to doubt that the writings of the Qumran covenanters also survived long enough to influence the Karaites.

The origin, history, and organization of the Qumran sect are competently discussed in Chapter XI, but there are a few points on which I venture to disagree with the author. I rather doubt, for example, that in the Manual of Discipline the word *rabbim,* usually meaning "the many," has the special meaning of "masters" rather than designating the membership as a whole in contrast to the ruling council. I also doubt that the obscure phrase HM GDL in Manual x.4 means "the [letter] Mem is large," as Burrows suggests (p. 244) and as other scholars have rendered, since the names of the Hebrew consonants are feminine, while here the adjective *gadol* "large" is masculine. I also think that Burrows exaggerates when he says (p. 245), "In general it may be said that the moral ideals of the covenanters of Qumran are much like those of similar monastic groups in other religions but quite unlike those of orthodox Judaism at many points." It seems to me that in most points their moral ideals were more like those of orthodox Jews than any other religious group.

The author has also done a good job of summarizing the beliefs of the Qumran covenanters in Chapter II, though, here again, a few of his statements seem to me questionable. He is right in saying (p. 251) that "the interpretations of the law in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Damascus Covenant and their relation to the rabbinic interpretations later crystallized in the Talmud should be thoroughly investigated," but he has overlooked the fact that this has been done very fully in the case of the Damascus Covenant by Louis Ginzberg, who is not mentioned in his bibliography, and more briefly by C. Rabin, who *is* mentioned there.

In this chapter Burrows raises the question of Gnosticism in the scrolls—one of the most complicated problems in the history of Juda-

ism and early Christianity and hardly to be disposed of in a non-technical work like this. On the whole the author has been judicious in weighing the evidence for and against the assumption of Gnostic elements in the Qumran writings, but I should be inclined to put the case for the affirmative more strongly than he does when he writes (p. 259), "Undoubtedly the scrolls contain ideas and ideals resembling those of the Gnostics at various points. Some indirect and indefinable historical connection is not impossible. On the whole, however, it seems unnecessary and only confusing to apply the term Gnosticism to the form in which such ideas appear in the Dead Sea Scrolls." In an article (not mentioned in Burrows' bibliography but cited further on in his text) published in the *Journal of Biblical Literature* in 1954, I tried to show that the Qumran covenanters, identified with the Essenes, were "gnosticizing Pharisees," but lack of space prevents elaboration of this theme here. More acceptable than the statement quoted from Burrows above is, I think, his later formulation of the problem (pp. 271-72); "Affinities with Gnosticism can be seen in beliefs of the sect but the covenanters did not depart so far from the ancient tradition as to adopt the metaphysical dualism of the Gnostics or their elaborate mythology of redemption."

The assumption of Gnostic influence on the Qumran sect does not, as may appear at first sight, conflict with the notion that the covenanters were close to the Pharisees in ethics and theology (one notable difference being the covenanters' determinism as over against Pharisaic belief in freedom of the will). This view seems to be shared by Burrows, though he expresses it somewhat differently (p. 261). "Whatever foreign influences may have affected the ideas of the Qumran covenanters, their basic point of view and major doctrines were thoroughly Jewish, derived primarily from the Old Testament."

Among the various details here treated is the question whether the "teacher of righteousness" was identified with the Messiah, as Dupont-Sommer believes, or not. Burrows seems to be in the right in siding with those scholars who oppose the view of Dupont-Sommer. He is probably also right in holding (pp. 270-71) that we have not sufficient evidence to show whether the covenanters believed in the resurrection of the body (as did the Pharisees) or, rather, in the immortality of the soul (as Josephus says the Essenes did), but he inclines to the latter alternative.

In Chapter XIII, "Identification," Burrows' usual and usually commendable caution seems to me to thin out into something like timidity. I suspect that he really believes that the Qumran covenanters were Essenes, but for some strange reason—not merely scholarly caution, I can't help feeling—he does not boldly say so. At any rate, I find a curious evasiveness or, at least, indecisiveness in various passages. For example, he says in one place (p. 280), "For myself I must say that the geographical connection remains the strongest reason for regarding the Qumran secretarians as Essenes. If they were not the same, there was hardly room for both Essenes and covenanters in the vicinity of Wady Qumran." In another place (p. 294) he writes, "If by Essene we mean a particular sect, which we assume to be accurately described by the ancient writers, then the covenanters were not Essenes. For the present it seems best not to speak of the Qumran sect as Essenes but rather to say that the Essenes and the covenanters, with other groups of which we know little or nothing, represented the same general type." In a third passage (p. 298) he is slightly more positive in saying, "If this term is used in a broad, comprehensive sense, we may legitimately call the Qumran sectarians Essenes. . . . At any rate, it is clear that the sect of Qumran was more closely related to the Essenes than to any other group known to us." And finally, he concludes (p. 344) that "the identification of the covenanters with the Essenes in particular is largely a matter of definition. If the covenanters were not Essenes, they were in any case closely related and lived in the same region."

To some readers this rather vacillating line may seem perfectly legitimate in view of the undeniable fact that there are a few differences between the beliefs and practices of the Essenes, as described by Philo and Josephus, and those of the sectarians whose views are preserved in the Dead Sea scrolls and the Damascus Covenant. But these differences are far outweighed by the similarities. Burrows' hesitancy seems to me puzzling, especially because of my belief that the differences between the Essenes of Philo and Josephus and the Qumran sectarians are less significant than the differences between the Shammaites and the Hillelites, and yet Burrows would presumably have no hesitation in applying the term "Pharisees" to both these groups. Then why not call the Qumran covenanters Essenes?

Perhaps it is ungracious of me to reproach Burrows for timidity in this respect since he has done me the honor to speak approvingly (pp.

293-94)—"if the identification of the Essenes and Qumran covenanters is assumed"—of my theory that the Essenes formed one of the three branches of the Pharisaic party, being in their social and economic views to the left of the liberal Hillelite Pharisees, these in turn being to the left of the conservative Shammaite Pharisees, and that all three groups formed a center partly between the Sadducees on the extreme right and the Zealots on the extreme left. I do not know, however, whether Burrows would approve of my further description of the Essenes (including the Qumran covenanters) as "gnosticizing Pharisees."

Before leaving this chapter I should like to comment on a detail (p. 282) of some importance. In discussing Dupont-Sommer's identification of the Qumran sect with the Essenes, Burrows says that "the obligation to reveal none of the secrets of the sect to outsiders is not specifically mentioned in the Dead Sea scrolls, but there are few possible allusions to it." *Doch.* In Manual ix.17 the words LSTR 'T 'ṢT HTWRH BTWK 'NŠY H'WL can hardly mean anything but "conceal the counsel of the Torah from men of wickedness (i.e., outsiders)," and Burrows himself renders similarly.

There are a good many sound and interesting observations in Chapter XIV on the various contributions made by the scrolls to biblical philology, but I must resist the temptation to linger over these technical matters and shall pass on to the concluding chapter, "Contributions to the Study of Judaism and Christianity." In contrast to the caution that he has shown throughout the rest of his book, the author here makes the rather bold statement (p. 327) that "there is no danger, however, that our understanding of the New Testament will be so revolutionized by the Dead Sea Scrolls as to require a revision of any basic article of Christian faith." This may be true of the material already discovered, but one never knows what further even more startling discoveries may be made. And, while his confident statement may be true at the present time, it might be well to add that, as a result of the discoveries already made and the studies already published, a far larger number of people may become aware of the fact that most New Testament writings can be fully understand only in the light of Jewish thought and literary forms.

Most scholars will probably agree with Burrows in holding that there are notable differences between the career of Jesus and that of the Qumran "teacher of righteousness" and in pointing out (p. 331)

that the covenanters' "high standards of morality . . . are found already in the Old Testament." He seems to me to be unfair, however, in saying that "the contrast between the love of enemies inculcated by the Sermon on the Mount and the hatred for the sons of darkness demanded by the Manual of Discipline shows how far the covenanters were from the teaching of Jesus." If we compare the hatred of the Jews shown by the evangelist John, whose gospel is supposedly the gospel of love, with the hatred of the sons of darkness shown by the Qumran covenanters, we discover that Christian theological odium is just as strong as that of the Essenes or the Pharisees.

The similarities and differences between the Qumran sect and the early Church are well presented (pp. 332-33), as are those between the teachings of Paul and the covenanters (pp. 334-36). To Burrows' observations one might add the suggestion that there are curious resemblances between Paul's un-Greek style and the Qumran writers' un-Hebrew style in respect of the heaping up of prepositional phrases whose meaning and relation to other parts of the sentence are often baffling.

Perhaps more attention has been given by scholars to the affinities of the Dead Sea scrolls with the gospel of John than with any other early Christian writing, and on this subject, as on so many others, Burrows takes a sensible view in arguing (pp. 339-40) that:

> even the most sriking parallels between the Johannine literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls involve little that is peculiar to them. . . . What may be said without any exaggeration is that the Gospel and epistles of John and the Dead Sea Scrolls reflect the same general background of sectarian Judaism. The scrolls thus show—and this has not always been recognized—that we do not have to look outside of Palestinian Judaism for the soil in which the Johannine theology grew.

From the passages selected for comment in this review, it will, I hope, be apparent how substantial a contribution Burrows has made to scholarship by summarizing a vast amount of scattered material on the recently discovered scrolls, and how useful a guide he had provided to non-scholars who wish to know something about the contents and significance of these new finds.

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*The Scrolls from the Dead Sea.* By Edmund Wilson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. 121 pp. $3.25.

It is not often that one has the privilege of reviewing a "best-seller" in a scholarly periodical. Yet because of the nature of the subject and the popular way in which it is presented, Mr. Wilson's book, *The Scrolls from the Dead Sea,* can well qualify as one of the best works of 1955 in the "popular science" field. Except for an additional three or four pages, this work had appeared earlier as an article in the *New Yorker* (May 14, 1955). It was here that the American public read for the first time the amazing story of the Qumrān Community and its manuscripts.

How Mr. Wilson, a novelist, literary critic, and "reporter at large" for the *New Yorker* became interested in this subject is quite a story in itself. In the school year of 1953-54, Mr. Wilson gave a series of lectures at Princeton University, his alma mater ('16). Since it was necessary for him to take up his residence in Princeton that year, he decided to study Hebrew so that he might read the literary treasures of the Hebrews in the language in which they were originally written. After a year of study with the reviewer, Mr. Wilson became so proficient in Hebrew and so interested in the Old Testament that he wrote an article for the *New Yorker,* entitled "On First Reading Genesis" (May 15, 1954).

In the spring of 1954 Mr. Wilson made a trip to Israel under the auspices of the magazine mentioned above. While there, he somehow accomplished the wellnigh impossible feat of crossing over into Jordan from Israel at the Mandelbaum Gate. During his short stay in Jordan, he visited Qumrān, many points of interest in Jerusalem and environs, and Samaria. These experiences he has described in "Eretz Yisrael" (*New Yorker,* Dec. 4, 1954), and the article on the Dead Sea Scrolls mentioned above.

Mr. Wilson's book is a masterpiece of on-the-spot news reporting. The author's inquisitiveness, boundless enthusiasm, and clear, crisp style are apparent on every page. Most of his facts regarding the archeology and history of Qumrān come directly from Père de Vaux himself, who generously shared of his time and notes. Material which had heretofore not been allowed to be published was now made available to Mr. Wilson, thanks to the magic word, "New Yorker".

It is not our purpose here to recount the facts and their interpretation which have been so attractively presented in this volume. Each year finds new and startling material coming to light which adds to our knowledge of the Qumrān sect and their manuscripts. But the main observations and conclusions given here, regarding the history of the sect and their monastery, will probably be altered very little by future discoveries.

A word, however, should be said about Mr. Wilson's own views about the Qumrān discoveries and their importance, especially for the understanding of Christian origins. It is rather unfortunate that the American public should have been introduced to the Qumrān Community and its manuscripts by one who has no religious affiliations or theological training. The answer to Mr. Wilson's query as to whether anyone but a "secular scholar is really quite free to grapple with the problems of the Dead Sea discoveries" must, of course, be answered in the negative, as his own book clearly shows.

In a flash of inspiration Mr. Wilson says,

> Anyone who goes to the Gospels from the literature of the intertestamental apocrypha and the literature of the Dead Sea sect must feel at once the special genius of Jesus and be struck by the impossibility of falling in with one of the worst tendencies of insensitive modern scholarship and accounting for everything in the Gospels in terms of analogies and precedents.

Yet on another page he falls into the same error he is here repudiating when he says,

> The monastery, this structure of stone that endures, between the bitter waters and the precipitous cliffs, with its oven and inkwells, its mills and its cesspool, its constellation of sacred fonts and unadorned graves of its dead, is perhaps, more than Bethlehem or Nazareth, the cradle of Christianity.

Mr. Wilson is right in the first quotation when he asserts that the uniqueness of Jesus cannot be accounted for in terms of analogies and precedents, but he does not go on to tell us what the source of that uniqueness is. For the Christian, the power and drive of the Christian religion can only be explained by the utterly unique character of its founder, not by a Jewish Essene sect, however much that sect may have contributed externally to the structure and practices of the early Church, or even to its thinking.

Again, Mr. Wilson says,

. . . and it would seem an immense advantage for cultural and social intercourse—that is, for civilization—that the rise of Christianity should, at last, be generally understood as simply an episode of human history rather than propagated as dogma and divine revelation. The study of the Dead Sea scrolls—with the direction it is now taking—cannot fail, one would think, to conduce to this.

But how, we ask, can Christianity, as an historical phenomenon, be separated from "divine revelation," or theological "dogma"? The one without the other means nothing. We can never understand the "electric power" of the Gospels, as Mr. Wilson calls it, apart from the faith of those who wrote them. The Qumrān Community lasted long after the death of Jesus, yet it never generated power like that found in the Gospels. The only explanation for this phenomenon is the person of Christ and the faith of those who believed that He was the Messiah.

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*Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period.* By ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH. Vol. I: *The Archaeological Evidence from Palestine.* xvii, 300 pp.; Vol. II: *The Archaeological Evidence from the Diaspora.* xi, 323 pp.; Vol. III: *Illustrations.* xxxv, 10 pp. (index), 1209 figs.; Vol. IV: *The Problem of Method: Symbols from Jewish Cult.* xiii, 235 pp.; 117 figs. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953-54. (Bollingen Series, XXXVII, New York, N. Y.)

This monumental work is not yet complete. Two or even three more volumes are still to come. The entire accomplishment when finished will be an outstanding contribution to the history of religion. The author is justified in having high hopes that "not only Judaism and the origin of Christianity may be illumined by the present undertaking, but it may also offer suggestions for a new methodology applicable to the whole spiritual history of the civilizations behind us." He sees in the evolution of Western mankind a continuous adaptation of certain basic symbols. As a historian of religion, Goodenough, on the basis of those symbols, investigates the reasons why Christianity could so early and quickly be Hellenized. In order

to explain this fact, he postulates a Judaism which was mystically inclined and kept itself outside the grasp of Rabbinic legalism.

There are no written documentations regarding this type of Judaism, the existence of which Goodenough tries to derive from the many monuments, synagogues, tombs, objects of all kinds, like lamps, amulets, glasses, coins, etc., which display an array of visual symbols, to a considerable part taken over from paganism. These symbols, according to Goodenough, testify to the mystic inclinations of those Jews who "used" them as visual indications that the immortality of the soul is sure and that salvation is theirs. He is of the opinion that Jews borrowed the art expressed in these monuments and objects systematically from the surrounding civilizations of the Greco-Roman world.

While aware of the hypothetical character of his explanations, Goodenough insists that "now no historian in the field may ignore or slight" the existence of this art, regardless of the results which he himself has to offer. The very fact that he has made such a comprehensive study of the archeological material at hand and presented it in an easily accessible systematization, assisted by hundreds of excellent illustrations, is a merit in itself. No Jewish scholar so far has even tried to give an overall account of the manifold archeological finds of recent decades. Whoever is working in this field must feel most grateful to Professor Goodenough for his excellent summary which, while it does not attempt to publish every object, is an outstanding archievement in the almost encyclopedic presentation of an hitherto scattered material.

To examine all these monuments and objects in the company of so spirited a writer as Goodenough is a delight in itself. On every page, in every line, the personality of the author can be felt. In the discussion of basic principles underlying the creation of the various items and designs he adds to his work unexpected spiritual dimensions. There are chapters in his books which, in themselves, deserve special attention, aside from the connection in which they are presented. A chapter on magic and religion in the second volume becomes an independent and profound treatment of the subject. The chapter entitled "Method in Evaluating Symbols," in the fourth volume, is of particular relevance to every student of religion from whatever angle

he may approach the subject. These highly personal and at the same time highly scholarly discussions are presented not as a guiding principle of the search made by the author, but as the product of his manifold investigations. These merits of Goodenough's stimulating and thoughtprovoking investigations are enhanced by the esthetic appearance of the books themselves, a printing job of the first order which makes the reading of the volumes a pleasure for the eye. The indices render the work most useful for reference.

To evaluate properly all the conclusions at which Goodenough arrives would only be possible in a treatment of adequate size and written with careful consideration of all the aspects touched upon in his challenging statements. He rightly says that the hypothesis which he offers cannot just be brushed aside, but can only be replaced by another hypothesis. It is with this thought in mind that certain criticisms are offered here.

Goodenough construes an inner antagonism between the symbol-happy Jews of late anitquity and the anti-symbolic, puritanistic rabbis. Maybe these two parties existed. But if so, were they really two Jewish parties? Judaism is fundamentally anti-mythological. This attitude we have to understand as its main difference, not only from the religions of the people which surrounded ancient Israel, but also from the mystery cults of late antiquity over which Christianity finalled triumphed historically as well as methaphysically. The question arises if a Judaism which by means of symbolic practice moves all too close to the syncretistic mystery religions can still be called Judaism. Goodenough entitles his book "Jewish Symbols" and shows how many pagan symbolic motifs were taken over by Jews. Can he therefore rightly call it "*Jewish* Symbols"? Should he not better name it "Symbols Used by Jews in the Greco-Roman Period"?

One of the reasons why this undeniably great abundance of visual symbols can be found in those ancient Jewish monuments may also lie in the change brought about by the Judeo-Christian emphasis on the spiritual. To express it, the art forms of antiquity, trained to bring out the human figure only, could not be utilized convincingly to convey the transcendental contents of those creeds which now pervaded the Hellenistic world. It became necessary to attempt a more abstract presentation and representation of those contents which finally led to the dissolution of the humanistic art forms of antiquity.

Art *had* to become "symbolic," and it needed no special sectarianism for that.

Using these spiritual expressions for which a form like the seven-branched candlestick (the only Jewish form in existence) lent itself very well, Jews had created a proper means of self-identification. Goodenough marvels at the fact that this seven-branched candlestick, the Menorah, is found so frequently on ancient Jewish tombstones. If he could visit the cemetery of the Roumanian city of Cernauti, he would see over fifty variations of the Menorah on tombstones, erected in the first half of the last century. These beautiful tombstones on which many other motifs, and quite a number of them "pagan," can be found were commissioned by the families of the deceased and carved by the tombstone makers according to a special tradition which called for certain decorative designs. Still, to this very day, when Jewish tombstone making unfortunately has deteriorated esthetically, a family is guided by the maker of the stone in the choice of the decorative part of a tombstone. There is no reason to assume that tombstone making in antiquity was in principle any different. The frequent occurrence of certain designs was in all likelihood caused much more by the catalogue of the stone cutter than by individual religious longings.

Time and again Goodenough emphasizes that, before the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, the Menorah does not appear on Jewish tombstones. This fact should prevent him from putting too much emphasis on the individual desire to safeguard future life by the emblematic use of the Menorah, which is rather to be understood as an expression of the Jewish people. Recently, in the *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*, Cecil Roth has proposed a most plausible explanation for the use of symbols like the Menorah, which becomes already clear in the title of the paper, "Messianic Symbols in Palestinian Archaeology." While Goodenough stresses the eschatological angle occasionally, the paramount messianic implication of the symbols used does not occur to him in its full force. Instead of a popular symbol with messianic and thereby national connotation, the Menorah in Goodenough's interpretation becomes the "light of the world or logos, God's mercy revealed to the Jew," and he practically neighbors it to what would amount to a representation of the Godhead Himself.

This rather daring interpretation of the Menorah is mainly based on the assumption that Jews in antiquity used the seven-branched candlestick in the synagogues all over the Roman Empire. A single stone piece, found in 1921 in the synagogue of Hammath-by-Tiberias, is used as proof for this supposition. It is a limestone block which shows in relief the shape of the Menorah and, on top, seven hollowed-out grooves which evidently were used for kindling lights. Sukenik, who calls the item a "stone candlestick," also based upon this piece the assumption that Menoroth were used in antique synagogues. It takes only a moment's thought to derive from this relief-carving of a Menorah just the opposite conclusion, namely that it is in no way indicative of the forbidden *use* of the seven-branched candlestick made of metal in the synagogue of old, but rather shows the *abstract representation* of a Menorah design. No Menorah made of metal for actual use from antiquity has yet been found, only its symbolic representation *on* lamps, not *as* lamps, and Goodenough has no right to speak of a "universal use" of the seven-branched candlestick in synagogues of that period.

While drawing conclusions from a wrong interpretation of evidence on one side, Goodenough interprets some archeological facts too arbitrarily on the other. A case in point is his attempt to explain symbolically why, in some Galilean synagogues, the central door of the southern facade was blocked by masonry. The Palestinian Talmud gives a rather simple solution to this puzzle which needs no symbolistic interpretation of any kind. The entrance was blocked because of the change in the direction of prayer on the part of the congregation which made the shifting of the entrance from the south to the north side necessary. (See *Introduction to the Palestinian Talmud,* by Louis Ginzberg, pp. 70 f.)

In his interesting discussion of the Shofar, Goodenough gives the blowing of the ram's horn on Yom Kippur the same importance as the Shofar blowing on New Year's day, and he derives from that a rather lengthy interpretation which should in proportion be shortened, because of the fact that the period which Goodenough discusses did not know of any blowing of the Shofar on the Day of Atonement at all. Still in the ninth century the famous order of prayer by Rab Amram does not know of this custom which is of medieval origin and nothing but a reminiscence of the sound which proclaimed the

Jubilee year in ancient Israel. It has no liturgic significance whatsoever and may have been introduced for purely practical reasons.

Another example how Goodenough at times adjusts evidence to his way of interpreting can be found in his discussion of the Torah breastplate, which he mistakenly thinks is usually designed to represent a little Torah shrine. This little opening with the small Torah inside can only be found in Eastern European pieces. It is also incorrect to call the Torah shrine a Mizrach, the device by which the direction of prayer is indicated on a special tablet used only in the Jewish home. In discussing a breastplate of the eighteenth century, Goodenough describes it in its various motifs and finds among them a motto "oaths" which he interprets as "covenants" to represent the Torah. Actually, in that breastplate is inserted a little plaque indicating the day for which that particular scroll was used in the synagogue. In this case it says *Shabuoth,* which means the festival of Pentecost. Goodenough, however, reads into this the plural of *Sh'buah,* meaning "oath," which has nothing whatsoever to do with the name of the Jewish Feast of Weeks, Shabuoth.

In his tendency to symbolize practically everything, Goodenough classifies the phylacteries under amulets, yet he should realize that, from the very outset, the rabbis of old have shaped the phylacteries in cubic form in order to distinguish them through their mere appearance from amulets, which usually are round. The term "phylacteries" as it is used in the Gospels already is a criticism in itself, as it characterizes the tefillin as magic implements. However, their use points at the fact that they are everything else but magic. While amulets are mainly effective at night, the time of the evil spirits, tefillin can be worn all day, but have to be taken down by nightfall. They are not to be used by women, who are the main bearers of amulets.

Other wrong interpretations, like the floor mosaic of the ancient synagogue of Beth Alpha, have already been repudiated by Franz Landsberger in his review of Goodenough's books in the *American Journal of Theology* (vol. 76, 4, October, 1955). We may just add to the pertinent remarks made there about the practice of Jewish art on one side and the rabbinic theories on the other one more thought. Goodenough does not know any passages where the rabbis of old distinguished between images in the flat and in the round when he dis-

cusses the various prohibitions regarding idolatry. Professor Boaz Cohen, under the title, "Art in Jewish Law," has published a preliminary treatment of this subject in *Judaism* (vol. 3, no. 2, Spring, 1954), where the various sources for the rabbinic prohibitions are given. The Hebrew word *Pesel* for idol can already furnish the proper explanation, as it actually means something that is hewn out. At any rate, Boaz Cohen has pointed out that, in consonance with the letter and spirit of Jewish law, sculpture in relief and in the round of the completely articulated human figure was eschewed by traditionally minded Jews of every age.

Yet it is a fact that, since about the year 1600, there appear in Jewish ceremonial art figures in relief and in the full round, not only on objects used in the home, like the Hanukkah candlestick or the spice box, but even on Torah ornaments, that is to say in the central sanctuary of the synagogue; nay, one could even find in the synagogues of Worms and Prague full round figures of Jupiter with the thunderbolt as a part of the synagogue candelabra. Suppose this evidence would come to light two thousand years hence. Certainly, no literary sources could be found about the existence of these figures which evidently defy tradition. It could well be that an interpreter of that time would read into the existence of these figures a blend of sectarianism which would represent an inner and outer opposition to Rabbinic Judaism. Yet we know only too well that such a sect never existed.

While this is only a small bit of argument, it should nonetheless give the diligent interpreter of the antique monuments a little food for further thought as to the validity of generalizations and the actual value of vestiges of old. That does not mean that Goodenough's impressive volumes are not useful; indeed they are, beyond the fact that they are stimulating and challenging. They undoubtly throw light upon the relation between Christianity and Judaism, and they have indeed already given rise to new discussions and evaluations.

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*The Rediscovery of the Bible.* By WILLIAM NEIL. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. 255 pp. $3.00.

William Neil's book is typical of a familiar genre of religious writing. It is biblical criticism and biblical theology for the lay reader. It shares the weaknesses and strengths of most such efforts and should be judged in terms of its type and not by the specialist's boredom with the obvious. There is little here that has not been said in similar handbooks. If one sets aside the trite illustrations which appear now and then (e.g., p. 25), the book is on the whole more readable than many others of its kind. The basic questions may well be: how many such books are needed? how widely are they used? how adequate is their viewpoint?

The author accepts the critical method of Bible study but warns against the facile philosophic and religious assumptions of many of its exponents. He points to the uniqueness of the biblical faith and rightly indicates that not only do we study that faith objectively but are summoned to a response in the presence of its witness. The essential insight of most modern theology is boldly placarded: the revelation to which Hebrew-Christian faith attests is in and through history. Critical study that lays bare the history, therefore, is an indispensable ally. Nevertheless, critical study is in itself neutral, for it may also be used in the interests of a rationalism or historicism which views man in a truncated fashion and has no sense of openness toward mystery. Neil recounts the biblical drama in its total range, focusing on the pivotal episodes from Genesis to Revelation. Everywhere he sees inter-personal encounter between a purposive God and responsive man. The uncompromising specificness of biblical faith, both in the concepts of chosen people and incarnation, is viewed as integral to the revelation.

When Neil speaks of "middle-of-the-road modern British Scholarship" he aptly describes his own position. He gives us a picture of the Old Testament which would be readily accepted by H. H. Rowley and of the New which would be at home in the pages of C. H. Dodd. When an author takes so vast a province even his most sympathetic reader is certain to find disagreements. There is, for example, a curiously obscure note on the Hebrew name for God (p. 76). The brutality of the early Hebrews is excused as "the clean cruelty of the desert

and not the brutal and sadistic savagery of their contemporaries" (p. 150). The blanket statement that "The Aryan laws of Hitlerism were no more rigid than the Jewish laws of Judaism" (p. 182) seems to ignore the respective fruits of Nazism and Judaism. The general trend of the discussion about the resurrection faith is distorted toward a crass materialism when it is said, ". . . once these rumours began to fly around Jerusalem it would have been the easiest thing for the authorities to suppress them if they had not been true" (p. 222).

The reviewer asks himself why he is disturbed by the book, in spite of his basic agreement with its critical and theological orientation. Had he been required to cover the same ground he would scarcely have done better in the same number of pages, probably not so well. Limitation of space and generality of expression contrive to sacrifice depth and clarity at a number of points. Liberalism (is the term advisedly used for the whole scope of biblical criticism?) is praised and condemned almost in the same breath, in such a way that the reader is likely to be left wondering. The notion of revelation in history calls for fundamental examination, rather than merely reciting the biblical story. Neil is aware of this but feels bound to the stereotype of what every biblical introduction for the layman ought to include.

Is it possible that we are simply trying to say too much in too few pages when we write books of this sort? More than this, is it conceivable that we are preparing a generation of Bible "readers" whose major knowledge is a vague impression of God acting in history? This is no doubt a more adequate schema than the image of ladder-like evolution of ideas about God. Still, it is true that the panorama of historical revelation can become just as mechanical and idolatrous as the evolutionary framework. Are people being prepared to think in terms of the biblical faith over against other faiths (and unfaiths) and of the problem of "translating" what the Bible is talking about? It may be unreasonable to ask an introduction to do this, but when example after example of this "Bible for the layman" genre come from the press in the same mold, we are entitled to wonder if there is the danger of paying fashionable deference to the Bible instead of exposing ourselves to its contemporary power. We should be grateful that the Bible and its faith are again at the center of religious thinking, but we must not forget the source of its power or the circumference toward which its insights are directed. Are we guilty of a new

Biblicism? The reviewer is asking that question not only of Neil but of himself, and of the present generation of biblical scholarship.

NORMAN K. GOTTWALD

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*Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality.* By PAUL TILLICH. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. 116 pp. $2.25.

The publication of this book by Paul Tillich will no doubt provoke further discussion on current issues involving affirmations and denials of a possible rapport between biblical religion and philosophy. The book is not long—only some eighty pages divided into eight succinct sections. Its brevity is, however, both a virtue and a defect. Its virtue is that it lays bare the basic structure and pattern of Tillich's argument. But this is also a defect in that the depth, richness, and sophistication of Tillich's thought is missing—qualities which enrich and sustain the argument. This is an unhappy situation, since many readers will depend on this particular book for their understanding of his position.

The argument is presented with masterful simplicity. Dr. Tillich rejects attempts to reduce philosophy to logical analysis or to reduce religion to revelation. For if philosophy is reducible to logical analysis and religion is sheer revelation, no confrontation between ontology and biblical religion is possible. It would be "as absurd as the confrontation of electrophysics and biblical religion." Philosophy, however, cannot be reduced to logical analysis, for man is the being who implicitly, if not explicitly, gives an answer to the question of the structure and meaning of being. Nor is biblical religion reducible to revelation as some Continental theologians understand it, for revelation must be received by a particular people in a particular time and place. "He who gives an account of divine revelation simultaneously gives an account of his own religion." Both biblical religion and ontology claim to have reference to an ultimate which is of decisive significance. The greater part of the book is devoted to stating the specific and contrasting characteristics concerning the ultimate and man's relation to it when the language of biblical theology and ontology are compared. A genuine confrontation appears to exist.

A confrontation, however, can take place only on the basis of a common ground underlying both biblical religion and ontology which makes such confrontation possible. There is thus a strong apologetical reason for refusing to reduce biblical religion to revelation and ontology to logical analysis. It is possible for the theologian to speak to the philosopher. The common ground underlying biblical religion and ontology lies in the fact that an ultimate concern characterizes man in the situation of faith, as well as man in search for ultimate being. The consequence is the problem of "two ultimates." But it is impossible to have two ultimates, for one or both "would not really be ultimate." The concern of the believer is concern about that which is really ultimate, and hence the believer, like the philosopher, is asking the question of ultimate being. The difficulty can be resolved if the believer assumes "that in the symbols of his ultimate concern the answer to the question of ultimate reality is implied." "Faith includes the ontological question, whether the question is asked explicity or not." Faith is in no danger of being undermined by the doubt implicit in ontology, because "faith includes both an immediate awareness of something unconditional and the courage to take the risk of uncertainty upon itself."

The philosopher, likewise, is "in a situation which also unites a 'No' and 'Yes'." "One cannot ask the ontological question without having at least a pre-philosophical knowledge of what 'being' means." Ontology is incorporated within faith and cannot be a threat to faith —nor does faith stultify reason—for both faith and ontology presuppose the awareness of something unconditional. The problem of two ultimates is really the awareness of one ultimate, and the problem of doubt is grounded in a prior awareness of the unconditional character of the ultimate. The consequence is that we must look through and past the symbols of our ultimate concern. The problem is to correlate and reinterpret the language of biblical religion in terms of what Tillich calls "the ontological question." The correlation and implicit reinterpretation is already made the moment one says, "God is."

There is, however, a curious ambiguity in Tillich's use of the phrase "the ontological question." He continually confuses a formal statement as to what is meant by an ontological assertion and his own interpretation that ontology is the answer to the search "for ulti-

mate reality beyond everything that seems to be real." The ontological question" arises because "we stand between being and nonbeing and long for a form of being that prevails against nonbeing in ourselves and in our world." Many would say that this confuses one particular understanding of the philosophical quest with philosophy as such. Tillich admits that it would be "neither fair to other philosophies nor adequate to the confrontation of philosophy and biblical religion if only *one* understanding of philosophy is brought to such a confrontation." In order to meet this objection Tillich takes issue with process philosophy and with the empiricist tradition where, he says, the ontological question is not denied but is "interpreted as the question of the most general structures and relations of reality and the methods of their analysis." Tillich claims to be able to "show that the ontological question underlies even this type of philosophy." If, however, ontology means the search for "a form of being that prevails against nonbeing in ourselves and in our world," if it means the search "for ultimate reality beyond everything that seems to be real," if it means the search for "being-itself," then it would appear that Tillich is taking his stand in one particular ontological tradition. And it is unfair and inadequate to define the motivation and concern for philosophical truth as conceived by the empiricist tradition in terms of the Platonic-Neoplatonic quest for "being-itself." It may very well be that the concern for objective philosophical truth as conceived by the empiricist tradition functions as the quest for "being-itself" functions for those who are concerned about their existential situation, but the content expressed by the Platonic-Neoplatonic "being-itself" should not be confused with the content involved in the search for objective philosophical truth as understood by the empiricist tradition. By continually confusing formal statements with statements involving specific interpretations, by confusing existential function with particular content, Tillich is able to show that his particular understanding of philosophy is philosophy per se.

Tillich believes he is relating elements that ought to be naturally related and which, indeed, are ultimately one when their depths are probed. This reviewer believes, however, that he has juxtaposed elements which are not so necessarily and ultimately related. It may be neither necessary nor possible to separate philosophy and biblical religion (as the book jacket says), but there does not appear to be any

necessity for linking the particular ontology underlying Tillich's particular understanding of "the ontological question" and the theology implicit in biblical language.

FRANK F. WEKERLE

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*Der Begriff "Verstehen" in Exegetischem Zusammenhang unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung der Paulinischen Schriften.* By MARTIN MAGNUSSON. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1954. 224 pp. Kr. 18.

The issues involved in the attempt to define the proper method for the science of interpretation have been dramatized in theology most recently by Rudolf Bultmann with his existentialist hermeneutics and "de-mythologizing" program. But the science of hermeneutics has always been of parmount interest to Protestantism, committed as it is in theory to the sole sufficiency of Scripture for faith and doctrine. And, as Wilhelm Dilthey, the foremost philosopher of historical method, pointed out in his *Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik,* the science in its modern form is immeasurably indebted to Protestant theologians. In a doctoral dissertation presented to the theological faculty of the University of Lund, Martin Magnusson has undertaken an examination of the grounds and proper goal of biblical hermeneutics as they are revealed in the actual attempt to interpret certain Pauline texts. Dr. Magnusson's method of illustrating his theory in concrete exegeses is particularly fortunate.

Magnusson's main contention is that the text itself plays the dominant role in the process by which an exegete achieves a "better" or even a "right" understanding of Scripture. The actual significance the author claims for the priority of the text first comes to light in his definition of the true aim of the interpreter: an understanding of the text as Paul himself intended his first readers to receive it. Hence, a "right" understanding cannot be achieved by a method that relies too heavily on theological definitions, for theological concepts as such are never unambiguous. A method that approaches Paul's meaning exclusively through a study of the mentality of the Pauline churches is no better, for that mentality in itself is too varied to admit of an easy characterization. Again, Magnusson rejects the hermeneutics that

takes the personality of the author as the primary object of its interest. It is not Paul's "inner feelings" or "religious life" that constitute the subject matter of the letters: "The message concerning Christ therefore dominates in the Pauline writings. Paul himself, therefore, as a 'personality,' has, in contrast, according to the Pauline writings, certainly no significance" (p. 22). Most readers will agree with this assertion that Paul was far more concerned with the proclamation of Jesus Christ than with the expression of his own subjectivity. Nevertheless, one wishes that the author had explored somewhat more carefully the relationship between the quality of Paul's own selfhood and the objective significance of his texts, for unless the exegete possesses in some measure the ability to project himself into Paul's own point of view and inner world, it is doubtful that he will ever succeed in extracting from any text the meaning Paul intended it to convey. The priority of the text should never be allowed to obscure the essential circularity of hermeneutical method. Furthermore, it is not at all evident, as Magnusson seems to think, that an attempted reconstruction of Paul's own individuality in the course of the exegetical process is tantamount to an evaluation of the Bible solely for what it tells us about the psychology of religion.

Magnusson offers a second sense in which the text is prior in the course of his demonstration of the method by which a new or "better" understanding of a text can be reached. In order to facilitate his exposition, the author has selected Romans 1: 16-17 to prove his point. Here the terms εὐαγγέλιον and δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ occur in an especially significant juxtaposition. To grasp the import of these words in this context, the interpreter must approach the text with his mind in a state of latency, allowing the text itself to "actualize" the relevant preliminary information, e.g., the exegete's knowledge of Greek. In addition, the text must be allowed to perform its "guiding" function for the interpreter, for only if he is guided by the text will it be possible for him to overcome his belief that the "righteousness of God" means a righteousness demanded by God of the individual rather than a righteousness not only demanded but given by God. In other words, the understanding of Paul's own intention in Rom. 1: 16-17 depends on the interpreter's readiness to allow the special combination of terms to drive him to a further study of the use of the genitive in the New Testament (righteousness *of* God) and so to have

prepared in him the ground for the creation of a new intellectual synthesis.

As in the former instance, this reviewer is not so much inclined to challenge what Magnusson affirms as to doubt whether he has said enough about the actual exegetical process to justify his allegation that, when the text is allowed to guide, its meaning becomes "plötzlich klar" (p. 76). The genesis of a new understanding can hardly be this mechanical. To grasp Paul's meaning a careful textual and linguistic study is necessary, but a confrontation with that reality with which Paul also was confronted as he wrote his letters is requisite too. The virtue of the existentialist school is that it recognizes that interpretation always presupposes a life-relationship to the subject matter that is being expressed in the text. It is regrettable that Magnusson's justifiable dislike of a hermeneutics that is only an exercize of personal virtuosity should have led him so far in the opposite direction that he has lost sight of the existential character of all successful interpretation and of the creative as well as passive role of the exegete's mind.

The final meaning of the principle of the priority of the text is revealed by the author in a discussion of the possibility of obtaining a "right" understanding of the text. Here Magnusson distinguishes between procedural methods involving the principle of non-contradiction and those depending on the principle of analogy. The former are applicable to the discrimination between various possible lines the interpretation could take and are capable of yielding certainty about the "right" direction. The latter are appropriate chiefly to the rounding out of the interpretation, for which no more than probability can be claimed. It is often difficult to follow the author's argument at this point, especially since he has failed to differentiate the concepts of probability, certainty and certitude with sufficient clarity (cf. p. 142). But, in any case, his intention is unmistakable in his own treatment of the problem of the identity of the pronoun ἐγώ in Rom. 7:14-25. After an examination of various traditional interpretations, Magnusson concludes that the "I" stands neither for humanity in general, nor for the heathen, nor the unconverted Paul, but for Paul the Christian and for the Christian man who is "simul iustus et peccator." Once more, while Magnusson's conclusion has a relative cogency and the force of a theological tradition behind it, the exegeti-

cal principles he adduces in its favor do not suffice for the certitude he claims. Such certitude must also be based on a personal affinity for Pauline theology as a whole, though not, of course, to the exclusion of the textual evidence. But no more persuasive example could have been chosen to demonstrate the impossibility of keeping Paul's own individuality subordinate to the text, for without the intrusion of Paul's own humanity in Rom. 7 the text would be void of meaning.

In general, the basic assumptions that give Magnusson's book its special character are never explicitly revealed by the author. He has provided his readers with a theory of biblical hermeneutics, but the necessary complementing discussion of the place of the Bible in Protestant theology is wholly lacking. In the context of the theological faculty of Lund, this is perhaps not a serious omission. But outside of that context the American reader will easily gain the impression that Magnusson's hermeneutics is based upon a view of the Bible that runs counter to one of his own criticisms, namely, as a repository of fixed theological concepts.

RICHARD R. NIEBUHR

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*New Testament Faith for Today.* By AMOS N. WILDER. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 186 pp. $2.50.

Any volume from the pen of the Professor of New Testament Interpretation at Harvard University is worthy of attention, and the one under review is no exception. Four of the six chapters in briefer form were given as lectures at the School of Religion of Butler University, and a fifth one appeared in a composite book on *Symbols and Values* in 1954. The subjects are: Commending the Gospel in our Time, The Language of Faith, The Proclamation of Jesus, The Message of Paul, The Johannine Witness. A valuable chapter entitled "Conclusion" closes the book.

The author is concerned with a persuasive presentation of the ultimates of New Testament faith to a world vastly different in many viewpoints from that in which the faith arose. It is a faith which is "relevant to men's this-wordly experience, it must not be escapist and compensatory. Man's whole indivisible nature, material and spiritual,

social and individual, must be dealt with." Nothing but a carping criticism could find fault with such a statement. It is a matter of deep satisfaction that Dr. Wilder has achieved no little success in his attempt.

Building firmly upon the literary and historical studies of the New Testament which placed its documents and their thought in the world in which they arose, he frankly and courageously states that much of the framework of New Testament ideas is of its own time and is not relevant to the religious need and thought of today. He endeavors to go behind the symbolism and the figures in which many of those ideas are presented and to discover the timeless essence which those ideas contain. From Jesus we gain the announcement of a "sublime Tomorrow for mankind or rather for that remnant of mankind that would fulfil the conditions required." It was already dawning, it would involve struggle, and it was to be realized in this world and in human life in this world. It is not only a message of faith, it is also one of hope. In fact, New Testament faith in its presentation in this book constantly walks in close company with hope. Well, Paul joined them indissolubly with fine effect long since.

From Paul New Testament faith, as it shines through the framework of Paul's world, much of which is irrelevant to our time, gains an emphasis upon a God who has an eternal purpose and goal, who has been and is working toward their attainment and whose purposes are even now "ripening fast."

In the Fourth Gospel the author finds a "faith" that God is steadily bringing to pass his purposes of a "sublime tomorrow." He is also working through his Son to break the power of evil and is "inviting all men into the fellowship of the sons of God and eternal life."

Although this is not a large book, it is difficult in a brief review to present in any adequate way the rich scholarship and profound thought which work their way to the interpretations just indicated. The frank recognition of the findings of earlier research on the New Testament, the constant endeavor to find the eternal amid the temporary forms, the relation of those eternal ultimates to life in a turbulent world as the everlasting workings of a divine person and purpose, give us an interpretive atmosphere that is refreshing and invigorating after the murky areas of some phases of Barthian and neo-orthodox thinking and expression.

The work is another mark, and an important one, in a new venture and advance in New Testament interpretation. It is an attempt to build a "more stately mansion" of the abiding significance of New Testament ultimates in thought and life. What its tomorrow will be is not easy to forecast, but those who, like this reviewer, had much of their New Testament research in the days when literary and socio-historical study of the New Testament was making its way against opposition, hope that it will be a bright and useful one. The world of human experience and fruitful living would be much poorer and less potent for the attainment of the "ultimates" if it were to lose the eternally hopeful essence of the specifically Christian scriptures because of insistence on the validity and authority of their symbolism. Unfortunately, there are too many who still make that insistence.

Not all readers will agree with everything that the author says. Some will think that he has dealt both too drastically and too leniently with Jesus. But those who know the difficulty of the material will be slow in adverse judgment. Some will have similar misgivings as to the treatment of Paul and the Fourth Gospel. But the movement to find the everlastingly redeeming in the New Testament amid its strange forms and symbols carries promise as a constructive step in the proper understanding of the great divine and human surges of its time.

Professor Wilder would not claim that this is the last word to be written in this field. Nevertheless, he has uttered an important one. Other studies will have to be made and more detailed application of the principles involved will have to be written before the task can approach completion. There are important areas in the New Testament which have timeless significance which merit more adequate consideration than the author has been able to give them in his search for great centralities. The book is greatly condensed, sometimes so much that complete grasp of the thought is not easy. Another book, written in simpler style, would serve a larger constituency. The fine scholarship and rich culture of the author indicate who might write it. If he were to do so, it would be another of the many valuable services which Professor Wilder has rendered to his particular field of study and to a humanity needing inspiration and guidance.

ERNEST W. PARSONS

Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

*John Žižka and the Hussite Revolution.* By Frederick G. Heymann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955. x, 521 pp. $9.00.

Although the name of John Hus is well known in English historical literature as one of the predecessors of the Reformation, the religious and social consequences of his teaching, the Hussite revolution, and the Taborite movement, which had a lasting influence on Czechoslovak history, have never received full treatment in the English language until the publication of Heymann's admirable study. Since the Taborite thought contained much "that was to form part of the substance of the Protestant thought" (p. 77), and since the Taborite movement in which the "warriors of God" strove to impose the Law of God upon the whole society, presents a splendid example of an attempt to realize an absolute Christian social order (as well as an example of the development of ideas, parties, groups, sects and movements out of one thought), this illuminating monograph of the Taborite leader, John Žižka, will be welcomed as an invaluable resource book in Church history as well as in the sociology of religion. Many chapters will also be of importance to those who are interested in the development of military art.

The author of this well documented study, which is largely based on original sources and the conclusions of the Czechoslovak historical scholarship, tries to present Bohemia as the birthplace of Protestantism. It is the opinion of this reviewer that Mr. Heymann succeeds in the effort to portray Hussitism as an integral part of the Reformation. The volume contains sufficient material to justify his thesis that "the birth of Protestantism as a movement of decisive importance for the shaping of modern Western man did not originally take place in Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century but a hundred years earlier in Bohemia" (p. 475).

The study is illuminated by very helpful maps, interesting photographs, an extensive bibliography, and especially by the translation of Žižka's letters, which themselves deserve the careful attention of the reader.

Mr. Heymann, like other writers on the Taborite movement, uses the term "sect," which some readers may find disturbing. As far as the causes of Tabor are concerned, they are almost identical with the characteristic causes of a sect. Furthermore, the ethical Taborite tend-

encies also agree with the ethical tendencies of sects. On the other hand, the basic characteristics of sects do not agree with the situation at Tabor whatsoever. While it is characteristic for sectarians to withdraw from the world, to prefer isolation, to be indifferent or hostile to the world, and to have no desire to control the world because they accept eschatological views and realize that the world cannot be conquered by human powers, Žižka and the Taborites made it very clear that their demands would not be limited to one country or nation. "For these sins, the mortal and even the venial ones, shall be suppressed 'in the kings' as well as the members of other estates," thus at least tentatively establishing an international demand, valid throughout Christendom.

In the first place, of course, the great self-purge is up to the Czechs, the people chosen by God to fight for Him at this time. Thus anyone who does not want to adhere to and to fight for the Four Articles cannot be tolerated in Žižka's army, nor anywhere else in the country" (p. 379). It is this passionate missionary zeal of the Taborites which is in sharp contrast to the characteristic of a sect as a fellowship whose aim is the preservation of the Christian ideal in a small community, and it seems that this tendency outweighs the sectarian trends of the Taborites (especially in the period of chiliasm). Mr. Heymann's splendid portrayal of Žižka's faith in the possibility of the renovation of the Church and the world even more confirmed this reviewer in the opinion that the Taborites, who are frequently typed as sectarians, appear to represent an aggressive movement within a movement, or a party, rather than a sect of the Hussite movement.

The reader will be grateful to the author for the clarity of the concluding chapters in which he summarizes the characteristics and the tenets of Žižka, as well as for his remarks on the problems which the understanding of Žižka's personality caused in modern Czechoslovak historiography. One reads Heymann's concluding passages on the permanence of the effects of the Hussite revolution and on the debt which the West owes to the land of Bohemia with a great amount of humility. A book of great scholarship, diligence, and clarity on the first phase of the Reformation!

ZDENEK F. BEDNAR

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*Religious Freedom in Spain, Its Ebb and Flow.* By J. D. Hughey, Jr. Nashville: Broadman Press, 1955. vii, 211 pp. $3.00.

It is not a controversial statement to say that religious liberty does not now exist in Spain and that it has not existed since the Franco regime came into power. The suppression of religious liberty was one of the avowed aims of that regime and of its Catholic clerical supporters, and the achievement of that aim is one of their proudest boasts. In their view, the "Catholic unity" of the Spanish people is essential to the integrity of the nation and the honor of the Church, and religious liberty is the antithesis of "Catholic unity." What does exist is such a limited degree of tolerance for Protestants as is deemed to be, in actual practice, less harmful to State and Church than would an all-out campaign for their suppression and liquidation. Granted the legitimacy of the "Catholic unity" ideal and the absence of any political principles involving respect for the civil liberties of citizens, the policy now in effect is as consistent as any.

Dr. Hughey's book, which is the outgrowth of a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University and four years of previous residence in Spain as a Baptist missionary, is a thoroughly documented and dispassionate history of the ups and downs of religious freedom in Spain from Reformation days to 1955, though touching only the high points in the first three and a half centuries and becoming increasingly detailed as it approaches the present. It is something of an achievement in scholarly objectivity for an ex-missionary to have produced a factual study of a theme which can so easily stir the emotions without admitting to his text, so far as this reviewer has observed, any expression of an unfavorable judgment or even a single opprobrious adjective. It appears also that he has dealt fairly in selecting data and documents so as to represent with equal adequacy the liberal tendencies and the repressive forces as they have struggled for the mastery and as one or the other has become dominant.

It would perhaps be more accurate to speak of the "flow and ebb" of religious freedom in Spain than of its "ebb and flow." The tide of liberty was at its lowest in the latter part of the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth century. With many fluctuations it rose to a full flood of freedom for a short time after the revolution of 1868 and again in the republic of 1931. Since the civil war which

broke out in 1936 and ended by setting up the Franco regime, the tide has steadily ebbed, though never to a mark as low as in the days of the Inquisition and the autos da fé. The first thing for the reader to get clearly in mind is that the author is not discussing a nonexistent subject when he writes about "religious freedom in Spain." It is not like the famous chapter on the snakes in Ireland, which exhausted the topic by saying: "There are no snakes in Ireland." There have been varying degrees of religious freedom in Spain, and there are vestigial remains of it even now.

Three key terms recur constantly in the recital of this history. The first is "religious liberty," meaning such complete equality in the government's treatment of all religions that no person is subjected to any restriction or civil disadvantage by reason of his belief, practice, or propagation of his religion, or even of anti-religious views. Periods of such liberty have been rare and brief in Spanish history. At times liberalism has been tainted with such violent anti-clericalism that even some legitimate liberties of Catholics have been infringed. The second term is "tolerance," meaning (in this context) a state of affairs in which the Roman Catholic religion was favored and supported as the religion of the State, but adherents of other forms of religion were permitted to exist and to carry on their worship under restrictions and disadvantages short of persecution. This has been the normal condition in Spain most of the time during the past 150 years and is the present condition. It is a state of affairs which would scarcely be described by such a gentle word as tolerance anywhere except in Spain. It represents the spirit of intolerance operating, for prudential reasons, at something less than 100 per cent efficiency.

The third key term is "Catholic unity." This brings us to the very heart of the matter. Except for a short period early in the nineteenth century when French liberal influence was dominant and the years 1869-75 and 1931-36, it has been a cornerstone of Spanish political theory and practice that there could be no national unity, strength, or stability without religious unity, and that, therefore, any dissent from the national Church is a subversive influence against the State, if not actual treason. This was the theory adopted by Ferdinand and Isabella (thereafter called pre-eminently *Los Reyes Catolicos*) when, having united the governments of divided Spain into single kingdom by war and marriage, they cast about for a means of welding it into

a single nation. Jews and Moors were the first victims; then the vigorous Protestant movement that rose in the sixteenth century and was exterminated by the revived Inquisition. Even the memory of these valiant Spanish reformers has been almost obliterated from history. Dr. Hughey tells about some of them. (For a much fuller account, see *Los Reformadores Españoles del Siglo XVI,* by Wilfride Artús. Buenos Aires, 1950.)

It would perhaps have drawn Dr. Hughey too far from his main theme, but it would certainly have contributed to the understanding of the basis of Spanish policy, and some other things as well, if he had gone farther back to trace the lineage of this idea of "Catholic unity." It is no Spanish invention. It had, in fact, been a dominant concept in the political philosophy of western Europe and in the teaching of the Catholic Church for a thousand years before Ferdinand and Isabella adopted it as the means of solving their problem in Spain. From the time of Theodosius it was regarded as an axiomatic truth by every respectable statesman and theologian that homogeneity of religion and the inclusion of the entire population within the membership of the Church was essential to political stability and social cohesion, as well as to the honor of the Church. If this was true, then any means necessary for the suppression of dissent would be legitimate. In the sixteenth century this principle found expression in the familiar slogan, *Cuius regio eius religio.* Obviously the concept of religious liberty, as a right to be exercized by individuals or nonconforming cults, is wholly alien to this program, and the degree of tolerance that might be granted would depend upon the precarious balance between the amount of trouble a dissenting minority might be expected to cause if allowed to exist under restrictions, and the estimated trouble and expense of a campaign to liquidate it. The only thing peculiar about Spain is the fact that she was late in adopting the policy of compulsory religious uniformity—for medieval Spain was relatively tolerant—and that she clung to it desperately while other countries in Europe and America have abandoned it as bad in practice and inconsistent with modern ideas, both secular and Christian, of human rights. The official pronouncements of the Roman Catholic Church have consistently supported the principle of compulsory Catholic unity and have encouraged the practice of it

wherever there was a chance of its success, though millions of Catholic laymen are on the side of liberty.

Space does not permit an account of the restrictions under which Spanish Protestants now exist. Read the book. Dr. Hughey's survey and analysis are confirmed by this reviewer's observations (so far as they go) on four visits to Spain in the past six years and rather constant correspondence with Spanish Protestants. For another authoritative report on the contemporary situation by a French Evangelical pastor who has studied it at first-hand, see *The Oppression of Protestants in Spain,* by Jacques Delpech (Boston, Beacon Press, 1955), with a preface by Howard Schomer and an introduction by John A. Mackay. Dr. Hughey's scholarly study is probably the best available account of the fluctuations of Spanish policy and the fortunes of religious reform through the whole course of modern history.

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*Gemenskapsproblemet hos Sören Kierkegaard.* By Per Wagndal. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1954. 264 pp. Kr. 20.

The purpose of the author is to make a contribution to the debate concerning Kierkegaard's thinking on the subject of fellowship. In writing *The Works of Love,* Kierkegaard's purpose is to

> refute the allegation that his emphasis upon the individual excludes a positive, Christian conception of fellowship. Kierkegaard desires to show that love to the neighbor is Christianity's expression of the true fellowship. But Christian love is something other than what man commonly thinks. Love is not the same as benevolence to others (p. 251).

Only man's obedient relationship to God can show what true love is.

> Thus the way to Christian fellowship goes through the category of the Individual. The inescapableness of the God-relationship includes the inescapableness of the neighbor. To love God is to love one's neighbor. Love is always the works of love to the fellowman. In order to solve the social problems to whose existence Kierkegaard does not shut his eyes even though he published no social ethic one must start from the Individual's experience of God (p. 251; cf. pp. 114-27; pp. 142-63).

The category of the Individual, accordingly, does not mean isolation, but rather "a positive fellowship based upon the individual's God-relationship. . . . God's inescapableness includes the inescapableness of the neighbor" (p. 18; cf. p. 68).

External reforms at their utmost achieve benevolence. But it is not until the one man personally offers something for the other without thought of reward that we may speak of Christian love. Here Kierkegaard cites the example of Jesus who personally committed Himself to the temporal need of the fellowman (p. 251; cf. pp. 172-76).

Wagndal makes the observation, however, that even though Kierkegaard rightly emphasizes the importance of the personal involvement,

he does not take into consideration the essential difference which prevails between complicated contemporary society with its rising demand for social and economic justice and the Gospel's simple division of rich and poor. His silence concerning the external reforms need not however be interpreted to mean that he was their opponent. But he regards it as his duty to call attention to the necessity of the personal involvement in every Christian work of love (pp. 251 f.; cf. pp. 177 f.).

"Since man is naturally selfish all forms of fellowship which belong to the human life in common are based on selfish motives. Kierkegaard makes no exception for friendship and marriage. . . . Kierkegaard however is of the belief that God has established marriage in creation itself" (p. 252; cf. pp. 91-94). Those who enter into the relationship of marriage must regard marriage as an institution of God, and each must regard the other as neighbor. Love for neighbor is the only love which brings about the true communion, whether in the relationship of friendship or of marriage (cf. pp. 184-94). One should not therefore assign a religious worth or significance to marriage.

Luther's defense of marriage was not based upon finding a primary religious worth in marriage but was a result of his corrective against the exaggerated medieval exaltation of celibacy. If in the time in which we live one goes to the other extreme and holds that one is a Christian because one is married another corrective is necessary namely the unmarried state. Kierkegaard holds accordingly that the official view of Christianity held by his contemporaries is so infiltrated by the exaggerated Jewish regard for marriage that the time has come to introduce this corrective (p. 252, cf. pp. 194-218).

Official Christianity had corrupted Luther's corrective by making it

normative. According to Wagndal, the extreme statements of Kierkegaard on the subject of marriage should be interpreted as his way of inducing his contemporaries to listen and to realize the wrong of making the corrective normative (p. 18).

It is Wagndal's belief that Kierkegaard continues to be relevant and significant for contemporary theological thinking and for the Church's constantly necessary work of self-criticism.

> With a seriousness and intensity of uncommon degree he has given prominence to Christian inwardness, to man as involved before God in sin and grace and to love of neighbor as the essential concerns in Christian life. His view of his own mission as a corrective for his own time is to be respected in spite of all the rash words he uttered especially during the conflict with the church (p. 254; cf. pp. 95-107).

> Since the mass-mentality and the numerical outlook upon life which Kierkegaard fought against have now returned to a certain degree, especially in the political realm, the corrective of the individual has again become timely. With reference to this one may say that in our time Kierkegaard is a timely name. It should then be remembered that Kierkegaard seeks to give a Christian message (p. 254; cf. pp. 70-90).

That persecution and suffering must inevitably come upon one who confesses Christ became an increasingly strong conviction in Kierkegaard. The experience of being hated by others was affirmed to be an essential reality in the truly Christian life (p. 19; cf. pp. 219-36).

Written with clarity and discrimination and carefully documented, Wagndal's scholarly work will be useful to the reader who strives to be both sympathetic and critical in his evaluation of Kierkegaard. Although some of the author's conclusions will be debated, one must be grateful to Wagndal for a masterly analysis of a controversial subject.

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*The Social Ideas of the Northern Evangelists, 1826-1860.* By CHARLES C. COLE, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. 268 pp. $4.25.

The social thinking of the American churches has recently been receiving the attention which it deserves. *The Rise of the Social Gospel*

*in American Protestantism (1865-1915)*, by C. H. Hopkins, first published in 1940, and the recent volume, *The Decline and Revival of the Social Gospel (1920-1940)*, by Paul A. Carter, together give us a picture of this aspect of social thinking in the churches since the time of the Civil War. Professor Cole's volume not only takes us behind the thinking covered in these volumes, but also, in contrast, shows us how different the social thinking was between the epochs (though to be sure the thinking since the Civil War should not be spelled out entirely in terms of the Social Gospel). More important, however, is that the Social Gospel before this period was not very social.

Early in his volume, Professor Cole gives us a glimpse into the life and times of the major evangelists. Included in his impressive list are such men as the Beechers, father and son, Peter Cartwright, Henry Holcombe, David Benedict, Jabez Swan, Joshua Leavitt, Horace Bushnell (in spite of himself), and the incomparable Charles Finney. In another chapter, Professor Cole delineates the history of the waves of revivals from the time of "The Great Awakening." In this period, American Christianity can definitely be considered revivalist.

The main concern in this book is, of course, to set forth the social views of those who were involved in the variety of revivalist campaigns. All of them were convinced that the Gospel had some relation to the problems of their times, but they had little concern for the question of any relation to the structure of society itself. It was a period for the organization of societies, such as missionary and Bible societies. Likewise, societies were organized for the elimination of vice, such as prostitution, dueling, and the abuse of the Sabbath. Perhaps the most vocal was the temperance crusade, and certainly the most dynamic was the anti-slavery sentiment. But none of these movements basically challenged the nature of society. Instead, the moral issue was most focused in its simplest form.

The status quo was also sanctioned in economic matters. Economic prosperity was the sign of virtue. While there was a concern for the alleviation of the suffering of the poor and for improvement in industry, the evangelists, nevertheless, were against the reduction of the working day and were vigorously opposed to strikes. In political matters, the decision for a candidate was a simple, moral choice in which the obviously good man was supported even if his program was in-

ferior. There was a deliberate rejection of the notion of the choosing of the lesser of evils. In short, the social ideals of these evangelists did not have much depth.

Mr. Cole convincingly points out that, while there was no unanimity on the anti-slavery question, this was, nevertheless, the sphere in which the evangelists became most vocal and explicit. The greatest support for the anti-slavery cause, for instance, came from the areas of the Finney revivals. At the same time, the evangelists were so passionate in connection with the anti-slavery crusade that they contributed to the unreason which created so many subsequent problems. Mr. Cole has also convincingly shown that the role of Henry Ward Beecher has been exaggerated, and that the role of Charles Finney has generally been underestimated.

The author's analysis of the factors involved in the end of the period of revivals is, indeed, very suggestive and penetrating. The new social forces of the post-Civil War period created a situation which meant that the revivals of Moody and Sankey could not be as successful as the previous revivals. The dread of hell, which played a part in the previous revivals, was a part of the spirit of the times and very forceful in its hold upon the minds of men. By contrast, the fear and anxiety of our own time is as nothing compared to the dread of hell experienced by this previous generation.

JOHN DILLENBERGER

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*A la rencontre du Protestantisme*. By GEORGES TAVARD. Paris: Éditions du Centurion, 1954. 141 pp. 250 fr.

*The Catholic Approach to Protestantism*. By GEORGE H. TAVARD. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. xv, 160 pp. $2.50.

The Roman Catholic Church is not formally or officially a member of the Ecumenical Movement for Christian unity, so far as that movement heads up in the activities of the World Council of Churches and its affiliates. Father Tavard's little book makes clear, however, that there exists what may be called "Catholic Ecumenism"—loyally Catholic in its theological assumptions and in its obedience to ecclesiastical discipline, but deeply distressed by the centuries-old division

between Catholic and Protestant Christendom and moving ahead toward a "creative peace" that may eventually remove the causes of this unhappy division. The first two steps toward such a peace are, according to the author's Introduction, (1) to put "understanding" ahead of "condemning" in dealing with our opponents, and (2) "eliminating our own prejudices." Throughout his book, it is evident that he strives sincerely to do both.

The book is divided into two parts: "Positions" and "Approaches." In the first part, Father Tavard gives the objective and sympathetic interpretation of the beginnings of Protestantism, its development into a variety of denominations, its "basic doctrines," the causes of its "anti-Roman prejudices," and its search for unity through the Ecumenical Movement. This is good reading for Catholics and Protestants alike, tending to overcome groundless prejudices on both sides. It cannot be expected, of course, that Protestants will entirely recognize themselves in their portrait drawn by a Catholic. This reviewer, who has tried his hand at the obverse task, and had certain defects in his portrait of Catholicism ably corrected by Tavard himself, owes his friendly Catholic critic a few Protestant countercriticisms:

(1) Churches such as the Congregationalists and Baptists are too closely assimilated to the Calvinist-Presbyterian type (p. 35), when they are really halfway between this type and the Mennonite-Brethren-Quaker type described later. (2) Sects such as the Christian Scientists, Mormons, and Jehovah's Witnesses have not actually "renounced Christianity" (p. 43), though it is important to say that they are not "genuine Protestant Churches." (3) The Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. are considerably older than 1878 and 1894 respectively (p. 66), for both have lately been celebrating their centennials. (4) The "nontheological factors of disunion" was not a topic first introduced into ecumenical discussion at Lund in 1952, and the study of it was not "postponed" there (p. 85); the topic was first introduced at Edinburgh in 1937. Much attention was given to it in the preparations for the Lund meeting, and it was voted at Lund to make it a permanent part of Faith and Order research. (5) Father Tavard's very thought-provoking attempt to compare the conceptions of the Church in Protestant and Catholic ecumenism (pp. 76 ff.) does not describe a position that any Church in the World Council could accept as pre-

cisely its own. As a matter of fact, conceptions of the Church as God wills it (Tavard's level A) and how to get to it from the churches as they are (level C) are so various that the next important Faith and Order conference (Oberlin, 1957), is to be devoted to an attempt to clarify "the nature of the unity we seek." Inexactitudes like the above are inevitable while Catholics and Protestants continue to "live in different worlds" (p. xii), but to listen to such descriptions from the other side, trying to square them with objective facts, does much to bring the two worlds nearer together.

Part II, "Approaches," is addressed primarily to Catholics, as Part I is primarily addressed to Protestants. Having already warned (p. 61) that oversimplified presentations of the Catholic position may give rise to anti-Roman prejudices by making authority look like tyranny and obedience seem servile, Father Tavard now (Ch. VII) severely attacks certain "negative attitudes" among Catholics which betray anti-Protestant prejudice, sometimes of "elephantine proportions." He protests against over-zealous Catholics who claim that the "official pronouncements" of their Pontiff, such as the Encyclical *Mortalium Animos* (1928), make ecumenical activity unlawful for good Catholics. What this encyclical condemned was not what the Ecumenical Movement has actually become, but an "indifferentism" and "modernism" with which it seemed to be infected at that date. The present official attitude is explained in these words:

> In practice the Holy Office would advocate colloquies between Catholic and non-Catholic theologians, the local Bishop being active in them through being kept informed of all that concerns the movement in his diocese and through his efforts to have Catholic doctrine explained without watering down as against the indifferentism that Pius XI feared (p. 114).

The book next sketches the history of Catholic ecumenism since the Reformation, showing how its early "boldness" of hope for a speedy reconciliation of divided brethren has given way to the "prudence" of men like Abbé Couturier and Matthias Laros, who accept alienation and misunderstanding as a tragic phenomenon likely to persist, but prepare the way for eventual peace by "prayer for one another that respects the loyalty of each," by patient clarification of misunderstandings, and by common action for common objectives where both parties are in hearty accord.

In conclusion, a program for sound Catholic ecumenism is drawn up. Ninety-nine out of every hundred Catholics or Protestants would find something new, amazing, and encouraging in Father Tavard's outlook. May his tribe increase.

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*The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche.* "Synchronicity, an Acausal Connecting Principle," by C. G. JUNG; "The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler," by W. PAULI. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955. 240 pp. $3.00.

This reviewer is one of the many of his readers to whom Jung refers in his foreword as having waited since 1930 for his interpretation of meaningful coincidences, the subject matter of his present paper. He confesses that he had "lacked the courage to make good (his) promise. . . . The difficulties of the problem . . . seemed too great; too great the intellectual responsibility." Over the years, however, his experiences as a psychotherapist made him increasingly aware of the great significance of the phenomenon in the lives of people. He therefore decided to "give a consistent account of everything (he has) to say on this subject." As could be expected, "everything" includes a great deal in the case of Jung. He gives two striking examples from his psychiatric experience, and he reviews a considerable number of earlier attempts to deal with the problem, e.g., Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Leibnitz, Kant, Schopenhauer, Kammerer, and Dunne. Particular consideration is given to the *I Ching* and to Tao, since Chinese thinkers could approach the phenomenon with a mind unprejudiced by Western preoccupation with physical causality.

Jung recognizes clearly that the parapsychological findings of J. B. Rhine do not involve causal relationships, but are of a coincidental character. A considerable part (34 out of 146 pages) of the paper is devoted to an astrological experiment in which Jung found a better-than-chance relationship between the horoscopes of husbands and wives. He realized, however, that the correlations claimed by astrology are not representative of deterministic laws, but occur as elements of meaningful coincidental situations.

Although the material is extremely interesting and comprehensive, the theoretical integration is not very successful. Because "many readers (of the German edition) found it difficult to follow (his) argument" Jung added a three page summary to the present English translation. The basic difficulty, however, is due neither to any fault of presentation nor to unawareness of most of the relevant contributions to the theory of the problem. The puzzling fact is that Jung does not draw the full logical conclusions from his premises. Specifically, he holds on to the concept of a specific physical reality as independent from psychological reality, although this is quite incompatible with the energetic, non-materialistic findings of modern physics. These inconsistencies are illustrated most strikingly in the "quaternio" schema of nature on page 137. One pair of opposites satisfies the postulates of modern physics: the "indestructible energy" and the "space-time continuum." The other pair of opposites, however, reveals that Jung has not really accepted the purely statistical character of the causality of classical physics: he makes causality and meaningful coincidence into opposites. Causality is defined as "constant connection through effect," meaningful coincidences are defined as "inconstant connection through contingency, equivalence, or meaning." It adds to the confusion that Jung coined the term "synchronicity" to take the place of the established concept of coincidence. "Synchronicity" singles out time as if it were an independent part of the space-time continuum. Jung concedes that the term lends itself to misunderstanding as "synchronism," and the English translation re-emphasizes that what is meant is "the occurrence of a meaningful coincidence in time." But does anything occur outside of time?

It is a striking example of psychoanalytical displacement of a repressed complex that in the "quaternio" the discontinuity concept in *physical* causality is repressed and appears in the concept of *psychological* meaning of nature instead. The latter, alias synchronicity, is described correctly as an acausal meaningful aspect of the world which is "independent of brain activity" (p. 123). It is supposed to be "only conditionally valid . . . unlike causality, which reigns despotically over the whole picture of the macrophysical world and whose universal rule is shattered only in certain lower orders of magnitude, synchronicity is a phenomenon that seems to be primarily connected with psychic conditions, that is to say with processes in the uncon-

scious" (p. 132). In other words, contrary to old philosophical and modern physical concepts, matter is considered to be continuous and the soul to be discontinuous.

Against the latter view the work of Viktor von Weizsaecker (*Der Gestaltkreis. Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen.* 4th edition. Stuttgart, 1950) should be remembered. The latter demonstrates in careful experimental work and in critical philosophical analysis that meaning is the continuous character of all life. It asserts itself not in form of determinate laws, but as a sequence of existential decisions. Thus space, time, and causality are not independent realities, but creations of life. The existential theory of form genesis appears a more satisfactory description of reality than the dualism of Jung, according to which "synchronicity" represents a "special class of natural events" to be added to the categories of space, time and causality (p. 143).

As a psychotherapist who has worked intensively with the Medical Section of the American Society for Psychical Research, I have become fully aware of the enormous tendency of the ego to repress consciousness of psychic occurrences. Thus, Jung considers "synchronicity" a rare phenomenon (p. 116). Awareness of the freedom and the unpredictability of the soul is frightening, because it deprives man of the magic comfort of absolute spiritual symbols and of physical laws. This vision strikes man as anarchy, and "Anarchy is the severest trial of independence, and it is to be expected that everybody fails it" (Viktor von Weizsaecker, *Anonyma.* Bern, 1946). This practical aspect of the existential concept of nature may have caused Jung, the therapist, to allow for creative acts only as "sporadic events" (p. 142) and to consider the statistical regularities of classical physics as despotic laws, rather than as repetitions of similar acts. At the very end of the paper Jung comes closest to the view point of Von Weizsaecker (p. 142, n. 17) in quoting St. Augustine's concept that time was created together with the world, although it is not compatible with the "quaternio" schema.

In comparison to Jung's paper, the one by the physicist Pauli is more modest in scope. It demonstrates the significance of archetypes for the formulation of early theories of modern science. In different ways both Kepler and Fludd tried to make the soul and God commensurate with geometrical and mathematical forms. The historical

perspective of the physicist adds to the scientific emphasis of the whole book. In view of the importance of Jung's personality and creativity, it would have done more justice to his theme if the present paper had been combined with his *Answer to Job* (London, 1954). In the latter work, actually published in the same year as *Synchronicity*, Jung draws existentially the consequences of his implicit understanding of the phenomenon and compensates for the conceptual inadequacies of the theoretical paper.

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*A Modern Philosophy of Religion.* By SAMUEL THOMPSON. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955. xvii, 601 pp. $7.50.

This is a highly competent and well-written introduction to philosophy of religion from a Thomist viewpoint. It is marked by breadth of outlook and reading, as well as by a single-minded adherence to Thomism. The author defines his position as "theism," and pleads for a return from "positivism and nihilism" (p. viii) to the great tradition of Western thought. He also takes his stand upon "an uncompromising acceptance of the absolute validity of reason" (p. 4). Philosophy of religion is distinguished from theology, he argues, in that the latter rests upon faith while the former operates on the basis of reason alone.

Successive sections of the book deal with Religion and Philosophy, Faith and Knowledge, Truth, the Nature of Man, the Idea of God, the Existence of God, Our Knowledge about God, and God and the World.

As we might expect, the climax of the book is the treatment of God. Such views of the subject as Naturalism and Pantheism are successively considered and rejected. The author expounds and affirms the theistic view, in what may be characterized as an unusually fresh and clear restatement of traditional Thomism. The argument moves by means of analogical reasoning from the real though contingent existence of the world to God who is self-existent being, the cause of Nature, and upon whom all else depends for its existence. This Su-

preme Reality, proven by reason, can also be shown to us in the "special way" of revelation.

Concluding chapters of this book deal with such aspects of God's relation to the world as Creation and Time, History and Human Destiny, The Problem of Evil, and Human Blessedness.

The result of all this is a text book which manages by its intellectual viewpoint and quality to be more than a text book. As a text, it will have two limitations; first its length will preclude much reading in primary sources, and second, teachers who are not Thomist in viewpoint may find problems in the book's single-minded adherence to this philosophy. However, general readers will find it an unusually illuminating and stimulating statement of this viewpoint.

One basic criticism of Thompson's philosophy of religion (and of the Thomism which he affirms) is rooted in the relation of faith to reason, of theology to philosophy which is fundamental to Thomism. As we have noted, Thompson argues that theology begins with assumptions of faith, whereas philosophy begins with reason alone. There is a valid point here; philosophic reason does indeed, particularly in the contemporary academic world, seem to embrace a wider, more catholic view of the world than does theology, which seems inherently limited and "dogmatic." However, must we not take a further step and see the dogmatic presuppositions which lie hidden behind the façade of impartial, objective rational method? By such a course of thought we may make our way to a very different relation of faith to reason from Thompson's Thomism.

This alternative view is suggested by the Bible, and articulated first in the writings of St. Augustine. It argues that all men have some presuppositions of faith and that their philosophies as well as their theologies give expression to this faith. Often in the case of philosophers it is a faith which is unconscious and therefore uncritically held. Since all men have some faith, the fundamental choice is not between faith or reason, but rather among the various faiths which compete for human allegiance. The role of reason is that of articulating, communicating, and criticizing faith.

Needless to say, this conception of the role of reason is very different from that envisaged by Thomism. This difference may be briefly illustrated by the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God. Chapters of Thompson's book are devoted to a statement and affirmation of

these proofs. Yet it would not be difficult to point out many logical flaws in these "proofs," even in Thompson's excellent statement of them. Are they truly proofs or are they, as the Augustinian viewpoint holds, a rational articulation of theistic faith? To take this alternative, in contrast to Thomism, is by no means to regard the proofs as insignificant. Their significance is that they paraphrase theistic faith into the language of philosophy in which it may be tested and verified or disproven! The rational or philosophic task is thus the critical appraisal of theistic claims by reference to all the varied facts of existence that we may lay our hands on. This is very different from the "proofs" of Thompson and St. Thomas.

There is also a sharp contrast between Thomism and Augustinianism with reference to the significance and use of reason. Thompson professes faith in the "absolute validity" of human reason. He may perhaps reply that the viewpoint here expressed entails the abandonment of reason, to which I would answer that it does abandon a faith in the "absolute validity" of human reason. For, in its most basic sense, reason means the capacity to respond to facts, and among the facts that men face is that human rationality appears to have limits. These limits appear both objectively and subjectively. Objectively, some facts seem past human finding out. Subjectively, who has not discovered that in many, many ways he is not as rational as he had supposed, or as a faith in the "absolute validity" of human reason would lead him to suppose? It is, of course, important that reason and not extra-rational authority discover and set these limits. But having done so, human reason is in a position to appreciate the irrationality of Rationalism, i.e., as a priori commitment to the omnicompetence of human reason. Such Rationalism is simply not very reasonable. The point of these remarks is that perhaps the most unreasonable aspect of Thomism, old or new, is its dogmatic Rationalism.

JOHN A. HUTCHISON

Columbia University

*The Bent World.* By J. V. Langmead Casserley. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. vii, 286 pp. $4.00.

Professor Casserley's latest book deals with a subject that must rank high on the priority scale of anyone who is seriously concerned with religion or political theory, or the relation of the one to the other. That subject is the relationship of what might be called the democratic ethos to what is invariably called "Judaeo-Christian values." Professor Casserley uses the conflict between Marxism and the West as the means by which to sharpen and clarify his theme and to illustrate its implications and meanings. As will be expected by anyone who is familiar with his earlier writings, Professor Casserley's treatment is lively and trenchant, with a vigor and clarity of style that makes the reading of it a pleasure. He says a number of highly important things, and he says them in a way to provoke more thought and discussion. His thesis is plainly stated early in the book:

> The really powerful alternative to Marxism is not a pagan and secularized individualistic democracy but the Christian interpretation of human existence in society and history, which transcends the conflict between Marxism and humanistic democracy in a new and deeper understanding of what both these contending forces are searching for (p. 12).

Professor Casserley effectively destroys some of the common assumptions about the essential points of conflict between the West and Marxism—the superiority of western technical production, the concern with the economic welfare of the proletariat, for examples. At many of these points the two antagonists are in essential and practical agreement, however much they may differ verbally. The real issue arises in the realm of opposing views of man, his nature and destiny, which give rise to political working arrangements, the conflicts between which constitute what most people would regard as the East-West encounter.

What one looks for in vain is any very deep or thorough-going analysis of the relationship between biblical religion and the democratic ethos. Indeed, Professor Casserley seems to be mainly concerned to say what the relationship is *not*—an important step in clarification but not an adequate or final step. He insists, for example, that democracy must be defined solely as "a way of carrying on the govern-

ment of a group" or "a particular technique for arriving at decisions." There can never be any such thing as a "democratic way of life." The advantages of the democratic method, according to Professor Casserley, are two: it facilitates social change, even of a radical sort, without violence; and it corresponds to the fact of man's original sin, the partiality of all his insights and the consequent necessity for the "checks and balances" of a free democratic society. The question that is posed at once is whether this is an adequate account of the relationship between democracy and Christianity. Is there not a deeper affinity between the two, deriving from the biblical concern for the freedom and responsibility of the individual? Casserley's picture of man as a sinner for whom democracy is necessary, chiefly as a restraint upon his egoistic instincts, would seem to suggest that his book should have been entitled—as he admits he was tempted to do —*The Broken World.* The late William Temple gave a more balanced account of the relationship between Christianity and democracy in his *Christianity and Social Order* (cf. especially the chapters on "Christian Social Principles"), and it is a serious oversight in Professor Casserley's treatment that he nowhere makes reference to this more thorough-going analysis.

There are several minor criticisms that may be added. One is puzzled by the inclusion of a large section on marriage and sex ethics in a book of this sort. Even after Professor Casserley's ingenious explanations, one is left with the impression that he had something he wanted to say on this subject and felt this was his only opportunity. Incidentally, the historian of Christian ethics will question his analysis of the difference between the attitudes toward sex in Puritanism and in early Christian asceticism. Another minor slip is the irritating equation of "secular" and "materialist." He writes: "(the belief) that the only truly human satisfactions are material satisfactions" . . . (is) . . . the very essence of secularism in all its forms." Surely here is another example of the slipperiness of the word "secularism," which, as Professor Edwin Aubrey has shown, has become so ambiguous as to be almost useless. As a set of notes on the great ideological conflict of our time this book is highly useful and ought to have a wide reading, especially among intelligent Church people. As a definitive statement

of the relationship between democracy and Christianity and the essential conflict with Marxism, it has some surprising gaps.

JOHN M. KRUMM

Columbia University

*La conscience concrète*. By PANTALEO CARABELLESE. Selection of texts, translation, and introduction by GIUSEPPE BUFO and LUIGI AURIGEMMA. Paris. Aubier, Éditions Montaigne, 1955. 218 pp. 540 fr.

This volume is intended as an introduction for the French student to the work of an Italian thinker who died a few years ago. Throughout his life Carabellese was overshadowed by his older contemporaries, Croce and Gentile. He was of necessity obliged to define his position by reference to the prevailing currents of historicism; this makes it hard for a non-Italian reader to grasp. In fact, he met with but little success even among his fellow countrymen; for some thirty years he continued to repeat the same theses, to answer the same objections, and to raise the same counter-criticisms against his opponents. The most sanguine reviewer, therefore, can hardly claim that an anthology of his work will give much satisfaction to an English reader who knows little of the recent history of Italian philosophy, and has, moreover, a large number of questions and objections of his own of which Carabellese appears quite oblivious.

Having thus given fair warning of the difficulties presented by this volume, let me hasten to add that for a reader who is willing to persevere the rewards are there. The problem that Carabellese was trying to solve is not peculiar to the Italian idealist tradition. His work was quite generally regarded as a variation of the monadic pluralism of Varisco, and I think that he was indeed inspired by Varisco's example when he took his stand against the prevailing influence of the Hegelian school. But he arrived at his own views as a result of long and fruitful meditation upon the work of Kant and Fichte.

He called his theory Critical Ontologism: this title indicates clearly that his aim was to find an interpretation of the Ontological Argument that was acceptable within a truly critical philosophy. He held that without a solution of this problem there could be no genuinely

critical philosophy. It is no use asking *how* knowledge is possible until we have shown *that* it is possible. Kant merely assumed dogmatically that knowledge exists, and that experience is the appearing of a non-phenomenal reality—the *Ding-an-sich*. But Fichte showed that for consciousness the *Ding-an-sich* could only have a negative significance and thus the objective foundation of knowledge was irretrievably banished from experience. This result was, properly speaking, the *reductio ad absurdum* of Kant's dogmatic realism. But instead of recognizing this, the post-Kantian philosophers tried to make it into the foundation stone of a new "idealism" which was, in fact, no idealism, because it rested on concealed realistic assumptions.

This, very briefly, is Carabellese's analysis of the problem. In order to resolve it the dogmatic assumptions about reality and man's knowledge of it, still present in Kant's first Critique, must themselves be subjected to criticism. A critique of pure reason is not enough; what is needed is a critique of consciousness in its integrity—a "critique of the concrete." Objectivity is not the mere negation but the immanent ground of actual consciousness. Experience is not the *self*-consciousness of an Absolute Subject, but rather the essentially inadequate consciousness of an Absolute Object by a plurality of subjects.

The subjects must be a plurality; for to exist, to be conscious, is to be reciprocally related to an "other" which, in order to be truly "other" for the subject, must be *like* the subject. Fichte was right in holding that consciousness involves an "other," but he was mistaken in supposing that Kant's *Ding-an-sich* would meet this need. The "other" of the Ego is not the *non*-Ego but *an*other Ego. Otherness is not negation, but rather reciprocal limitation.

This reciprocity is only possible because each of us individually is conscious of an absolute Object which is the ground of our *likeness* to each other, and hence also of our mutual otherness. Empirically the objectivity of consciousness is manifested in the fact that we inhabit one common world; but this empirical community is a posteriori and remains always problematic. That the world of different observers is one world is a matter of faith, and this faith is only justified when the observers actually succeed in reaching agreement. The so-called "real world" is the result, not the condition of this agree-

ment. Hence empirical "reality" is not and cannot be *outside* of consciousness; it is the recognition of community *in* consciousness.

It is the business of the philosopher to seek for the a priori principle in which this community which we discover a posteriori has its ground. Carabellese calls this principle "God"; and he characterizes concrete consciousness as the immanence of God, the absolutely unique Object, in a plurality of reciprocally related subjects. God is the unique term to which all consciousness refers.

It seems to me that this terminological decision is unfortunate. The Absolute Object does not *exist;* it is not a person but a principle. What the Ontological Argument proves is not that God exists but that *Being is.* If this absolute being *existed,* it would have to be in relation with its own other; but either it has no "other" or else it is not Absolute. If Carabellese's God were a person He would be reciprocally related *to* us, and not immanent *in* us. To have to keep on using the personal pronoun is disastrous, because it leads to precisely the misinterpretation that our author wishes to avoid.

When we ask for some further explanation of this basic thesis about concrete consciousness—when we seek to discover what this necessary being, this unique Object, is, and what it means to say that it is the immanent ground of existence—we are apt to be disappointed. There are hints scattered here and there, but in general Carabellese is so busy insisting that consciousness is the immanence of an absolute *Object,* not an absolute Subject, that he has no time to tell us more. At first sight, one might be inclined to identify the Object with Truth, as being the proper object of reason. This identification, as far as I can see, would make Critical Ontologism a return from Kant to Spinoza; and as soon as we recollect that Carabellese's critique aims to be not simply a critique of reason but a critique of experience as an integral whole, we can see that this interpretation is inadequate. Tucked away in his early book, *Critica del concreto,* there is a short section in which three moments are distinguished within the Object. As *past* it is knowable as Truth; as *present* it is sensible as Beauty; and as *future* it can be willed as Good. Thus we might perhaps describe the Object as *real time.* Real time is not the empty Kantian form of succession: its moments are *not* successive but rather mutually immanent; no experience is absolutely past or pres-

ent or future. Whatever can be cognized, can also be appreciated or willed and vice versa. According to the translators of the present volume, Carabellese developed this theory at length in his last years. It seems to me to be the Pure Act of Gentile purified, so to speak, of all the contaminations of Hegelian logic. Not that I mean to imply that it is derived from Gentile's theory—that would be a ridiculous assertion—but I think that a detailed comparison would be illuminating.

The translators offer a good general review of Critical Ontologism in their introduction—with special emphasis on the work of Carabellese's last years, which is not yet generally available. But in their choice of texts they seem to me to have failed miserably. What one would most like to have would be a translation of one of these inaccessible texts; or, if it is impossible to appreciate this later work without some previous grounding, they could certainly have translated *Il problema teologico come filosofia,* which is by general consent Carabellese's most important book. Perhaps best of all as an introduction, they could have given us the early work, *Critica del concreto,* which their title seems to promise. Instead, they have chosen the first chapter of the *Problema teologico* (1931), with some disconnected later essays. In so doing they have shown Carabellese at his worst; there is too much polemical repetition of abstract theses condensed—as in this review—almost to the point of unintelligibility. I doubt if they could have done worse.

In a footnote on the first page of the actual text, the translators claim that they have generally sacrificed style in favor of accuracy, but they add that they have eliminated some rhetorical flourishes which were not important. I have been able to compare about half of the translation with the original Italian, and in general I have found it very faithful. There are a few blunders and in one place an important sentence—italicized for emphasis—has been accidentally omitted. Such slips are regrettable, but they are less serious than some of the deliberate omissions of "rhetorical flourishes." At the climax of one essay, for example, Carabellese asserts that "the conception of God as a person or ego is diabolical." Without indicating any omission the translators have "eliminated" not just this sentence, but the whole concluding paragraph (p. 166)—presumably in order to avoid offence to orthodox Catholics. One may wish that the author had expressed

himself with greater restraint, but he is here discussing the keystone of his whole theory, and any attempt to camouflage his views on this point is a betrayal of the translators' most fundamental obligation.

H. S. Harris

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*Charisteria Iohanni Kõpp octogenario oblata.* Stockholm: Estonian Theological Society in Exile, 1954. (Obtainable from Bookstore, Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary). 304 pp. Paper $5.00.

Archbishop J. Kõpp, to whom this volume was dedicated on the occasion of the eightieth anniversary of his birth, has been a great administrator of both the church and the Estonian national university at Tartu. The volume starts with a short dedicatory letter in Estonian and English, followed by the nine page *Tabula gratulatoria.* The articles and surveys are offered under two headings: *Generalia* and *Estica.* In the former, the first article is a posthumous (?) publication of U. Masing, entitled "Der Begriff *ḥesed* im alttestamentlichen Sprachgebrauch." The author tries to explain the confusing fact of the existence of contrary meanings of this word by assuming that originally it could designate everything connected with a potlatch, and only gradually became more differentiated and defined. This is at least a stimulating idea. R. Koolmeister offers the study, "Selbstverleugnung, Kreuzaufnahme und Nachfolge. Eine historische Studie über Mt. 16,24." He gives first a condensed history of the problem concerned, and in actual exegesis holds himself close enough to A. Fridrichsen. This is followed by the article of K. Kundziņš, "Zur Diskussion über die Ego-Eimi Sprüche des Johannesevangeliums." According to the author the Ego-Eimi sayings of the Gospel of St. John display an independent original Christian type of Ego-Eimi utterances. Similar sayings are also found in the Apocalypse. Next is A. Vööbus's "Liber Graduum. Some Aspects of its Significance for the History of Early Syrian Asceticism." It has become a quite general custom to connect the *Liber Graduum* with the Messalians. The author's definite conclusion, however, is that it has "hardly anything" to do with the Messalians. Then comes A. Nygren's "Christ—the Hope of the World. Remarks on the Main Theme of the Evanston

Conference." This is a short meditation on the theme of hope, with quotations from both the New and Old Testament. Next is J. Sittler's "Eschatology and the American Mind." The non-eschatological character of American theology, preaching, and Christian nurture is explained by the "open frontier" attitude of the Americans seeking to *affirm the illimitable.* However, the limits of sin and death are a reality. Next comes O. Pello's "Über Teichmüller-Tennmanns Philosophie des Christentums." A careful critical appreciation of both outstanding philosophers of religion is offered here. Next is H. Pöhl's "Contenu théologique de la critique Berdiaeff sur le marxisme et le communisme." This is a summary of Berdiaeff's views, dwelling especially on the well known claim of communism that it can replace religion.

The first article under *Estica* is by O. Loorits, "Zu den Quellen und zur Methode der Religionsforschung." The article offers far less than might be expected from its title. The author operates, e.g., with a "uralische Volksgeist," although *Uralic* is a purely linguistic term like Indo-European. It is also quite uncritical to quote a comparatively recent personal epitaph (p. 189) as proof of a people's philosophy. Using the data of folklore, Loorits asserts that the ancient Estonians were not at all warlike. However, according to historical sources, e.g., Henricus de Lettis's *Chronicle of Livonia,* the Estonians were good soldiers. Next is E. Blumfeldt's "Estonian-Russian Relations from the IX-XIII Century." In spite of the contrary assertions of Soviet historians, the author comes to the firm conclusion that Estonia never was a part of the ancient Russian state during the period under consideration. This is followed by H. Nuudi's "The Social, Cultural and Spiritual Trends in Estonia during the XIX and XX Centuries." This is a popular but useful survey. Next comes J. Aunver's "Some Characteristic Spiritual Aspects of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church." This gives a good insight into the various problems and trends in the development of Estonian Evangelical Lutheranism. It might also have dealt with the spread of religious indifference during the period of Estonian independence and its causes. Next is A. Vööbus's "Estonian Theological Research. Some Remarks on the Work and the Suffering." Since this survey deals not only with works published during Estonian independence, but also with those initiated or planned at that time, in the reviewer's opin-

ion the research performed in exile could have been fully included. Anyway, the lion's share of the latter has been done by Vööbus himself. The last article in the volume is J. O. Lauri's "Über das Geschick der überlebenden Teile der Estnischen Freien Volkskirche. Ein Beitrag zur neueren Kirchengeschichte Estlands." This is a survey of the organization of the Estonian Lutheran Church in exile, and of the various problems connected with it. Last comes the *Elenchus bibliographicus Johannis Kõpp,* which shows that J. Kõpp's own research was concentrated on the local and educational history of the Estonian people.

The book is not free of misprints, some of which are misleading. On the title page it is printed Szegedy, which should be Szeged (also the Hungarian form Debrecen is preferable to the German Debrezen); *Versidealisieren,* should be *Veridealisieren* (p. 196); the famous Estonian statesman, Tõnisson, has been given a French first name, although the correct form, Jaan, appears in the same line (p. 302).

In conclusion, this volume can be recommended as a good source of information to all persons interested in the Baltic area, especially in its religious-cultural aspects.

Alo Raun

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# BOOK NOTES

*Down to Earth.* By Robin Place. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. xvi, 173 pp. 90 illustrations. $7.50.

This "practical guide" to the archeology of Great Britain from the Old Stone Age through the early Iron Age makes fascinating reading. Moreover, it is enriched by a lavish number of illustrations, both photographs and line drawings, which reconstruct most vividly the life of fargone ages. Provision for a future life in the form of burial objects appears only in late Pleistocene graves, and there is little evidence of "sympathetic magic" such as that of the French cave paintings. But by the Neolithic Age came the building of huge burial units, either stone tombs or underground barrows. Was it fear of the dead which caused them to be buried under tons of stone? Mysterious also are the cremation cemeteries, with their circle of "ritual pits." The most spectacular monuments of this burial cult, however, belong to the Bronze Age, as well as the greatest variety of practices. Sometimes the dead were buried in a crouched position, sometimes extend; sometimes they were enclosed in stone coffins, sometimes in tree-trunk or boat-shaped coffins. Sometimes they were cremated. The great bluestones of Stonehenge were brought to Salisbury Plain all the way from South Wales, and, according to a recent discovery, they bear marks which show that they formed part of an older monument apparently dismantled so that they could be brought to Stonehenge. In the Iron Age people of rank were buried with full panoply, including parts of chariots, mirrors, pottery, jewelry, etc., and even joints of meat. There are also evidences of human sacrifice in connection with the building of new walls. The worship of female divinities connected with healing springs and wells was prevalent, as well as the worship of the sun and rites for the renewal of his power, celebrated in May and November.

Parts II and III contain interesting technical information, such as descriptions of actual digs, their organization and methods, and the various scientific tests used in the dating of sites, and establishing the chronological sequence of cultures. To put it simply, this small book is a mine of interesting information.

M. B.

*Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna.* Edited by Sujitkumar Mukhopadhyaya. Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1954. xvii, 245 pp. 10 Rs.

The present translation of this ancient text is based upon all the available texts, with footnotes recording all variations. The legend shows that the Buddha was not bound by caste considerations in accepting disciples. There is much else in the text, but the legend, which is the best preserved

section, is translated into English from a Chinese text of the third century A.D.

A Mātaṅga girl who has given Ānanda water at his request then insists on marrying him. She refuses to listen to reason, throws tantrums, and has her mother work sorcery (characteristic of the Mātaṅgī) in her behalf. She was, of course, an unclean untouchable, but, in the end, when the Buddha uses the familiar argument about the vileness of the body, its organs, and their functions, she becomes enlightened and becomes his disciple. It turns out that, in one of the five hundred previous lives of Ānanda, the Mātaṅgī had been his wife (Shārdūla-karṇa, Tiger Ear, was his name in the former birth).

The *Avadāna* deals also with astronomy, and the Mātaṅga are connected up with Trishaṅku, now a constellation in the summer sky. Valmiki, among others, tells the story well.

The Mahaut Nats, of outcaste status, hold Mātaṅgī to be the mother of the elephants. The Mādigas of South India claim to be her descendents, and Mātaṅgī is still regarded as a priestess. There is a great deal of lore from ancient times about the Mātaṅgī confirming their peculiar status.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

*Visva-Bharati Annals.* Edited by P. C. BAGCHI. Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1955. viii, 161 pp. 10 Rs.

This seventh annual number from Santiniketan contains two contributions. The first is an exhaustive re-examination of the data about the Shakas in India. The Shakas, by force of circumstances, "proved politically a great success, more than any other foreign tribe that founded an empire" in India. All in all, India profited by the Shaka occupation. For example, "It was in Ujjayinī, possibly the capital of the Western Kshatrapas, that Greek astronomy was transplanted into Indian soil, which was ultimately recast and remodelled by the Indians . . ." (p. 80). In the end they were Indianized. One example of this was the integration of the Shaka Brahmans into the social order. "By Patañjali's time the Shakas had already been Indianized and were admitted into the dining tables of the orthodox Indians" (p. 91).

The second contribution is the presentation of a unique manuscript of an unpublished one-act play with an elaborate introduction in which the editor discusses the "shadow play," because this drama is called a *chāyānataka,* and concludes that this is rather a puppet show. It was composed between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries A.D.

Appendix III contains valuable bibliographical notes.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

*De Pallio und die Stilistische Entwicklung Tertullians.* By GÖSTA SÖFLUND. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1955. xi, 233 pp. Kr. 25.

This is a very careful and elaborate study of Tertullian's style. The first part deals with the *De Pallio,* and the linguistic analysis casts some light upon the larger issues of that tract, especially the anti-Romanism of Tertullian's later writing (the author dates it about A.D. 205). The second part treats the relation between the *Adversus Judaeos* and the *Adversus Marcionem* III. Many interesting points emerge, not least of which is the authenticity of the whole of the former tract, which is defended against Kroymann.

The book has a most useful bibliography for the patristic scholar and the Latinist.

C. C. R.

*Introductory Papers on Dante.* By DOROTHY SAYERS. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. xix, 225 pp. $4.00.

These interpretative essays by a noted literary critic and theologian are directed to the general reader who shies away from Dante because of the difficulties of his medieval theology and the complexity of his thought. Dr. Sayers is well fitted for the task of interpretation, both by her studies of the text in preparation of her translations of the "Hell" and the "Purgatory" and by her experience as a popularizer of Christian theological ideas. She begins with an analysis of Dante's imagery, symbolic and pictorial, in two chapters which the "general reader" may well find difficult reading. This is followed by two chapters explaining the meaning of Heaven and Hell and Purgatory in the Catholic theology of Dante's day, an understanding of which is absolutely essential, though unpalatable to the modern Protestant reader. She then presents an analysis of Dante's own explanation that his allegory is to be interpreted on four levels: literal, political, moral, and mystical. In a chapter entitled "The City of Dis," Dr. Sayers describes how, in a sudden, intuitive vision, she "saw the whole lay-out of Hell as something actual and contemporary; something that one can see by looking into one's self, or into the pages of tomorrow's newspaper. I saw it, that is, as a judgment of fact . . ." (p. 128). In the last two chapters, on the "comedy of the Comedy," and its paradoxes, she makes some very pertinent points, but one can hardly say that she succeeds in making it all clear to that "general reader." In fact, she leaves Dante as she found him, a very difficult poet indeed!

M. B.

*Conscience in the New Testament.* By C. A. Pierce. (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 15.) Chicago: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1955. 151 pp. $1.50.

C. A. Pierce has written a thorough and careful study of the meaning of *syneidesis* and related terms. His examination of classical and Hellenistic usage shows that *syneidesis* changed little in meaning, and that while it could be used as a philosophical term for self-awareness, the meaning "conscience" was popular usage. As such it expressed an unreflective experience which Pierce describes as a pain which arises when one has transgressed his moral limits. He shows that in Greek "conscience" refers to one's own acts only; that its reference is to specific *past* acts or to character in so far as it has produced acts; and that with few exceptions conscience is concerned only with bad acts. It is "good" usually only in the negative sense of recording nothing bad.

In the New Testament *syneidesis* was adopted from popular usage by Paul. It did not come from the Greek Stoics, who scarcely use the term, but was apparently adopted because it was a catchword at Corinth. Paul uses it in its usual sense, relating it to God as the internal expression of the Wrath (Rom. 13:5). In his treatment of I Corinthians, Pierce shows how Paul took a catchword of the "strong" and used it to express his concern for the "weak."

The lexical study is well done, though some will find the system of classifying meanings too rigid and the abbreviations a bit confusing. In his conclusion, Pierce applies his study to the work of the preacher. He finds the modern, relativistic conscience an "idol," and attacks the individualism of "let your conscience be your guide." No notice, however, is taken of the modern "guilty conscience" or of the studies of conscience in depth psychology. There is much practical value in his conclusion, but it raises a question about the relation between biblical interpretation and preaching. Pierce holds that New Testament usage of terms is normative for modern Christians, but this is to oversimplify the problem of interpreting the New Testament. For example, the question of the extent of "natural" knowledge of right and wrong needs a broader theological base than the sole term *syneidesis,* yet discussion of the modern term "conscience" leads into this broader problem, which is inadequately dealt with by Pierce. None the less, his work rightly indicates that detailed New Testament studies find their significance for the Church in their being brought to bear on the contemporary interpretation of Christian faith.

William A. Beardslee

*The Tyranny of Progress.* By Albert Salomon. New York: The Noonday Press, 1955. 115 pp. $3.00.

In these "Reflections on the History of French Sociology," Professor Salomon, of the New School for Social Research, packs a tremendous

amount of interesting material into a very small space. He tells the amazing story of the two "messianic bohemians," Comte and Saint-Simon, who unwittingly laid the foundations of the totalitarian state. As Robert M. MacIver puts it in his Introduction, "Revolution thinks in absolutes, but its absolutes are often the reversal of the absolutes it overthrows"; these philosophers "petrified the order that was to be."

In Chapter One, the author states the problem: "Man's potentiality for nobility or degradation," which the modern philosopher must treat, not so much from the point of view of man's moral nature as from that of history —the history of Progress regarded as practically an inevitable development. There were some dissenters from this prevailing optimism, e.g., de Tocqueville and Burckhardt, who foresaw the end of Liberalism in anarchy and despotism.

In Chapters Two and Three we have a fascinating account of the lives and work of Comte and Saint-Simon, whose center of activity was the coffeehouse—"the home of the homeless intellectual," a peculiar type of bohemian, "learned men who have not submitted to the rules of social and professional careers," and are financially irresponsible. It is ironical that the new science of "Sociology" was born in so profoundly "unsocial" a setting; "it is uprooted men, men who are absolutely out of sympathy with their time, who come to believe that they have discovered a way to end the chaos of all history." Thus was born the sociologist's dream of "the union of mankind in one universal organization."

In Chapter Four, "The Religion of Progress," we find a brilliant analysis of the spiritual aspects of the new sociology, with its deification of science as the foundation of the Kingdom of God on Earth. Saint-Simonianism was a true heir of the French Revolution and inheritor of its messianism. It denied a transcendent God and derived its spiritual power from scientific and humanitarian thinking; its clergy would be composed of scientists, poets, and artists.

M. B.

*L'Action, Instrument d'Evangélisation*. By Joseph Becaud. Paris: Editions Ouvrières, 1955. xi, 417 pp. 1,050 fr.

This book is the fruit of the author's experience as a chaplain to various groups of Catholic Action in the industrial Lyon area in France. What it tries to do is rather difficult to define. Its somewhat loosely connected construction gives no clue to the purpose of this essay. The reader is, however, rewarded when he finds himself, through the author's mediation, in contact with Christianity working as a true leaven in a de-Christianized milieu. Ordinary workers in all sorts of odd jobs are its apostles. This provides a rich background to the book, Abbé Bécaud's reflexions on this collective experiment of re-Christianization are addressed to lay Christian militants

themselves, to priests who, with less experience than he has, may be called on to advise them, to those who are concerned with the evangelization of the masses and, in general, to all who take an interest in the lay apostolate in the Roman Catholic Church.

Evangelization is presented in terms of God's pedagogy with his human children. This pedagogy takes on various, graduated forms. It is, to keep the order adopted in the book, human, religious, ecclesiastical, Catholic, and evangelical. One could, of course, find fault with this classification. From a theological standpoint it is not accurately defined. And it is not extremely practical. One could also regret a certain lack of inconsistency in the structure of the chapters. The author's study of the laiety's responsibility in the Church (*l'action du laïcat*) is spread out in various sections of several chapters. One easily sees why the notion of hierarchy comes in the chapter "Pédagogie de l'Eglise," but why should a survey of Marxism fill one third of the chapter on "Pédagogie catholique"? Many will also wonder why a good half of "Pédagogie de l'Evangile" is devoted to a theological meditation on the Blessed Virgin.

These flaws only show that Abbé Bécaud is not a professional writer. They do not detract from the value of his book as a moving document on evangelical activities in modern France. In this matter everyone will appreciate the originality of his notations and the wisdom of the lessons he draws. Particularly enlightening are the many extracts he gives from confidential reports made by laymen on their work conditions and the difficulties of a Christian apostolate in their surroundings. At this point Abbé Bécaud's work escapes classification and cannot possibly be summarized. As one should expect, it reflects a particularly European (rather than specifically French) class-consciousness. Even if they are not interested in the psychological meaning of this class-consciousness, Americans would do well to ponder over its massage, which is universal: "Provided that we be loyal to our faith, we have no need to fear communism, for Christianity alone is the youth of the world" (p. 285).

GEORGE H. TAVARD

*The Meaning of the Creative Act.* By NICOLAS BERDYAEV. Translated by DONALD A. LOWRIE. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 344 pp. $4.00.

This volume, one of the earliest in the long series by the late Nicolas Berdyaev, sets forth the essence of his beliefs, even though some details were modified in his later books. These beliefs, once they are grasped, are startling in their simplicity and magnitude. They are far more influenced by such German mystical thinkers as Jakob Boehme than they are by traditional Orthodox theology, of which he often speaks with some disparagement, although he quotes extensively from some Orthodox mystics.

The germ of his thought is his belief that the individual man who is to

be worthy of the name, must be and consider himself consciously as a microcosm connected through Christ, the God-man, with the macrocosm. It is frankly a call for a new type of aristocratic thinking based upon spiritual, creative conceptions, and denying or transforming all of our modern conceptions of art, sex, society, etc., which, in his opinion, are based upon an antiquated mode of thinking, an Old Testament (God the Father) theory of justice, or a New Testament (God the Son) call to redemption, and are to be replaced by a future (God the Holy Ghost) call to creativity or an enlightened and more acute consciousness freed from earthly barriers.

These beliefs are most clearly seen in his treatment of sex, the family, and art, where his call for a spiritual union between the sexes takes the form of a development through Plato and Vladimir Solovyev to the idea of the androgyne, the ideal union of the youth-virgin as opposed to its travesty, hermaphroditism, and its denial of normal sexual life as the world understands it.

These chapters represent the strength and the weakness of Berdyaev, who never solved to his own satisfaction the relations of man and God under his own theory. As he says (p. 320):

> Diety (Eckhardt's *Gottheit* and Boehme's *Ungrund*) is deeper than God the Father, Son and Spirit. But in this world the Triune Deity, God in three persons, is coming to expression. And the whole differentiated, many-sided world is a revelation of Divinity. The Trinity is internal movement within Deity, and the dynamic of the Trinity creates the world. But formally and logically there is no possibility of creative movement in God the Absolute; if there is creative activity in God, then he is not Absolute, since something is lacking in Him, there is an incompleteness. But with equal justice we may affirm that the absence of creative movement in the Absolute would be a lack, a certain poverty of God.

Or again (p. 15):

> This slavery to "the world" is really absorption with themselves and this absorption with themselves means the loss of themselves. Freedom from "the world" is union with the true world, the cosmos. Thus to go out of oneself is to find oneself, one's true centre. And we can and we must feel ourselves real people, with a real nucleus of personality, with an authentic, not an illusory, religious will.

Such passages will show that the message of Berdyaev is especially directed against the common phenomena of the objective and tangible world and its would-be exponents. It can speak seriously only to persons who are accustomed to think in terms of abstracts or of advanced mysticism. It cannot help the ordinary mortal who is trying to live on an untransfigured planet. The translator, using an enormous philosophical vocabulary and coining many new words, has been able to express this feature of Berdyaev adequately in English, which does not so well lend itself to abstracts as the Russian.

It is good to have the book in English, but the reviewer ventures to say that few will be able to understand definitely the author's view of creativity,

the new dispensation, and its place in the order of the material and spiritual universe.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

*Christian Theology, An Ecumenical Approach.* By WALTER MARSHALL HORTON. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. xii, 304 pp. $3.75.

Professor Horton has written an extremely useful book. It is indeed a truly ecumenical introduction to theology and a truly theological introduction to the ecumenical problem, i.e., to the basic issues which the Ecumenical Movement faces today. The plan and method of Dr. Horton's work are very simple: he takes the classical themes of Christian Theology one by one —the knowledge of God, God and the World, God and Man, the Nature of God, Christ the Savior, the Church and the Means of Grace, the Christian Hope—and applies the same three questions to each one of them: (1) "what is the universal ('ecumenical') human problem which underlies this topic in theology?" (2) "what is the universal ('Ecumenical') Christian answer to this problem, so far as the Christian Churches and schools of thought are now agreed?" (3) "what are the principal disagreements and conflicts which obscure the clarity of the Christian answer to this particular problem?."

The answers include the main Christian confessions (from Roman Catholicism to the radical Free Churches) as well as the most important and representative of the contemporary "schools of thought." In presenting these answers Dr. Horton achieves a remarkable degree of objectivity and such respect for positions obviously different from his own, as to make his work an ecumenical achievement in itself. The clarity and simplicity of this book, the unique gift of Dr. Horton for distinction of the essential from the secondary, his masterly presentation of the *main* lines—all this concurs to make it much more than a manual; it is a real instrument for all those involved in the ecumenical activity.

It is well known that the Ecumenical Movement has, paradoxically enough, produced a real revival of "confessionalism," i.e., a new interest in each denomination for its *sources,* and a desire to return to them. It is certainly a positive fact, for it gives the ecumenical encounter its real theological depth. Yet in order to be "ecumenical" and not "sectarian," this confessionalism, this fresh study of sources and traditions must necessarily be undertaken against a realistic knowledge of the contemporary theological situation in its general, ecumenical dimensions. It is this need that the book of Dr. Horton meets, and we must be thankful to him for the way he wrote it.

On many particular points one would like to have more detailed analysis. To give but one example, the very deep differences in the whole understanding of Mariology between the Roman Church and the Eastern Orthodox is not given a sufficient emphasis. But, of course, the size of the book

made it impossible for Dr. Horton to give us more than an inspiring introductory study, a guiding principle. The large section devoted to bibliography, references, and questions will allow everyone to continue the study which the book has so well introduced.

ALEXANDER SCHMEMANN

St. Valdimir's Seminary
New York City

*Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion.* Edited by DANIEL J. BRONSTEIN and HAROLD M. SCHULWEIS. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954. ix, 532 pp. $5.75.

This book was published to meet "the need for a collection of stimulating readings on the basic issues of the philosophy of religion." Whether this statement has any real practical meaning will depend on what aspects, what emphases, perspectives, and implications of the "basic issues" are stressed. If one wishes a book for a course grounded primarily in scope and variety, designed to fit a focus concerned with an explorative and inquiring survey of diverse viewpoints, then this collection is excellent. On the other hand, one who wishes a book for a course whose focus is more sharply defined and concentrated will find this collection too diverse and varied. The writings are stimulating and, on the whole, the range as well as the intrinsic character of the selections are noteworthy.

The collection is divided into six chapters dealing respectively with the nature of religion, the existence of God, God and evil, God and human freedom, Church and state, and immortality. The chapter on "What is Religion" is balanced, diverse, and contemporary. There are, for example, selections from Kierkegaard, Niebuhr, Pascal, Fromm, A. J. Ayer, etc. The section on the existence of God comprises traditional classical material from Anselm, Aquinas, and Hume. There is a selection from J. S. Mill's little read, but balanced work, *Theism.* Feuerbach, Sorley, James, and Huxley are also represented. It is unfortunate that material from Tillich was not included. His view that it is "as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as it is to deny it" would certainly add flavor to the collection. The material on "God and Evil" covers the "intellectual" possibilities adequately: the idea of the finite God, evil as unreal, evil as a challenging and educating power, and evil as privation. In this selection, Mill, Augustine, Spinoza, Maimonides, Tennant, and Royce, find representation. The chapter on "Church and State" is contemporary and adequate, though some may feel that certain "classical" works were neglected, e.g., Dante. The chapters on "God and Human Freedom" and "Immortality" are the weakest of all. The selections are primarily determined and limited by a context of ideas and approaches which have been, in many respects, by-passed by contemporary biblical realism. This limitation may seriously hinder the acceptance and

use of this material by those under the influence of biblical perspectives in contemporary philosophy of religion. Certainly such writers as Brunner, Tillich, and Berdyaev should be represented. And it is inadequate to limit Roman Catholic representation to Augustine when dealing with God and human freedom.

In general, this is an excellent collection and, on the whole, it will fill a real need for an introductory collection of readings for a broad, explorative type of survey course.

FRANK F. WEKERLE

*Marriage and Society*. By E. O. JAMES. New York: John de Graff, Inc., 1955. xiv, 215 pp. $3.75.

First published in England in 1952 in Hutchinson's University Library, *Marriage and Society* has been reissued in the United States. Disturbed by the present uncertainty pertaining to marriage, family life, and sexual morality, the eminent British historian, anthropologist, and theologian begins with a synopsis of marriage and its associated regulations. He asserts that there is no knowledge of absolute promiscuity even at the beginning of social organization; the helplessness of the infant at birth and his slow maturation presuppose a permanent family unit. He discusses marriage in hunting, agricultural, pastoral, and urban society with their differing conceptions of home-making, social organization, division of labor, and regulations to make the family group a harmonious, co-operative unity.

Dr. James then moves toward a philosophic, ethical, and theological evaluation in terms of Christianity, discussing contemporary problems such as artificial insemination and birth control. He shows that historically monogamy is the prevailing and recurrent form of marriage, despite the prevalence of polygamy and concubinage, and ought to be for the sake of man's personal dignity. He advocates the re-creation of the domestic tradition in family life, the mother as the consolidating center, and an emphasis upon the permanence of marriage as a moral imperative not only for the contracting parties but for society.

The author is quite lucid in his expression as always and has given a helpful survey. His theology of the marriage relationship, however, is not equal to that of D. S. Bailey's *The Mystery of Love and Marriage*. As a member of a commission dealing with marriage, the author knows that a major problem, both from the standpoint of church and society, is legislation pertaining to marriage, including divorce. He gives few cues to the sort of legislation which would do justice to the marriage which has failed as a functioning relationship. He discusses Canon Law in detail, but the prevalence of asceticism, patriarchal family structure, and other factors in the long history no longer prevalent invalidate the legislation of the past as an apt guide to the present. The problem remains as to how to emphasize the

permanence of marriage as an ideal while respecting the dignity of individuals involved in unions which are destructive to those involved; whether to doom to celibacy those whose marriages no longer function or permit them another opportunity to share the experiences of marriage.

LEE A. BELFORD

*Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud.* By HERBERT MARCUSE. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1955. xii, 277 pp. $3.95.

The author of this book is a professor of political science at Brandeis University, research associate of the Institute of Social Research of New York and Frankfurt-am-Main, and author of, among other works, "Reason and Revolution." In his attempt to reassess aspects of Freud's theories Marcuse "employs psychological categories because they have become political categories." To at least one reader this thesis seemed dubious at the outset and remained unconvincing at the conclusion.

Even those who might find some of Marcuse's ideas suggestive and stimulating may well regret an awkward style and air of pretentiousness which limit the value of his writing. He himself remarks that his own lack of competence restricts his authority in discussing the therapeutic merits of the revisionist Freudians. Perhaps this contributes to a sense of dealing with an "obscurantist pseudo-mythology"—to apply to Marcuse a phrase which he uses in describing the writings of Carl Jung.

Readers of *The Review of Religion* may be especially interested in Marcuse's re-evaluation of Freud's treatment of religious development in *The Future of an Illusion:*

> Perhaps no other writing shows Freud closer to the great tradition of Enlightenment; but also no other shows him more clearly succumbing to the dialectic of Enlightenment. In the present period of civilization, the progressive ideas of rationalism can be recaptured only when they are reformulated. The function of science and of religion has changed—as has their interrelation. Within the total mobilization of man and nature which marks the period, science is one of the most destructive instruments—destructive of that freedom from fear which it once promised. As this promise evaporated into utopia, "scientific" becomes almost identical with denouncing the notion of an earthly paradise. The scientific attitude has long since ceased to be the militant antagonist of religion, which has equally effectively discarded its explosive elements and often accustomed man to a good conscience in the face of suffering and guilt. In the household of culture, the functions of science and religion tend to become complementary; through their present usage, they both deny the hopes which they once aroused and teach men to appreciate the facts in a world of alienation. In this sense, religion is no longer an illusion, and its academic promotion falls in line with the predominant positivistic trend. Where religion still preserves the uncompromised aspirations for peace and happiness, its "illusions" still have a higher truth value than science

which works for their elimination. The repressed and transfigured content of religion cannot be liberated by surrendering it to the scientific attitude.

This lengthy quotation is submitted in part as evidence in support of the reviewer's criticisms.

JAMES GUTMANN

*Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis.* By WILLIAM GRAHAM COLE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. xiv, 329 pp. $4.00.

This is a courageous, scholarly and readable work by the Chairman of the Department of Religion at Williams College. About two thirds of this book is a study of historical theology. Beginning with Jesus and Paul, the interpretations of sex as found in the writings of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, contemporary Catholicism and Protestantism are reviewed. Contemporary Protestantism is represented by Leslie Weatherhead, Otto Piper, Emil Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr. It is both refreshing and sobering to read this section, as one sees how the Christian interpretation of sex has been a curious mixture of sound insights and neurotic defenses. Not that the author makes this interpretation, for he simply presents the material for the judgment of the reader. For example, while we could not accept Luther's views on sex completely, it is encouraging to find that he does not place a premium in the name of morality or of Christianity on the neurotic manifestations of frigidity and impotence at the expense of healthy sexual needs. One finds much evidence in these pages for the insight that theological interpretations of such a dynamic and pervasive force as sex may be tainted (to put it mildly) with the theologian's own experience of sexual feelings with the accompanying anxiety and guilt. When we really learn this we will place a higher value on the achievement of mature Christian sexual experience than on a given theological interpretation of sex!

The second section deals with the psychoanalytic view of sex, as found first in Freud and then in those analysts who have modified some of Freud's interpretation. In this, as in the previous section, the author has achieved an amazing objectivity and fairness in presentation. Its reading will correct many false impressions about what psychoanalysis says about sex, and will help the theologian to become aware of the biological and cultural facts of sex which are very pertinent to any theological view, and which indeed, cry out for an adequate theological interpretation.

The third and shortest section is the author's attempt to reconstruct a Christian interpretation of sex. The meaning of the facts of sex is to be found only in a perspective of the meaning of the whole of life, and the Christian faith offers the most adequate synoptic view. The meaning of sex is then examined in the light of the Christian doctrines of creation, of original sin, and of redemption. This is followed by a few comments on issues such as sex education and the role of women. The author has no cut and

dried answer to the problem of sex, but his psychological and theological orientation combine to lead him to conclude that the final solution of sex problems lies in the development of persons who are capable of directing their sexual feelings through mature Christian love which requires a profound respect for the sexual partner.

This book has distinctive values for the layman, the pastoral counselor, the preacher, and the Christian scholar. Its scholarship is expressed in language which is vivid and clear. The honesty with which the meaning of sex is faced, and the fairness with which the various interpretations are presented is refreshing. The manner in which Christian and psychoanalytic thinking is placed side by side is stimulating. It is to be hoped that the book falls into the hands of many readers with each orientation who can match the author's courage and honesty. But this may be hoping for too much!

CARROLL A. WISE

*Anxiety and Faith.* By CHARLES R. STINNETTE, JR. Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1955. ix, 209 pp. $3.50.

The children of some modern hypochondriacs use the terms "allergy," "shot," and the like, before they are five, and throughout the lives of those whose early education begins with indoctrination in the jargon of their psychology-crazed elders, neither the concepts of Christianity nor any others are easily grasped till these have been first well soaked in modern psychology. The question is whether this ritual really helps. In *Anxiety and Faith,* Dr. Stinnette addresses himself to the laudable task of providing yet another book of Christian intent and psychological flavor to meet the need of the many for whom the jargon is the mainspring of an otherwise limited vocabulary.

The difficulty of translating the New Testament into American Freudese should not, however, be underestimated. "Anxiety" is, in the opinion of the present reviewer, a misleading rendering of Kierkegaard's *Angest,* the anguish of the soul caught in God's searchlight. Nor is "security" a satisfactory translation of the Hebrew *shalom,* let alone the *eirene tou Kyriou.* The relation of such ideas to each other is, of course, as legitimate a subject for inquiry as the relation between *agape* and *eros.* Dr. Stinnette is not unaware of the difficulties. Nevertheless, even in his passage "Some Distinctions" there are signs of a confusion that is certainly due to no lack of Christian conviction, for the author exhibits this well enough, but, rather, to his having fallen too completely under the psychologists' spell, which seems to work with peculiar efficacy when it is woven on the clergy.

But there is much of interest in the book. Dr. Stinnette is aware that the present age needs a Christian doctrine of man even more urgently than it needs a Christian doctrine of God. One chapter raises this question. It is to

be wondered how many members of the human race would qualify as claimants to the title "man" that we so casually bestow on ourselves. Is a feeling of anxiety sufficient? It was not so in Cicero's day.

The author is in deadly earnest about *unam sanctam*. In the Eucharist, man "is at one not only within himself, but with angels and archangels" and the various other ranks of the celestial hierarchy mentioned in the Preface of the Mass. True, communion with God is not arranged on a network of private telephone lines to Zion; but the author, despite the Buberian passages that are evidently compulsory for writers of books on religion these days, may be in danger of overlooking the role of solitude in religion. Religion may not be quite, as Whitehead once defined it, "what a man does with his solitariness," but learning how to be creative in solitude is surely an important aspect of the spiritual life. The author's thesis, stated in the preface of his book, is that "Man alone cannot resolve anxiety. . . . He needs community. . . . But community comes as a gift of God." It also enables men to discover themselves when saying their prayers, and such discovery takes place in what is traditionally called solitude, which is the only safeguard against loneliness.

In a chapter entitled "In the World . . . Anxiety," we are warned that "The individual who carries 'anxious dread' as the 'gnawing secret' of his life is unlikely to seek the help of a psychiatrist. What is more, he will not come to grips with the ultimate meaning of his life." It is the hope of the present reviewer that seeking the help of a psychiatrist is not an indispensable condition of entrance into the Kingdom, for not only has he never consulted one; he intends to persevere in this neglect *usque ad mortem*.

Dr. Stinnette's book is readable, and enriched by apposite quotations. It should be helpful to its public.

GEDDES MACGREGOR

*Law and Covenant in Israel and the Ancient Near East*. By GEORGE E. MENDENHALL. Pittsburgh, Pa.: The Biblical Colloquium, 1955, 50 pp. 13 illustrations. $1.00.

This study, reprinted from two issues of *The Biblical Archaeologist* (May and September, 1954), consists of two parts: I. Ancient Oriental and Biblical Law; and II. Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition. It illustrates well the great value of such comparative methods in scholarship.

*A Study of the Language of the Biblical Psalms*. By MATITIAHU TSEVAT. Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1955. viii, 153 pp. $1.50.

This work, the revised form of a doctoral dissertation at Hebrew Union College, is published as Volume IX in the Journal of Biblical Literature

Monograph Series. Of this highly technical linguistical study, the author states that it is not concerned with higher criticism and "has no primary aim beyond itself. The object is a description of the idiom of the psalms as against the whole of classical Hebrew." But, the author continues, "whatever I may be able to say about the language of the psalms is a contribution to our better understanding of the literary species of psalmic literature, of its basic means of expression, of the role of the pattern in it, and of its place in the history of the civilization of Israel."

*The Interpreter's Bible.* Vol. IV: The Book of Psalms; The Book of Proverbs. New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1955. ix, 957 pp. $8.75.

This monumental commentary on the Holy Scriptures, in twelve volumes, is being published under a distinguished editorial board, composed of George Arthur Buttrick, Walter Russell Bowie, John Knox, Paul Scherer, Samuel Terrien, and Nolan B. Harmon. Each book is treated under four headings: Introduction, Text, Exegesis, and Exposition. In the present volume the Book of Psalms is discussed by W. Stewart McCullough, William R. Taylor, J. R. P. Sclater, Edwin McNeill Poteat, and Frank H. Ballard; the Book of Proverbs, by Charles T. Fritsch and Rolland Schloerb. The map of Palestine (p. 2) is useful for setting the stage, so to speak, for the Psalms, thus making them more intelligible and more vivid.

*Essays on Old Testament Literature.* By B. Davie Napier. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. xxii, 223 pp. $3.00.

In spite of the "tearing apart" of the Old Testament by the higher criticism, the author believes that there is an underlying unity, namely, the theme of faith. "From myth to law, Old Testament literature deals centrally with the same concepts of faith, such concepts as Creation, Sin, Judgment, Covenant and Redemption." In his Introduction, he discusses trends in interpretation, past and present, and its nature and technique. The types of literature selected for discussion appear in the chapter headings: I. Myth; II. Legend; III. History; IV. Prophecy; and V. Law. "As different from one another as are these varied literary types, *as literature,* they are remarkably unified in the common history and faith of the community of Israel."

*The Gospel of Matthew.* Edited by Frederick C. Grant. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 69 and 61 pp. $1.50.

These two small volumes are issued in Harper's Annotated Bible Series, intended for the use of pastors and teachers. In his Introduction, Professor Grant gives us the best in modern scholarship concerning the Gospel's origin

and background. The running commentary printed beneath the text begins with an illuminating discussion of the genealogy of Jesus and the birth stories as related to the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. The commentary on the controversial text in Ch. 16 concerning the commission to Peter is interesting, though not wholly convincing as a refutation of Peter's claim to primacy as the Rock on which the Church is founded.

*Personal Experience and the Historic Faith.* By A. Victor Murray. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 304 pp. $3.75.

This is a new edition of a book by an eminent English educator, the President of Cheshunt College, Cambridge, which first appeared in 1939 and has long since proved its usefulness in the field of religious education. In the Preface, the author states the "cardinal question of the Christian faith" as "How can a fact in history become an object of contemporary experience?" The book is an answer to that crucial question.

*Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge.* Edited by Lefferts A. Loetscher. 2 vols. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1955. xx, 1205 pp. $15.90.

This work bears as its sub-title the following: An Extension of the *New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge,* and it has been prepared for the purpose of adding the first half of the twentieth century to that great encyclopedia. Working under the Editor-in-Chief, Professor Loetscher, of Princeton, was a distinguished staff consisting of Elmer E. Flack (Old Testament), Bruce M. Metzger (New Testament), William A. Mueller (Ancient Church), Albert Hyma (Medieval and Reformation Church), Theodore G. Tappert (Post-Reformation Church), Raymond W. Albright (Contemporary Biography), Edwin E. Calverley (Comparative Religion), Andrew K. Rule (Systematic Theology), Andrew W. Blackwood (Practical Theology), and George A. Barrois (Ecclesiastical Terminology). In the Preface, the Editors state that "Biblical archaeology, texts and versions, languages, criticism, history, exegesis, and theology are treated in the light of the most recent scholarship." The work should be a welcome addition to all libraries, and will be greatly appreciated by students of religion.

*Mark's Witness to Jesus Christ.* By Eduard Lohse. New York: Association Press, 1955. 93 pp. $1.25.

*The Christians' God.* By Stephen C. Neill. New York: Association Press, 1955. 90 pp. $1.25.

*Christian Giving.* By V. S. Azariah. New York: Association Press, 1955. 96 pp. $1.25.

*Christianity and Science.* By Charles E. Raven. New York: Association Press, 1955. 96 pp. $1.25.

In his introduction to this series of small books published under the general title, *World Christian Books,* Bishop Stephen Neill, the General Editor, says: "Today it is not enough to believe; it is necessary also to understand. From every part of the world comes the demand for books that will help the Christian to understand his faith, to find the answers to the questions that he and other men are asking, and to know how to present the faith to others." The present series is intended to meet that demand. The authors chosen for these first volumes represent a wide variety of interests and experience. Dr. Eduard Lohse, of Johannes-Gutenberg University, Mainz, is one of the younger German scholars in the New Testament field. Bishop Neill himself has had a varied career, including twenty years in South India as missionary, teacher, and bishop, two years as chaplain and lecturer at Cambridge, and four years with the World Council of Churches, Bishop Azariah served as YMCA secretary in India for ten years and, at thirty-eight, became the first native Indian bishop of an Anglican Church. Canon Raven has had a distinguished career in both church and university and, as both theologian and scientist, is eminently fitted to deal with the problem of the conflict of science and religion.

*Rediscovering Prayer.* By John L. Casteel. New York: Association Press, 1955. xiii, 242 pp. $3.50.

This study of prayer by a professor of theology is unusual and refreshing for several reasons: first, it avoids sentimentality and is written with commendable reserve; second, it deals with prayer from the purely religious viewpoint, without benefit of "depth psychology," with its almost inevitable reductionistic tendencies; and third, it avoids altogether the latest religious fad of "Peelism," which applies the techniques of magic in utilizing God as an instrument for achieving worldly success and material benefits. Its emphasis is primarily on the mystical aspect of prayer as communion with God.

*Holiness Is Wholeness.* By Josef Goldbrunner. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955. 63 pp. $1.75.

This unusual book is by a Catholic priest who is both theologian and practical psychologist, and one of the foremost European exponents of the psychology of C. G. Jung, which avoids the reductionism of other types of depth psychology. Dr. Goldbrunner uses no technical Jungian terminology, but the following statement brings to mind forcibly Jung's "principle of integration":

"To live a spiritually healthy life one must find one's own truth and to find one's own truth the natural soul must be laid bare; one must consciously come to terms with the irrational forces within oneself, incorporating them into the total life of the soul, but never allowing them a perfectly free rein. The problem is to build the natural sphere harmoniously into the total human personality" (p. 31). He is unsparingly critical of the traditional Christian view of the dualism of body and soul, and especially of his own Church's overemphasis on asceticism. He quotes Francis Thompson approvingly when he calls "the blind tyranny of the spirit against all flesh" a "murderous struggle." In so brief a review, it is not possible to do justice to this remarkable book.

*No Man Is an Island.* By THOMAS MERTON. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1955. xxiii, 264 pp. $3.95.

This book by a Trappist monk quite naturally depicts the spiritual life in traditional Catholic terms, but it is more mature and less perfervid than his earlier works. He sees the dangers of asceticism, as well as its glories. "If my soul silences my flesh by an act of violence, my flesh will take revenge on the soul, secretly infecting it with a spirit of revenge. Bitterness and bad temper are the flowers of an asceticism that has punished only the body." And, further, "It is supreme humility to see that ordinary life, embraced with perfect faith, can be more saintly and supernatural than a spectacular ascetical career." In his chapter on Vocation the author reveals his new insights, especially in his analysis of St. Francis as being "beyond vocation," unworried by "comparisons between the active and contemplative lives."

*Le Mal et l'existence.* By LUCIEN JERPHAGNON. Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1955. 155 pp. 330 fr.

In this compassionate consideration of the eternal "problem of evil," a professor of philosophy undertakes a new approach. He begins with a survey of contemporary French literature, with quotations from the works of De Lubac, Lavelle, Sartre, Camus, Nedoncelle, Marcel, and others, to ascertain the way the problem presents itself to this generation, with somewhat devastating results. He finds that the tendency of contemporary French thought is to elevate evil into a kind of God, that is, to revert to Manicheism, which "explains everything, and very clearly," but does not solve the fundamental problem of the origin of evil. In fact, there *is* no rational explanation. Evil has been degraded into a "problem" by the philosophers; for the religious, it is simply a "mystery." But the great mystery of all is existence itself.

*Civilisation or Chaos?* By I. H. Conybeare. London: Markham House Press, Ltd., 1955. 252 pp.

The subtitle, "A Study of the Present World Crisis in the Light of Eastern Metaphysics," places the author in the increasing number of Westerners who have despaired of Western science and philosophy as means of understanding existence, and have gone over to the "wisdom of the East." "At last, after many years, I came to a Silent Haven, to discover that All-Knowledge was within myself! But that IT could only be revealed through the grace of a God-Realised Master!" (in this case, Meher Baba, the founder of a new sect in India). The book is, in fact, an exposition of the Baba's teaching. The author gives a brief account of his development from a schizophrenic boy, suffering from long lapses of consciousness, into the state of a Perfect Master, head of a sect of many hundreds of adherents. From a psychological viewpoint the chapter on the "masts," the insane or "God-intoxicated" holy men, is most interesting, but somewhat disgusting reading. These filthy, diseased creatures are described as "human dynamos, of what can only be called 'God-essence'." There is much in this book which is simply incomprehensible to a rational Western mind.

*Religion and the Moral Life.* By A. Campbell Garnett. New York: The Ronald Press, 1955. viii, 223 pp. $3.50.

In this work Professor Garnett upholds the necessity for a religious faith in a personal God for the fulfillment of a moral life, though he admits that "man's insight into the essential nature of his duty is independent of his theological beliefs." Secular or humanistic philosophies are not enough. He holds that the "distinctive element in religion is not that of belief, but of attitude, the attitude of devotion to something other than the self," and "supremely worthy of devotion." The choice of such an object of devotion implies moral judgment. In developing his thesis the author discusses "Morality without Religion," "The Faith of Humanism," "The Faith of Theism," etc. In two sections, on punitive theology and legalistic ethics, he criticizes sharply the traditional doctrine of the Atonement for "its tendency to introvert the personality, thus defeating the wholesome extroverting tendency of faith and love." He finds Kierkegaard to be the most tragic example of this blight. What Professor Garnett offers is religion for the "healthy minded."

*The Moral Decision.* By Edmond Cahn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. 342 pp. $5.00.

The subtitle of this book, "Right and Wrong in the Light of American Law," reveals its concrete and practical character. The author, himself a practicing lawyer, asks, "What moral guides can be found in American law?" He

finds the law to be "a rich repository of moral knowledge which is continually reworked, revised, and refined," distilled from the long experience of our courts. As a method, he uses statements of real cases, summarized from the reports, and then discussed from the viewpoint of the human drama which has produced the crisis. Like the reports of case histories in psychoanalytic works, these brief statements are extraordinarily moving scenes in the "human comedy." They are grouped under the following headings: "The First of Life," "Sexual Relationships," "The Conduct of Business," "Business with Government," "The Enlargement of Personality," "The Last of Life." The author's comments are admirable for their balanced common-sense, as well as for their warmth of human feeling and compassion. In short, it is a very inspiring book!

*Milarepa ou Jetsun-Kahbum.* Edited by W. Y. Evans-Wentz. French translation by Roland Ryser. Paris: Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1955. 363 pp. $5.45.

This is a complete translation into French of the English edition of 1928, edited by Evans-Wentz, and translated from the Tibetan by Lama Kazi Dawa Samdup, with all the notes and commentaries. In his preface, M. Ryser says, "In opposition to our materialistic conception of life, the Buddhist ascetic of the eleventh century affirms a spirituality which overwhelms and surpasses us. . . . That this ideal of Light and this marvellous pursuit of the divine may become also for us Occidentals another reason for living, such is the earnest desire of the French translator." The book is enriched by a frontispiece in color and six other illustrations.

*Egypt's Liberation.* By Gamal Abdul Nasser. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. 119 pp. $2.00.

The subtitle, "The Philosophy of the Revolution," reveals Premier Nasser as a thoughtful man striving to understand his own role in history. He says, "these thoughts are an effort to explore ourselves." In her Introduction to the book, Dorothy Thompson pays high tribute to the author: "Abdul Nasser reveals himself as a patriot idealist animated, initially, by too naive a faith in his people," and he himself describes his disillusionment in poignant words: "dissension, chaos, vindictiveness and selfishness were unleashed at the very first moments. . . . I said, and I shall continue to say, that that was the greatest shock of my life." By degrees he came to understand that Egypt is the product of her past, and that she cannot be changed overnight. "We live in a society that has not yet taken form."

*The Beginnings of Quakerism.* By WILLIAM C. BRAITHWAITE. (2nd ed.) Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. xxviii, 607 pp. $4.75.

This new edition of a standard work on early Quakerism (first published in 1912) has been thoroughly revised by Henry J. Cadbury, and it is to be followed by a new edition of the companion work, *The Second Period of Quakerism.* In his Foreword, L. Hugh Doncaster says: "Much has happened since it was written. Scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have been at work, and much new material is now available. Emphases have been changed and fresh facts have emerged." It has been Professor Cadbury's important task to make the necessary textual revisions and add the footnotes necessary to bring the work up to date. Needless to say, the task has been performed with the skill of mature scholarship in the field of Quaker history.

*Billy Sunday Was His Real Name.* By WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, JR. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1955. xxix, 324 pp. $5.50.

This is not a biography in the strict sense of the word; it is, in the author's words, a book "about Billy Sunday, but it is also about the revival tradition in which he worked and the era in which he lived. It is necessary at the outset to distinguish between these three elements—the man, the tradition, and the temper of the times. . . ." It is a sociological study of the American culture of the period as a matrix for this phenomenon of revivalism of a unique kind, organized to the n'th degree as "big business for the Lord," with such backers as John D. Rockefeller, Jr., John Wanamaker, John M. Studebaker, Henry Clay Frick, to name only a few of the millionaires behind him. And, by 1920, Sunday himself was rated at a million and a half. It is hardly surprising that he attacked the Social Gospel as "sacrilegious, un-American quackery." In Chapter 5, "The Calliope of Zion," the author gives a vivid description of Sunday's flamboyant methods and platform antics. Truly, we shall not look upon his like again—let us hope!

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